End of the post-Cold War era

[Prime Junta]

I don't know if anyone noticed, but the post-Cold War era just ended.

Specifically, Russia suspended its application of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

When the Cold War ended, three major treaties defined the military relations between the Great Powers: START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty), and CFE. (There's also the ABM, but that's a bit different.)

Of these, START and INF didn't have that much of a practical effect, although symbolically they're certainly significant. They still left all participants with hair-trigger nuclear arsenals big enough to devastate the planet several times over, so they didn't really change much.

CFE was different. Pre-CFE, the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces were pretty much facing off in attack formation at the Fulda gap: it would have been a matter of days to get the tanks rolling. This was also the raison d'être of tactical and intermediate-range nukes in Europe -- since NATO couldn't match Russia in ground force numbers, it countered with a tacnuke arsenal.

What CFE did was pull back the forces to a "peacetime configuration" and, most importantly, put in a strict regimen of transparency, reporting, and inspections. This made it impossible for either side to initiate a surprise attack. Since a nuclear first strike doesn't make much sense without a conventional-forces attack to go with it, this treaty alone did more to reduce the risk of nuclear war than anything before or since.

And now it's pretty much dead in the water, but nobody seems to care. Which, I believe, is the major problem -- ironically, Russia seems to be the only country where the CFE is a high diplomatic priority. They suspended it because most NATO countries have not ratified an updated version of it. NATO countries have refused to ratify it because Russia has troops stationed in Abkhazia, and Russia won't back down from that.

I'm pretty sure that if the diplomatic will was there, some sort of compromise could be reached over Abkhazia. But it isn't.

So, essentially, we're going back to the Cold War way of doing things because of... Abkhazia. Wonderful, eh?

[magerette]

Aside from the embarrassment of not knowing WTH Abkhazia is, I have to say I don't find this too surprising. The chest-thumping and national fervor going on right now reminds me very strongly of the types of events I remember from that period. It seems obvious that Putin is invested heavily in an aggressive return to Russia as a world power, and that interferes with the balance of things in ways that I'm sure alarm his closer neighbors as much as they are minimized by soft-pedaling in our US national news.

Not that a lot of facts haven't been reported(though I certainly don't remember hearing about this one,) just that no one really seems to want to look at them very closely. Iraq is a big distraction here, as is the media circus surrounding the upcoming presidential election, and world affairs take a low priority as an entertainment factor. As the little snip I posted about Kosovo also shows, Russia seems to be initiating pretty much any stance that will divide and weaken local consensus while strengthening their own position locally and/or globally. As you say, Cold War tactics and a very ugly way to begin the next decade of the millennium.

[Prime Junta]

Aside from the embarrassment of not know WTH Abkhazia is,

No need to feel embarrassed. You're in good company.

In a very small nutshell, Abkhazia is a part of the Republic of Georgia in the Caucasus mountains, which is ethnically mostly Russian. Most Abkhazian Russians even have Russian passports, and Pootie clearly feels that the border could do with a little shiftin'. There were some minor wars fought, and as a result some Russian soldiers are camped there too. Naturally the Georgians aren't having any of it, and what with their current Prez being very closely tied to Washington, we have a fine diplomatic mess on our hands.

But that's really beside the point; the point being that in the big scale of things Abkhazia really isn't that important, and if there was a will to solve it, it could certainly be solved. My apologies to any Georgians and Abkhazians who would certainly feel differently, but there you have it.

I have to say I don't find this too surprising. The chest-thumping and national fervor going on right now reminds me very strongly of the types of events I remember from that period. It seems obvious that Putin is invested heavily in an aggressive return to Russia as a world power, and that interferes with the balance of things in ways that I'm sure alarm his closer neighbors as much as they are minimized by soft-pedaling in our US national news.

There is that; Russia clearly considers itself the protector of the ethnic Russian minorities in former Soviet republics -- and its protection can be, um, heavy-handed at times. However, I have to say that the West hasn't really done a damn thing about some of Russia's entirely legitimate concerns. Take the Baltic states, for example -- they're NATO and EU members now, they treat their Russian minorities pret-ty shamefully, and Brussels/NATO hasn't so much as raised a peep.

(And yeah, I know, they didn't end up with these minorities because they invited them in, but neither is it the Russians' fault for being transferred or born there. There are certain standards we should adhere to, and many post-Soviet states aren't doing it -- and nobody even notices, other than Russia of course.)

Not that a lot of facts haven't been reported(though I certainly don't remember hearing about this one,) just that no one really seems to want to look at them very closely. Iraq is a big distraction here, as is the media circus surrounding the upcoming presidential election, and world affairs take a low priority as an entertainment factor. As the little snip I posted about Kosovo also shows, Russia seems to be initiating pretty much any stance that will divide and weaken local consensus while strengthening their own position locally and/or globally. As you say, Cold War tactics and a very ugly way to begin the next decade of the millennium.

Chess is the Russian national sport, and Putin is pretty good at it. He's also a black belt judoka. Both games/sports involve turning your opponent's actions against him. He's not someone you want as an enemy.

However, neither is he a megalomaniac loon out to take over the world. He has tried engaging with the West -- for example, post 9/11 he actively helped the US war effort in Afghanistan. What did he get? A few months of adulation followed by what he would see as a total betrayal. So he went back to chess and judo, and here we are.

What really bugs me about the situation is how entirely avoidable it was. Surely there's some better solution than having the tanks facing off at the Fulda gap again?

[magerette]

Prime J wrote:
But that's really beside the point; the point being that in the big scale of things Abkhazia really isn't that important, and if there was a will to solve it, it could certainly be solved. My apologies to any Georgians and Abkhazians who would certainly feel differently, but there you have it.

Why am I inexorably reminded of the assassination of the Arch Duke Ferdinand?

Chess is the Russian national sport, and Putin is pretty good at it. He's also a black belt judoka. Both games/sports involve turning your opponent's actions against him. He's not someone you want as an enemy.

Yes, he has dangerous eyes. But he also appears to be both strong and intelligent, and I imagine there may be a volume or two of Machiavelli and Sun Tzu in his collection as well.

What really bugs me about the situation is how entirely avoidable it was. Surely there's some better solution than having the tanks facing off at the Fulda gap again?

World peace, justice and balance are things private people yearn for, but not I think governments. It doesn't appear to be in the nature of those who hold or desire to hold power to be able to resist applying it, let alone relinquish it to a greater good, and sometimes not even to their own best interests. I'm far from a historical buff or political scholar, but it often seems to me the closest we ever get to peace and accord is the acknowledged relative equality to destroy each other between the powers that be.

So while I'm sure that there's a better solution than bringing back the tanks, the question is how do you get there? Condoleeza Rice got a somewhat arctic reception on her last foray as Bush's pc diplomatic errand girl (a few months back-the reason for her trip to Moscow escapes me, but I have a vivid memory-photo of her sitting at a long table listening to what appeared to be the Russian version of the good ol boy network talk her down, with a non-plussed and lost look on her face) For no doubt many reasons, it would seem the US is (self?)cast in the role of the force to be resisted in any diplomatic endeavors. You point out the NATO countries are also not as yet bringing anything to the table. Who's going to be the big dog that draws the line and urges enforcing the treaty if it's participants don't ratify it?

One would think there would be something the U.N. could do. My neo-con friends have a poor view of it, but I 'm a political as well as spiritual agnostic, so to me it's a solution that ought to work in disputes between countries.

[Zaleukos]

I think that this would have gotten more attention if it had been more sudden. But Putin has stated that Russia would pull out of the CFE (in response to the central European missile shield that he considers a threat to Russian security) for years, and the actual decision to pull out was made by the Russian parliament at the beginning of this year AFAIK. This is in some sense just the final signing of a document that has been around, and has been known, for a long time.

PJ, since you are well read on the subject you might have an idea of the answer to an issue that has bugged me. Is the missile shield really near the trajectory of Russian missiles going anywhere but western Europe? I had this conception that their ICBMs either are submarine launched, or in the land based case will fly across the polar cap, making the shield pretty useless against them (unless the targets are in Europe), but I dont have any hard facts to back up that assertion.

[Prime Junta]

Oh, the missile shield.

First off, it doesn't work. Not yet, and it's not certain whether it'll ever work -- hitting an ICBM is extremely difficult; hitting more than one at a time is even harder than that, and hitting a big swarm that also deploys decoys is harder by orders of magnitude. And, of course, Russia has a big bunch of technology that bypasses any such shield altogether -- sub-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, sub-launched ballistics, and, hell, supercavitating torpedoes.

That out of the way, the only missiles the shield could counter (if it worked) would be intermediate-range ballistic missiles launched from one specific region in Russia against Western Europe.

However, it doesn't do a damn thing about the genuine or even conceivable missile threats currently on the table; in order of decreasing likelihood, a Chinese attack on Taiwan, a North Korean attack on the US over the Pacific Ocean, or an Iranian attack on Israel. (FWIW I don't think any of these are particularly likely.)

In other words, the whole thing just doesn't make any sense. The way I see it, this is pretty much a re-labeled SDI -- "Star Wars" -- which is essentially a very efficient way to funnel tax dollars to the defense establishment without demanding too much in return.

Finally, your question about the layout of Russian nuclear forces. In a nutshell, it's very much like the American nuclear capability: it consists of a fairly limited range of warheads, a very wide range of delivery mechanisms, and massive over-capacity predicated on the idea that even if a surprise first-strike knocks out 90% of the capacity, the remaining 10% will be enough to destroy the attacker.

Of course, both the US and Russia operate a pretty wide variety of delivery platforms for their nukes -- apart from ICBM's (about 500 missiles with about 2000 warheads total on each side), they have the naval forces (about a dozen submarines, plus missile cruisers, aircraft carriers, with about another 2000 warheads), and strategic bombers carrying cruise missiles (about 80 aircraft on each side, with about 900 warheads). No conceivable missile shield could effectively counter an attack by either side.

All of these are still on hair-trigger alert, by the way, especially the ICBM's. So even today we're one order and 30 minutes away from total annihilation. Funky, eh?

So, *in theory,* an anti-ballistic-missile weapon *might* be able to counter a handful of missiles launched from a "rogue state." The missile shield as it's currently planned would be between Iran and Western Europe, but even if Iran suddenly managed to increase the range of its rockets fivefold and develop an arsenal of deployable nuclear warheads, I just can't think of any conceivable reason it would want to nuke Paris or London. Tel Aviv just maybe, but that missile shield should be put in Syria and I don't think the Good Doctor of Damascus would agree.

[Zaleukos]

I'm well aware of the technical problems of the missile shield (it's not all that far from my professional specialisation after all:)). And I agree 100% that it is rather senseless to push so hard for a system that most likely wont work.

I was just thinking that even if it worked "according to plan", the shield wouldnt affect the Russian missiles.

[Prime Junta]

Not those Russian missiles, no.

[Geist]

Surely there's some better solution than having the tanks facing off at the Fulda gap again?

Well, they won't be facing off at the Fulda gap luckily so at least there will be a bit of a buffer this time. Interesting topic. I don't think Russia's suspension of the CFE necessarily heralds the start of a large military buildup on its western border. It could be a tactical maneuver to pressure NATO into signing the revised ACFE that was concluded in Istanbul in 1999, or used as a bargaining chip over some other contentious issue. In any case, it underscores the ever increasing tensions between Russia and the West. The aggressive political interventions by western powers in the former Soviet republics and their efforts to undermine the Kremlin's influence in Eastern Europe have put Russia under a lot of pressure. Russia is certainly in no position to engage the West militarily, nor would any US or European leader who isn't a total nutcase, consider a direct military attack on Russia. What we will likely see in the future though, is a rise in the number and intensity of wars fought by proxy, with Russia increasingly supplying weapons or intelligence to factions hostile to US interests. If the US ever attacks Iran, relations with Russia will become very dicey.

[Prime Junta]

Oh, it's certainly a tactical maneuver. Trouble is that in diplomatic impasses tactical maneuvers have a nasty habit of becoming facts on the ground.

[Squeek]

That makes a lot of sense, PJ. But I wouldn't discount completely the Russian's concern that a missle shield might actually work. Just compare all the technical innovations over the past hundred years with everything experts had to say about them at the time.

I wish I could understand and explain it. There's a long list of authorities who laughed out loud about things like the Internet, the laser, space travel, etc. I don't imagine that's lost on the Russians.

[Prime Junta]

I was talking about the predictable future -- say, the next 10-20 years or so. It's certainly conceivable that there will come a time when it will be possible to build, for example, a laser system capable of shooting down anything at all. We're very far from it now, though; so far that we can't even say with any reasonable degree of confidence that it's possible even theoretically.

However, in this case it wouldn't really matter even so -- geography dictates that even a 100% effective missile shield positioned where this one is being positioned would have very little strategic impact on the Russian nuclear threat. If you're concerned about American security, you'd have to make it big enough to cover all of Canada and then some; if it's Europe you're worried about, you would have to deploy it from Tallinn to Odessa.

[Geist]

Russia probably isn't too worried about the actual missile shield, but it is very much concerned about the growing US military presence in former Warsaw Pact countries. Putin wasn't particularly pleased to see American military bases recently established in Bulgaria and Romania, and while the missile shield itself may not constitute a threat, the equipment and supporting facilities that come with it could serve as a platform for the eventual implementation of more offensively oriented military installations if needed.

Incidentally, I just noticed I really don't like the first sentence of my previous post ("Well, they won't be facing off at the Fulda gap luckily, so at least there will be a bit of a buffer this time.")
That's a very narrow, western European way of looking at it. My apologies to anyone living in those countries I referred to as a "buffer".

[Prime Junta]

I think that plain old pride and dignity factors into it. Russians feel that the NATO countries have been doing exactly as they please without asking or even considering the Russian point of view with regards to security arrangements in Eastern Europe; and they're still especially upset at the (perceived) slap in the face they got after Putin's genuine attempt at engaging with the West in 2001-2002. Much of the thinking is "if they don't care what we think, then fine -- we won't care what they think." Good ol' tit-for-tat one-upmanship in other words.

[Squeek]

Poor Putin. He's so genuine. What have the Russians ever done to deserve such distrust? ;)

[Prime Junta]

Oh, a quite a lot, there's no question about that. He's no angel, and he's doing a hell of a job pandering to the worst aspects of Russian nationalism too.

I was just explaining the other side of the story, since the Western media (usually) doesn't.

[Bartacus]

Oh, a quite a lot, there's no question about that. He's no angel, and he's doing a hell of a job pandering to the worst aspects of Russian nationalism too.

I was just explaining the other side of the story, since the Western media (usually) doesn't.

I don't know PJ, I think Russia indeed need such a man. I know that the freedom of outing your opinion is considered one of the basics of a democracy, it's not all bad things he does. There had to be a hard reaction against the Russian mob and also (more importantly) a hard sign against the 'oilthieves'. I'm talking about that scum called Ibrahimovic (Chelsea) who was just a taxidriver at the start of the nineties. And yes, I believe that one can make much money if he sets his mind to it, but you can't make 12 billion dollar out of thin air!
At least Putin will use the oilmoney to help his country. One of the benefits of a cold war is that the economy booms cause of the war factories. It might be hard to grasp, but I really think Putin is just trying to do what he thinks is good for his country.

[Zaleukos]

You are mixing up Ibrahimovic (Swedish footie player) with Abramovich (Russian oligarch and owner of Chelsea.

Interestingly Abramovich is one of the oligarchs that have been left alone by Putin (and not the only one). The dividing line between those who went into involuntary exile/jail and the Abramovichs is whether they decided to meddle in politics post-Yeltsin or not. There is a marked decrease in corruption under Putin, but there is also a tendency to hide and keep quiet about the problems that remain. And Putin is using the oil money to buy up media (Gazprom has been a major tool in the gobbling up of independent national TV channels) and weapons.

I dont think Russia as a country, nor the Russians, have some inherent need to be ruled by a strongman. It is however a fact that centuries of mismanagement, corruption, and heavy handed centralisation attempts by the more effective rulers, have left Russia with a lack of civil society. There is no structure to fall back upon in times of poor leadership, unlike Western countries that would suffer much less under weak leadership.

[Prime Junta]

I don't know PJ, I think Russia indeed need such a man. I know that the freedom of outing your opinion is considered one of the basics of a democracy, it's not all bad things he does. There had to be a hard reaction against the Russian mob and also (more importantly) a hard sign against the 'oilthieves'. I'm talking about that scum called Ibrahimovic (Chelsea) who was just a taxidriver at the start of the nineties. And yes, I believe that one can make much money if he sets his mind to it, but you can't make 12 billion dollar out of thin air!
At least Putin will use the oilmoney to help his country. One of the benefits of a cold war is that the economy booms cause of the war factories. It might be hard to grasp, but I really think Putin is just trying to do what he thinks is good for his country.

I'm fairly certain Putin is trying to do what he thinks is good for his country. However, that's not much of an excuse, in my book. In fact, the most horrible things in history have been done for the good of the country.

It's also painfully clear that Putin is far from the worst option for Russia -- lots and lots of worse ones have been tried over the years. (In fact, he's doing damn well compared to just about any Russian leader since Alexander II at least.)

But that doesn't mean I like what the Nashi stand for, that I find political assassinations acceptable, that I find the way Russia treats its own minorities acceptable, that I believe that the way Russia treats foreign business for anyone in the long run (including Russia), that Putin's use of his leverage as energy provider is wise or morally tenable, and so on.

However, I also believe that many of these things are exacerbated by the fact that the West consistently talks down to Russia, ignores its perfectly legitimate concerns, let Poland set the tone for EU-Russian relations, and turns a blind eye to the way the Russian minorities are treated in the Baltic countries. I believe that if we believe in, for example, decent treatment and human rights for everyone, regardless of creed, color, or nationality, we should first and foremost set our own house in order; only then do we have the moral standing to criticize others on it -- even if the others are much worse than us in this respect.

[Eliaures]

West consistently talks down to Russia

I know the West involves more than just the U.S., but I think our current President and his abysmal approach to international relations can't help but exacerbate the former Soviet satellites aggression towards its Russian minorities and Russia. If not for The Shrub's tough guy, cowboy stance towards Russia, I'd think Georgia, Poland, and the other countries that used to buffer Russia in the former Soviet Union could not be quite so bold in their relations with Russia.

I'm hoping that our next President, and I'm assuming it will be a Democrat and not one of those chest thumping gorillas the Republicans have campaigning, will bring some reason to international diplomacy. Obviously, our current "do what we want or else" policy is not working too terribly well.

It's also painfully clear that Putin is far from the worst option for Russia

Am I mistaken, or is not Putin pretty much just a continuation of Yeltsin's Russia? A few Russians from positions of power grabbing most of the choice assets and then the leadership protecting those folks through government? Of course I realize the irony, the U.S. is not much different in this respect. I suppose the Russians could do worse with another Stalin, but for the average Russian, the fall of the Soviet Union has been no advantage. I think they would have been better off with Gorbachev, and certainly with Kasparov had the elections not been rigged.

[Zaleukos]

I know the West involves more than just the U.S., but I think our current President and his abysmal approach to international relations can't help but exacerbate the former Soviet satellites aggression towards its Russian minorities and Russia. If not for The Shrub's tough guy, cowboy stance towards Russia, I'd think Georgia, Poland, and the other countries that used to buffer Russia in the former Soviet Union could not be quite so bold in their relations with Russia.

Shrub is not at fault there. These countries were more or less occupied by the Russians for fifty years, and see NATO and EU membership as a guarantee of independence. They would have been let into those communities regardless of who is in the white house (and I really dont think it is any business of Russia's to dictate the course of action of sovereign countries either).

The Polish in particular managed to produce a government that antagonised pretty much anyone when they elected the Kaczynski twins (luckily this dynamic duo is split by now).

I'd like to paint a somewhat different, but not incompatible, picture of EU relations vs Russia compared to that given by PJ. First of all the union is divided. Germany is for instance fairly happy to look the other way since it is dependent on Russian energy (and a Russian-German gas pipeline that circumvents the former Russian satellites is well under way). There's also been some (albeit not enough:() European pressure on the Baltic states to treat their Russian minorities better (the main issues are language requirements and citizenship) through the European court of human rights.

But rather heavy handed Russian handling of relations with the Eastern and Central European countries (a long standing boycott on Polish meat, the Estonian statue affair, "technical" difficulties with gas and oil deliveries that accidentally coincide with conflicts) has however pushed the EU into a somewhat more united, and more anti-Russian, position.


Am I mistaken, or is not Putin pretty much just a continuation of Yeltsin's Russia? A few Russians from positions of power grabbing most of the choice assets and then the leadership protecting those folks through government? Of course I realize the irony, the U.S. is not much different in this respect.

Yes and no. Putin has kept many of the economists and administrators of the Yeltsin era, and he does let the apolitical oligarchs live on. There is however at least one significant difference in that the president now run the country, not the oligarchs (kind of ironic given that Putin was chief oligarch Berezovsky's choice as new president once:D). The government finances are also much better than under Yeltsin, with public officials getting paid on time and more effective law enforcement. This is more due to Russia making loads of money from increased raw material prices than to profound structural reforms, but things do in some ways work better.


I suppose the Russians could do worse with another Stalin, but for the average Russian, the fall of the Soviet Union has been no advantage. I think they would have been better off with Gorbachev, and certainly with Kasparov had the elections not been rigged.

The soviet union was a gangster state that was rotten to the core. The main reason that corruption seemed more rife under Yeltsin was that the system became more transparent. The bread queues and chronical shortages of the late Soviet days are also a thing of the past now.

While I get the feeling that I am lot more critical to Putin than PJ I dont think things would have been better with Kasparov (who didnt participate in the last elections). First of all the "Other Russia" coalition whose poster boy he acts as is a hodgepodge mix with the National Bolsheviks (a rather unpleasant bunch) as a significant component.

Garry also shows that brilliance in Chess wont propagate into other fields by believing in Fomenko's theories about "stolen history". Fomenko is a kook mathematician who by taking a select few ancient accounts literally claims to prove that our historical chronology is false: http://www.world-mysteries.com/garrykasparov.htm

The real democratic opposition in Russia is the SPS party, whose senior members have managed the economy under both Yeltsin and Putin (though the latter successfully paints them as primarily Yeltsin products).

[Prime Junta]

I know the West involves more than just the U.S., but I think our current President and his abysmal approach to international relations can't help but exacerbate the former Soviet satellites aggression towards its Russian minorities and Russia. If not for The Shrub's tough guy, cowboy stance towards Russia, I'd think Georgia, Poland, and the other countries that used to buffer Russia in the former Soviet Union could not be quite so bold in their relations with Russia.

Well, Georgia is essentially a classic "our sonofabitch" country at this time -- Saakashvili fits the bill wonderfully. Poland appears to have rejoined the ranks of the Not Completely Deranged Nations ever since they gave Tweedledum the boot and elected Donald Tusk instead.

But the EU in general hasn't been any better here. There has been no consistent Russia-policy; no attempt at building trust and strengthening relations to the point where genuinely difficult topics could be discussed without resorting to screaming about the death of democracy in Russia or Western imperialism and double standards.

Am I mistaken, or is not Putin pretty much just a continuation of Yeltsin's Russia? A few Russians from positions of power grabbing most of the choice assets and then the leadership protecting those folks through government? Of course I realize the irony, the U.S. is not much different in this respect. I suppose the Russians could do worse with another Stalin, but for the average Russian, the fall of the Soviet Union has been no advantage. I think they would have been better off with Gorbachev, and certainly with Kasparov had the elections not been rigged.

Well, that would depend on your point of view. Power changes hands in Russia in one of two ways: either the outgoing boss picks a successor and hands the reins over quietly (which may be happening right now, btw), or there's a bit of an upset where the winner stands the losers against a wall and shoots them. So in this sense, yeah, Putin's Russia is a continuation of Yeltsin's Russia.

However, if you leave out the revolutionary events, the difference between Putin's Russia and Yeltsin's Russia is night and day. It would be a very long trek to explain it even in its basic outline, but here are some phrases that are typically associated with the Yeltsin and Putin eras:

Yeltsin:
* "smutnoe vremya" -- "time of troubles"
* disintegration of the Russian state
* macroeconomic collapse
* collapse of the currency
* collapse of public services
* severe degradation of an already dodgy infrastructure
* economic hardship for "normal people"
* military setbacks in Chechnya
* massive Western interference in politics and especially the economy
* rise of the oligarchs
* capital flows to Swiss bank accounts
* poverty for most, immense riches for a very few
* massive corruption
* severe degradation of military capabilities
* disintegration in public order
* mafias operating openly; "business-related" shootings happening all the time
* a sickly, drunken president
* loss of Russian influence in the "near abroad"
* severe loss of self-confidence

Putin:
* restoration of law and order -- far less open lawlessness and insecurity
* political power of oligarchs broken, returned to the central government (also much of the wealth they accumulated during Yeltsin)
* western influence curtailed
* Russia regaining its influence in the "near abroad"
* Russia regaining some influence as a global power
* restoration of the Russian military, both operational and industry
* stabilization of the economy, followed by massive economic growth
* restoration (in part) of social services
* stabilization of the currency
* emergence of a middle class, with a standard of living approaching and then surpassing that of Soviet times
* confrontation with the West
* victory in Chechnya (sorta, kinda)
* xenophobic Russian nationalism becoming the political "mainstream"
* centralization of the media

From the Russian perspective, you could compare the past few decades in Russia to the 1929 stock market crash in the US (~the collapse of the Soviet Union), followed by the Great Depression (~the Yeltsin years), followed by the New Deal (~the Putin years). Obviously the analogy is of limited value since Yeltsin isn't Hoover, Putin isn't FDR, and Russia isn't America, but from the point of view of actually living through it, it's pretty similar: first a catastrophe where most people "lose everything," followed by a period of confusion where the leadership doesn't appear to have a clue and only makes things worse, followed by somebody who does appear to have a clue, and things start to get better really quickly.

[Prime Junta]

While I get the feeling that I am lot more critical to Putin than PJ I dont think things would have been better with Kasparov (who didnt participate in the last elections). First of all the "Other Russia" coalition whose poster boy he acts as is a hodgepodge mix with the National Bolsheviks (a rather unpleasant bunch) as a significant component.

I'm not so sure we're that far apart on Putin. It may appear to be so, since (1) I like to bring out the "other side of the story" and (2) I like to think in terms of "what could we do?" rather than "what should they do?" based on the assumption that we have a measure of power to affect the former, but can do precious little about the latter.

I'm also a huge believer in "soft power" -- the power to influence events by example, and using more carrots and fewer sticks. Hell, it works with my dog -- he learns stuff a lot quicker if I give him a carrot rather than yelling at him. Yes, he actually likes carrots. You could say that I believe that if you have to talk tough or act tough, you've already lost -- *almost* always, that point could have been avoided by talking less tough earlier on.

Put another way, "violence is the last resort of the incompetent" (Asimov).

[Prime Junta]

Oh, and the NatsBols? I'm still not entirely sure what to think of them, and I've been following them very closely for several years. IOW, I'm not sure whether I should consider them (a) a genuinely dangerous populist/fascist political movement, (b) a bunch of buffoons with nothing better to do, or (c) a performance art project.

Whenever I read Eduard Limonov, I have a sneaking suspicion that it just might be (c).

[Zaleukos]

I prefer "speak softly and carry a big stick", but the preferred course of action is the same. Soft power tends to cause a lot less collatoral damage than the harder varieties, and this is one reason I find adminstrations starring mental giants akin to the Kaczynskis or GWB problematic... Soft power does however require that you have something that the other side wants, and I feel that the mistakes during the Yeltsin years (with the -97/98 crash being the last straw) wasted a window of opportunity for us. But we have to work from the current situation, not from what could have been done better in the past.

Now it seems like the best we can do is to tell the Russians that we gladly will do mutually beneficial business with them, while simultaneously giving a clear message that the Baltic states and their other former possessions are sovereign states now. Working towards some sort of association deal that lets Russia participate in the common market might be one positive gesture that everyone could agree to.

As for Limonov and friends I dont know quite what to think of them either, but I think all the possible cathegories fall under d) Not to be trusted with the power to run anything of importance.

They remind me of Zhirinovsky's "liberal democrats". What little rethoric I've seen is similar. That would make them fall under b) more than anything else.

Kasparov's "Fomenkoism" puts a question mark next to his judgment regardless of where the National Bolsheviks stand though:p

[Prime Junta]

I prefer "speak softly and carry a big stick", but the preferred course of action is the same. Soft power tends to cause a lot less collatoral damage than the harder varieties, and this is one reason I find adminstrations starring mental giants akin to the Kaczynskis or GWB problematic... Soft power does however require that you have something that the other side wants, and I feel that the mistakes during the Yeltsin years (with the -97/98 crash being the last straw) wasted a window of opportunity for us. But we have to work from the current situation, not from what could have been done better in the past.

Actually, I feel the window of opportunity only finally closed around the turn of 2001/2002. If you want to point at an individual event, it would be the USA's unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty (Dec, 2001). This did enormous damage to Russian/Western relations, since (1) Putin had gone against his base to support the US attack on Afghanistan post-9/11, and (2) the ABM treaty was far more important to Russia than the US. It weakened him, and he (and Russian public opinion!) saw it as pure betrayal. There never was much trust between Russia and the West to start with, and that event validated the Russians' worst fears about Western attitudes and intentions. Putin has been playing hardball ever since, and it's hard to argue that it hasn't worked better for him (and Russia).

Now it seems like the best we can do is to tell the Russians that we gladly will do mutually beneficial business with them, while simultaneously giving a clear message that the Baltic states and their other former possessions are sovereign states now.

I agree -- but I *also* feel we should be putting pressure on the Baltic states to treat their Russian minorities as citizens rather than... well, something quite a bit less than that. And I believe we should be doing this regardless of what Russia does or doesn't do; human rights should not be bargaining chips.

Why bring it up here, then? Because our turning a blind eye to this gives Russia the excuse to call us hypocrites and do whatever it likes to its minorities (or us).

Working towards some sort of association deal that lets Russia participate in the common market might be one positive gesture that everyone could agree to.

Again, I agree.

As for Limonov and friends I dont know quite what to think of them either, but I think all the possible cathegories fall under d) Not to be trusted with the power to run anything of importance.

LOL! Well, yeah, I considered that pretty much a given. But I do think that we should be more concerned if they actually had a snowball's chance in hell of getting to within spitting distance of power.

They remind me of Zhirinovsky's "liberal democrats". What little rethoric I've seen is similar. That would make them fall under b) more than anything else.

A bit, except I think Zhirinovsky was something of a Kremlin plant -- a lightning rod designed to serve several purposes. Such as something to point to saying "Look, it's either us or those loonies," and to give the loose cannons in the country someone to vote for. To my knowledge, Zhirinovsky never actually did anything at all to go against the wishes of the Kremlin.

Kasparov's "Fomenkoism" puts a question mark next to his judgment regardless of where the National Bolsheviks stand though:p

To be honest, I have no respect at all for Kasparov as a politician. As a chess player, certainly, but I'd be very surprised if he makes any difference at all in the political realm (let alone a positive difference).

[Eliaures]

Heh, heh...I think I shall bow out gracefully here. Again I show my ignorance and I really appreciate this discussion, I've learned a lot. I haven't researched Kasparov as a politician, or a chess player for that matter, and my only real exposure to him was on a news program here in the States. He "sounded" really progressive and I was impressed with what he said. I suppose this is like most politicians. I listen to our Presidential candidates, even Republicans like Huckabee and Ron Paul, and they "sound" reasonable, but when you look into their records and what they really stand for, you find that they are not quite what they present on TV.

[Prime Junta]

Heh, heh...I think I shall bow out gracefully here. Again I show my ignorance and I really appreciate this discussion, I've learned a lot. I haven't researched Kasparov as a politician, or a chess player for that matter, and my only real exposure to him was on a news program here in the States. He "sounded" really progressive and I was impressed with what he said. I suppose this is like most politicians. I listen to our Presidential candidates, even Republicans like Huckabee and Ron Paul, and they "sound" reasonable, but when you look into their records and what they really stand for, you find that they are not quite what they present on TV.

The fundamental problem with Kasparov is that he's a Western plant rather than someone emerging from the Russian political landscape. Compare with Yushchenko in Ukraine: he is a Ukrainian phenomenon as well as being pro-Western; despite the fact that the Orange Revolution ended up as a royal clusterfuck in proud Ukrainian tradition, there was a real chance of it working, and the West played its hand rather well. Point being, if you want to influence the politics of another country, you have to work with what's there, recognize the openings, and be discreet about moving into them -- you can't just pick someone with a well-known name, buy him a nice suit, put him on TV, send him in, and expect to make any difference.

Anyway, Russia's never had a shortage of people who talk the talk, especially to Western media. Take Anatoly Chubais, for example -- one of the biggest thieves and crooks to grace pages of 20th century history, yet he's *still* regarded by some as a proud knight of freedom, democracy, and capitalism who got knocked off his horse by evil siloviki.

[Zaleukos]

Actually, I feel the window of opportunity only finally closed around the turn of 2001/2002. If you want to point at an individual event, it would be the USA's unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty (Dec, 2001). This did enormous damage to Russian/Western relations, since (1) Putin had gone against his base to support the US attack on Afghanistan post-9/11, and (2) the ABM treaty was far more important to Russia than the US. It weakened him, and he (and Russian public opinion!) saw it as pure betrayal. There never was much trust between Russia and the West to start with, and that event validated the Russians' worst fears about Western attitudes and intentions. Putin has been playing hardball ever since, and it's hard to argue that it hasn't worked better for him (and Russia).

We are thinking of slightly different aspects of soft power. You are talking about cooperation with the Russian government, while I was thinking of "the western model" having an appeal to the Russian electorate. The window for the later was closed a lot earlier. I put the 97/98 crisis as an absolutely last date as Russia has done well "on its own" since then. EDIT: And that is a very late date...

Heh, heh...I think I shall bow out gracefully here. Again I show my ignorance and I really appreciate this discussion, I've learned a lot. I haven't researched Kasparov as a politician, or a chess player for that matter, and my only real exposure to him was on a news program here in the States. He "sounded" really progressive and I was impressed with what he said. I suppose this is like most politicians. I listen to our Presidential candidates, even Republicans like Huckabee and Ron Paul, and they "sound" reasonable, but when you look into their records and what they really stand for, you find that they are not quite what they present on TV.

He might well be the greatest chess player ever:)

You are neither the first nor the last to overestimate Kasparov as a politician:) But that he had valid points regarding freedom and assembly and the election campaign isnt enough to make him a good candidate (the at least as unelectable communists raised pretty much the same issues but for obvious reasons they didnt get as positive coverage in the western press).

[Prime Junta]

We are thinking of slightly different aspects of soft power. You are talking about cooperation with the Russian government, while I was thinking of "the western model" having an appeal to the Russian electorate. The window for the later was closed a lot earlier. I put the 97/98 crisis as an absolutely last date as Russia has done well "on its own" since then.

OK, right -- I see what you mean (and I agree). And incidentally that is what I primarily think about when I think about soft power.

That said, I think it's pretty unlikely that a genuine democracy would ever have emerged from the post-Soviet chaos -- democracy is not generally speaking an effective way to sort out chaotic messes; it requires a degree of stability to work in the first place. (I believe this is the ultimate reason the February revolution failed in 1917, btw.) Perhaps democracy could have emerged if Gorbachev had managed to sort out his perestroika and glasnost' more successfully, or perhaps the Soviet system was too far gone by then.

And perhaps it's conceivable that one might eventually evolve from the semi-authoritarian system in place now.

[magerette]

Apropos of Mr. Putin, Time (http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753_1690757_1690766,00.html)magazine has selected him as their "Person of the Year" for 2007, and there is a lot of coverage on him both at their online site, and in their print mag. The terrifying aspect of this award is that Al Gore and J.K. Rowling were the top runners-up. :)

Seriously, I'm glad to see the interest here(in the US) in this man, and the acknowledgment that

Russia is central to our world—and the new world that is being born. It is the largest country on earth; it shares a 2,600-mile (4,200 km) border with China; it has a significant and restive Islamic population; it has the world's largest stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and a lethal nuclear arsenal; it is the world's second largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia; and it is an indispensable player in whatever happens in the Middle East. For all these reasons, if Russia fails, all bets are off for the 21st century. And if Russia succeeds as a nation-state in the family of nations, it will owe much of that success to one man, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

There's an extensive interview (6 pages) from which I select one quote, since I was reading for information on Putin's feelings towards the U.S.:

What gets Putin agitated—and he was frequently agitated during our talk—is his perception that Americans are out to interfere in Russia's affairs. He says he wants Russia and America to be partners but feels the U.S. treats Russia like the uninvited guest at a party. "We want to be a friend of America," he says. "Sometimes we get the impression that America does not need friends" but only "auxiliary subjects to command." Asked if he'd like to correct any American misconceptions about Russia, Putin leans forward and says, "I don't believe these are misconceptions. I think this is a purposeful attempt by some to create an image of Russia based on which one could influence our internal and foreign policies. This is the reason why everybody is made to believe...[Russians] are a little bit savage still or they just climbed down from the trees, you know, and probably need to have...the dirt washed out of their beards and hair."

An interesting read, for journalism. :)

[Squeek]

Now that he's been named Person of the Year, maybe Putin will get cleaned up and learn the proper way to curtsy.

[Prime Junta]

There are some pretty good "deep" reasons why Westerners and Russians often don't understand each other. For one thing, Russians look like us, dress like us, listen to similar music as us, drive the same cars as us, so it's pretty natural to think that they *are* like us.

But they aren't. Our historical experiences are very different, almost as different as between us and, say, the Chinese. That results in a pretty drastically different outlook on many things, different values, different priorities. If you're not aware of these differences and acknowledge them, there will be trouble.

[Zaleukos]

That said, I think it's pretty unlikely that a genuine democracy would ever have emerged from the post-Soviet chaos -- democracy is not generally speaking an effective way to sort out chaotic messes; it requires a degree of stability to work in the first place. (I believe this is the ultimate reason the February revolution failed in 1917, btw.) Perhaps democracy could have emerged if Gorbachev had managed to sort out his perestroika and glasnost' more successfully, or perhaps the Soviet system was too far gone by then.

And perhaps it's conceivable that one might eventually evolve from the semi-authoritarian system in place now.

I think Russia is in a state similar to that of Taiwan or South Korea prior to democratisation (arguably freer than those), where the only thing we can do now is to wait for a "progressive" insider to push it in the right direction. Unfortunately corruption remains a problem that will act as a glue rather than a lubricant to democratisation and the building up of a civil society.

Regardless of Russias political course it will be interesting to see how the Medvedev-Putin relationship evolves once Putin resigns as president. Even if things turn out ugly it can make for a good political soap opera:)

magerette: Well deserved "award". I dont like the man, but he is competent, man of the year is not an award for being nice, and we've not seen many outstanding individual performances on the international scene in -07.

[Prime Junta]

Didn't Hitler and Stalin both get the Time MotY award? "Nice" isn't the first attribute most people would associate with them.

And yeah, compared to the clowns currently on the stage of international politics, Putin does look pretty good -- and as someone on this thread already pointed out, Russia could do, and has done, a lot worse.

But I still don't like the Nashi.

Edit: I found the MotY list. It's a pretty interesting one, and I have to say that most of Time's picks have stood the test of time rather well. No mean feat, that.

[ http://history1900s.about.com/library/weekly/aa050400a.htm ]

[Zaleukos]

Stalin was even awarded twice.

[Prime Junta]

I think Russia is in a state similar to that of Taiwan or South Korea prior to democratisation (arguably freer than those), where the only thing we can do now is to wait for a "progressive" insider to push it in the right direction. Unfortunately corruption remains a problem that will act as a glue rather than a lubricant to democratisation and the building up of a civil society.

I think there are things we can do other than simple passive waiting. Specifically, we can look for win-win scenarios in trade, politics, culture, and so on. These kinds of things can build trust and confidence as well as let both sides understand each other better; this in turn erodes two of the foundation-stones of authoritarian thinking -- ignorance and fear.

IOW I don't think there's much to be gained from lecturing or pressuring Russia; it's too big, too proud, and too self-sufficient for that. But there is much to be gained by cooperating in areas where cooperation is possible.

[magerette]

Wasn't sure where to put this, but this thread seemed the most appropriate:

Russia's Putin issues missile warning to Ukraine (http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1285270620080212)
which basically consists of some threatening language should Ukraine join NATO:

"I am not only terrified to utter this, it is scary even to think that Russia, in response to a possible deployment of the missile shield in Ukraine..., would have to target its offensive rocket systems at Ukraine," Putin said.

He said it was Ukraine's sovereign right to decide whether to join NATO.

But he added membership would "lead to real consequences: bases, the missile shield, which we believe has as its aim the neutralization of our nuclear missile capability, and which presents Russia with the need to take retaliatory measures".

Thoughts?

[Squeek]

Here (http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1285270620080212) is the correct link (maybe they moved it?).

This is just a continuation of the old Soviet Union line about needing to protect their border from the troops that were massed on the other side to protect themselves against Soviet invasion.

Putin is an ass.

[Prime Junta]

Nothing beyond the obvious -- Putin feels NATO is close enough to Russia as it is, and would like to discourage Ukraine from joining or drawing closer to it. I'm quite sure he (or his successor) will do exactly what he says if NATO expansion towards the Russian "near abroad" continues.

But the new Cold War this isn't.

[magerette]

Thanks for correcting the link, Squeek--don't know how it got messed up, but I also fixed it.

But the new Cold War this isn't.

Perhaps not. It seemed rather reminiscent of the passive-aggressive side of aggressive that we saw back then, consisting of a lot of line-drawing in the sand and threats not without substance, but difficult to actually see happening. Perhaps this threat is all too real, but in that case, surely Ukraine knows, and is pursuing a somewhat dangerous course in applying for NATO status.

[Zaleukos]

Wasn't sure where to put this, but this thread seemed the most appropriate:

Russia's Putin issues missile warning to Ukraine (http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1285270620080212)
which basically consists of some threatening language should Ukraine join NATO:



Thoughts?

Russia is rather tired of NATO expansion eastwards, and losing Ukraine (which has been part of the Russian sphere for much longer than say the Baltic republics or Poland) would obviously be seen as a more aggressive enlargement than the past ones. There is also a complicating practical issue of a Russian naval base (the Black sea navy) on the Crimea (a bit unnecessary given that Crimea historically isnt Ukrainian but only given to the Ukraine SSR during Soviet times).

The talk about missiles is symbolic. If Russia genuinely wants to hurt Ukraine it will do so by cutting energy exports there and starting a general trade war on the nation. I can imagine the Ukrainian economy still is rather dependent on Russia. Such a course of action (particularly "technical difficulties" in gas and oil deliveries) are definitely a realistic option. Given the shaky political climate in Ukraine I dont see any outsiders jumping to their aid either...

[Prime Junta]

Perhaps not. It seemed rather reminiscent of the passive-aggressive side of aggressive that we saw back then, consisting of a lot of line-drawing in the sand and threats not without substance, but difficult to actually see happening. Perhaps this threat is all too real, but in that case, surely Ukraine knows, and is pursuing a somewhat dangerous course in applying for NATO status.

The thing is that under current conditions, all of this is just gesturing. The real Cold War was predicated on very real assumptions of the possibility of it turning hot at any moment. The USSR was mortally afraid of an American "first strike," and NATO was mortally afraid of the USSR rolling through the Fulda gap. Worse, what with ICBM's and all, there was a big strategic advantage to striking first. Well, kinda; it'd mean that less of your territory would be permanently uninhabitable since you would get *some* of the other side's nukes.

Currently this isn't the case. None of the great powers is genuinely on a war footing towards each other. This could conceivably change, of course, and if it does, those forward bases and missile shields could suddenly prove very valuable. That's the reason for this game of moving chess pieces on the map -- you put an ABM station in front of my house, I'll point my nukes right at it.

As Zaleukos said, when Russia means business, it'll just pull the plug. I'm fairly convinced Ukraine would come to heel quickly if they did that. Naturally this type of thing doesn't come without cost either (the previous "technical difficulties" got Europe to get serious about diversifying its energy supply, which is not what Russia wants either). Mega-cards like this are really only effective when they're not played.

[magerette]

Thanks Zaluekos and Prime Junta, for the clarifying input.

There does seem to my simple brain a similarity to these chess moves, and the cards that were often put on the table but never played in the Cold War earlier, but I can see that the casino set-up, if you will, is a bit different.

Everyone has played the game before, and the stakes are better understood. If I understand your collective points correctly, threats that were made then with a hand actually on the gun are now more symbolic, and an economic threat, especially an energy-related one, trumps a nuclear bullet because it works as well or better and is so much less likely to pull world opinion and foreign powers into the fray.

It's also reassuring to hear that the European union has some concerted clout that in the original Cold War was lacking. (Or that's my interpretation of the description of the response to 'technical difficulties,' anyway.)

Again, I appreciate the European perspective on things; you are much more aware of the nuances in that part of the world than we are over here, and your remarks help me make sense out of a somewhat alien playing field.

[Squeek]

...Ukraine (which has been part of the Russian sphere for much longer than say the Baltic republics or Poland)....Didn't they declare themselves free in the days after WWII? And didn't the Soviet Union roll in tanks to crush their dream of independence?

[Zaleukos]

Well, Russia is more or less a neighbour, so it gets a lot of press here.:) The Baltic is also becoming one integrated economic area in a way that we havent seen for hundreds of years, so it makes sense to look eastwards again.

"Technical difficulties" just mean that Russia, as Europe's provider of oil and most importantly natural gas, tends to just have to close down its pipelines to whatever country they are having a row over regarding Estonian statues, Polish beef, or a Ukrainian election result that doesnt go their way. It is a card that has been played a few times and it does hurt the recipient, particularly if done during winter.

The weakness of this energy card is that these pipelines also serve Germany with gas. A Germany that not only needs the Russian gas, but also is Russias main friend inside the EU, and a very important economic partner to Russia.

Overuse of the energy card has made Germany more sympathetic to the plights of Poland and the Baltic states, and also made it more attractive for Germany to support a diversification of the EU energy supply.

These results are obviously contrary to Russias strategic interests. The solution seems to be to build a pipeline going directly from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea, circumventing all those pesky countries that are hostile to Russia. The Nordstream project is chaired by Gerhard Schröder (who approved the project while still German chancellor). Sweden and Finland who have the economic rights to the seabed where the pipeline will be laid are conducting "environmental evaluations" of the project that may or may not political smokescreens for stopping the project...

I can understand how you get cold war vibes though, the rethoric is still there. But it is to some extent a matter of pandering to a nationalist/chauvinist domestic public more than anything else. Russia is doing business with the rest of the world to an extent that the Soviets didnt, and it's direct aspirations only concern the immediate neighbours and possibly the traditional ally Serbia. I also get the feeling that there is an isolationist trend on your side of the pond (heck, Bush was a bit of an isolationist before WTC).

[Zaleukos]

Didn't they declare themselves free in the days after WWII? And didn't the Soviet Union roll in tanks to crush their dream of independence?

I havent heard about that, but Ukraine did suffer horribly throughout Stalin's regime. The Nazis were initially seen as liberators and there was anti-Soviet guerillas in the aftermath of WW2. There were some Ukrainian statelets during the Russian revolution. These are however all very brief historical outliers.

But otherwise Ukraine has been split between Poland and Russia (and mongol/tatar khanates) for the last thousand years. The state that had its court in Kiev was part of a Russian federation of Rurikid princes (the Moscow branch died out with Ivan the Terrible IIRC) but was destroyed by the mongols.

[magerette]

...The weakness of this energy card is that these pipelines also serve Germany with gas. A Germany that not only needs the Russian gas, but also is Russias main friend inside the EU, and a very important economic partner to Russia.

Overuse of the energy card has made Germany more sympathetic to the plights of Poland and the Baltic states, and also made it more attractive for Germany to support a diversification of the EU energy supply.

Very clear and makes perfect sense.

These results are obviously contrary to Russias strategic interests. The solution seems to be to build a pipeline going directly from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea, circumventing all those pesky countries that are hostile to Russia. The Nordstream project is chaired by Gerhard Schröder (who approved the project while still German chancellor). Sweden and Finland who have the economic rights to the seabed where the pipeline will be laid are conducting "environmental evaluations" of the project that may or may not political smokescreens for stopping the project...

I thought your first sentence was a little sarcasm, but then you name an actual project...that seems like a very expensive alternative for Russia and Germany, and it also smells like an attempt to build a base of power that's quite exclusionary. If I were sitting in Finland and Sweden, I think I'd be looking for an out also.

I can understand how you get cold war vibes though, the rethoric is still there. But it is to some extent a matter of pandering to a nationalist/chauvinist domestic public more than anything else. Russia is doing business with the rest of the world to an extent that the Soviets didnt, and it's direct aspirations only concern the immediate neighbours and possibly the traditional ally Serbia. I also get the feeling that there is an isolationist trend on your side of the pond (heck, Bush was a bit of an isolationist before WTC).

Helpful comparison. And yes, there is a latent streak of isolationism that is flaring up here atm, mostly due to our disastrous recent foreign policy and the disillusion with the Iraq war and the concept of 'nation building' it invokes--though it seems to me more nation-destroying...Deep down, I think the 'nationalist/chauvinistic domestic public' side of the American people is fundamentally isolationist and hates being in the position of 'policemen to the world' that our leaders frequently adopt. It's only after a dramatic incident like 9-11 or a convincing paranoid fantasy of the same (the advance of Communism, WMD, etc) is spoonfed to us that most are willing to back any kind of long-term fight outside our borders.

[Zaleukos]

I thought your first sentence was a little sarcasm, but then you name an actual project...that seems like a very expensive alternative for Russia and Germany, and it also smells like an attempt to build a base of power that's quite exclusionary. If I were sitting in Finland and Sweden, I think I'd be looking for an out also.


Nah, the project supposedly pass an economic cost-benefit analysis as well. Russia needs to build a new pipeline somewhere no matter what. Schröder's involvement is still highly suspect though:)

Personally I think we Swedes should let them build the thing but expand our own nuclear power so that we can export energy to the rest of Europe. And still do straight honest business with Russia without political undertones. A wealthy Russia with a functioning civil society (as opposed to the power concentration tendencies seen the last few years) could be a great neighbour.

Deep down, I think the 'nationalist/chauvinistic domestic public' side of the American people is fundamentally isolationist and hates being in the position of 'policemen to the world' that our leaders frequently adopt. It's only after a dramatic incident like 9-11 or a convincing paranoid fantasy of the same (the advance of Communism, WMD, etc) is spoonfed to us that most are willing to back any kind of long-term fight outside our borders.

Most people would probably not give a hoot about the rest of the world if they had a choice, but a lot of us live in tiny countries where that isnt so much of an option:) It is dangerous if the politicians lack a readiness to cope with international events though (and I feel that much of Bush' foreign policy failure comes from this lack of readiness).

[magerette]

That's a very kind way of putting it, Zaluekos. It's definitely a lack of something....;)

Personally I think we Swedes should let them build the thing but expand our own nuclear power so that we can export energy to the rest of Europe. And still do straight honest business with Russia without political undertones. A wealthy Russia with a functioning civil society (as opposed to the power concentration tendencies seen the last few years) could be a great neighbour.

Prime Junta needs to leap in here and explain the form of economics this represents. I agree that a Russia with a real functioning middle class is bound to be a better world neighbor for all of us, much as China has altered with it's acquistion of same--though in their case, I think the verdict may still be out on whether or not their middle class seeking a high energy-consuming life-style in a country with a very low emphasis on the environment makes them more of an asset or a liability to the rest of us. (Not that the US is that great either, of course, but hopefully that is changing.)

[Zaleukos]

Rest assured that I dont think very highly of the current US administration:p

I'm inclined to believe that we will develop a middle class lifestyle that is less problematic for the environment sooner rather than later. A large middle class wont stay apathetic with respect to the environement for long anyway.

Civil society is also a matter of things such as independent media, lack of corruption, and a business world that isnt crooked or acting like a political tool. Russia has some way to go on those issues, but once they are fixed it'll be a land of opportunity:)

[Prime Junta]

Didn't they declare themselves free in the days after WWII? And didn't the Soviet Union roll in tanks to crush their dream of independence?

They did, but it's a great deal more complex than that. For starters, Ukraine is really three countries mashed into one: Western Ukraine, which is ethnically Ukrainian (Eastern Catholic and speak Ukrainian, a Western Slavic language closely related to Polish and Slovak), Eastern Ukraine, which is ethnically Russian and Orthodox, and Central Ukraine which is centered around Kyiv/Kiev and has a mixed identity (some speak Russian, some speak Ukrainian, some speak "surzhyk," which is sort of a pidgin between the two, and religiously Uniate or Orthodox). On top of this are the political divisions -- at the time, there were plenty of true-blue Communists of all ethnicities, with a large group of integral nationalists (ideologically similar to Fascists) in the West.

The Ukrainian independence movement crystallized around the UPA (Ukrajins'ka Povstans'ka Armia, Ukrainian Insurgent Army), which was Ukrainian integral nationalist, and based in Western Ukraine, around Lviv/Lvov. During the chaotic bits of WW2, they controlled a quite a significant swathe of territory, and Stalin fought a minor war against them after the German surrender; after being defeated in regular warfare, they went underground and continued to resist. You know, blending in with the civilian population, not wearing uniforms, doing sabotage, assassinations, and terror attacks; that sort of thing. (But, naturally, they were white, Christian, and anti-Communist, so this is all OK.)

Anyway, they fought a damn good fight, and it took Stalin until 1955 or so to stamp out the last remnants of the armed resistance. Some of their leaders emigrated to the USA and Canada; a few of that community made it to quite important political and academic positions there. A Ukrainian nationalist underground remained, but only managed low-key agitation through samizdat and smuggling in books printed by the emigrants; when the USSR collapsed, Ukrainian independence sort of just happened half by accident, a bit like the Czech-Slovak split.

Incidentally, this little episode is worth studying for anyone interested in counter-insurgencies. It's sobering to think that it took someone like Stalin, with one of the biggest, scariest armies ever, and certainly the biggest, scariest secret poilce ever, ten years to stamp out that little affair. These things aren't easy.

[Prime Junta]

Sweden and Finland who have the economic rights to the seabed where the pipeline will be laid are conducting "environmental evaluations" of the project that may or may not political smokescreens for stopping the project...

At best, retarding it. We don't have a snowball's chance in Hell of stopping it, if Russia and Germany have agreed about it. The Gulf of Finland seabed is dead anyway. And at least we get much of our electricity and all of our natural gas from Russia, so we're not really in a position to complain. (Not to mention that a bunch of, um, episodes have drummed it pretty deep into the national consciousness that picking fights with Russia is not a good survival strategy for a country of five million with about a thousand miles of border with them.)

[Prime Junta]

Prime Junta needs to leap in here and explain the form of economics this represents. I agree that a Russia with a real functioning middle class is bound to be a better world neighbor for all of us, much as China has altered with it's acquistion of same--though in their case, I think the verdict may still be out on whether or not their middle class seeking a high energy-consuming life-style in a country with a very low emphasis on the environment makes them more of an asset or a liability to the rest of us. (Not that the US is that great either, of course, but hopefully that is changing.)

Yeah, it'd be awesome if Russia suddenly turned into Sweden. Hey, Rurik did it once, maybe if they asked nicely Carl Gustav could give 'em a hand?

Seriously, though -- Russia is Russia. We're going to have her as a neighbor no matter what kind of society and government they have. Thing is, Russia is not an unreasonable nation (well, not since they shut up about world revolution and stuff), and we can have perfectly functional relations with them. It's my personal opinion that the majority of our problems with them aren't about questions of substance at all; they're more about tone and attitude. I believe a great deal could be solved simply by toning down the rhetoric a few notches.

[magerette]

Yeah, it'd be awesome if Russia suddenly turned into Sweden. Hey, Rurik did it once, maybe if they asked nicely Carl Gustav could give 'em a hand?

Seriously, though -- Russia is Russia. We're going to have her as a neighbor no matter what kind of society and government they have. Thing is, Russia is not an unreasonable nation (well, not since they shut up about world revolution and stuff), and we can have perfectly functional relations with them. It's my personal opinion that the majority of our problems with them aren't about questions of substance at all; they're more about tone and attitude. I believe a great deal could be solved simply by toning down the rhetoric a few notches.

Did you catch me oversimplifying again? Sorry. Still, it seems to me that the middle class has so much more to lose, that they are a significant factor in calculating whether tensions will escalate or be controlled, and make it easier to have those functional relations you refer to. If I was cranking up any rhetoric, there, I was unaware of it. I was trying--apparently with less than overwhelming success--to think in terms of economics. :)

So many of our problems are about tone, attitude and of course, paranoia and prejudice. Thanks for the enlightening history lessons, both on the Ukraine and in the Hezbollah thread.

[Zaleukos]

Magerette : I am more likely to be the one guilty of cranking up rethoric here:p

At best, retarding it. We don't have a snowball's chance in Hell of stopping it, if Russia and Germany have agreed about it.

The first step towards retarding the process has been taken. Sweden ruled that the application is incomplete and has to be revised before we can look at it again:p

I've always wondered exactly what kind of rights an "economic zone" that isnt actual territorial water gives the nation owning it.

Swedifying Russia might also be to take it a bit too far, but I do think it is reasonable to hope for less arbitrary law enforcement and reduced corruption, and that such changes would be in the interest of any native population regardless of cultural differences. The Russian economic development would have been more diversified if investing there had been a more predictable and less bureaucratic venture. Sure, the country is there and we have to deal with it no matter what, but in addition to doing business with them we need to make clear what kind of rules are required for such cooperation to flow smoothly. EDIT: I dont think obstructing pipelines is the way to go about it though.


The Ukrainian independence movement crystallized around the UPA (Ukrajins'ka Povstans'ka Armia, Ukrainian Insurgent Army), which was Ukrainian integral nationalist, and based in Western Ukraine, around Lviv/Lvov. During the chaotic bits of WW2, they controlled a quite a significant swathe of territory, and Stalin fought a minor war against them after the German surrender; after being defeated in regular warfare, they went underground and continued to resist. You know, blending in with the civilian population, not wearing uniforms, doing sabotage, assassinations, and terror attacks; that sort of thing. (But, naturally, they were white, Christian, and anti-Communist, so this is all OK.)

Interesting. It also sounds like an example of what kind of genies that can be let out once totalitarian pressure is relieved (you dont get much more totalitarian than uncle Joe and it is safe to say that pre-war USSR was somewhat lacking in political pluralism). But was this UPA the legacy of a serious political movement or just a band of thugs that the Nazis gave arms to act as cannon fodder and concentration camp guards?

[Prime Junta]

Interesting. It also sounds like an example of what kind of genies that can be let out once totalitarian pressure is relieved (you dont get much more totalitarian than uncle Joe and it is safe to say that pre-war USSR was somewhat lacking in political pluralism). But was this UPA the legacy of a serious political movement or just a band of thugs that the Nazis gave arms to act as cannon fodder and concentration camp guards?

Very serious, and entirely home-grown. The Nazis considered the Ukrainians, as Slavs, to be racially inferior; they didn't give any of them arms nor support of any kind. (Big strategic mistake; if they had been less racist, they could easily have co-opted such nationalist movements, which could conceivably have won them the war. OTOH if they hadn't been such racist pricks, they probably wouldn't have fought the war in the first place.) Their closest political equivalents in the West would be authoritarian corporatist nationalists like Franco, Päts, or Mussolini.

As it was, they fought a glorious fight and went out in a blaze of martyrdom; however, had circumstances permitted them to actually get to power, we probably wouldn't have liked the results much: they had pretty clear ideas of what to do with the Jews and the Russians, most of which weren't very nice.

[Zaleukos]

On a somewhat more positive Russia-related note Medvedev (Putin's designated heir) talks the talk at the Krasnoyarsk economic forum:


Heir to Putin' in economy pledge



Mr Medvedev, 42, is first deputy prime minister and head of Russia's state gas monopoly, Gazprom.

Speaking at the Krasnoyarsk economic forum in Siberia on Friday, he said "a significant share of the functions carried out by state organs should be given over to the private sector".

Large state-owned companies should adapt to remain competitive, he said.

"I think there is no reason for the majority of state officials to sit on the boards of those firms.

"They should be replaced by truly independent directors, which the state would hire to implement its plans."

Rule of law

Mr Medvedev said he would seek to make Russia into "one of the biggest financial centres in the world" with a stable currency, strong banking sector and reformed tax system.

He talked little about foreign policy or defence but stressed the need to create an independent judiciary.

"One of the key elements of our work in the next four years will be ensuring the independence of our legal system from the executive and legislative branches of power," he said.

Mr Medvedev also spoke of the need to mend what he called the "law breaking" habits of Russians.

"What kind of equal opportunity and innovative thinking can there be if everybody knows that rights only belong to those with the sharpest teeth, and not those who obey the law," he said.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/...ope/7246161.stm

Published: 2008/02/15 07:44:14 GMT

Great if anything comes out of it (particularly the part about an independent judiciary would be invaluable both for the Russian people and for Russia's neighbours), but even if he is since he still would have to best both a hostile Siloviki faction and the inertia of the publicly owned company mishmash. There is also something mildly surreal about a Gazprom director talking about apolitical and independent companies:p