Lebanon on the brink [Archive]

Prime Junta

May 8th, 2008, 20:46

Hezbollah has moved against the Hariri group's offices; there are heavy firefights on in central Beirut. There's no pulling back now.

Next up: the army break-up. We'll have a pro-government faction fighting a pro-Syrian faction, with some coordination between Hezbollah and the latter. Following that, the territorial break-up, on somewhat different lines than the last time.

We will have:

* "Hezbollistan" in three separate areas: the south along the Israeli border, Beka'a around Ba'albek, and the Southern Suburbs of Beirut.
* Beirut itself. This time, Beirut proper may not fragment; the Sunnis and the Maronites are (mostly) on the same side. A lot depends on what Michel Aoun does, but his position isn't anywhere near as strong as it was last time around.
* "Maronistan" to the north of Beirut, inland, and a stretch of coastline from Jbeil in the north to Kaslik closer to Beirut, including East Beirut. This will probably maintain communication with most of Beirut.
* A combined Sunni/Druze area between south Beirut and south Lebanon. I wouldn't want to be driving along the Beirut-Tyre highway right now.
* Tripoli and surroundings. This is mostly Sunni, and pretty far from the action; it's likely that for now it'll maintain good relations with "Maronistan."

Expect the best pyrotechnics along the line between Furn esh-Chebbak and the Southern Suburbs, the line between Sunni West Beirut and the Southern Suburbs, and possibly some fun stuff in the South.

This is likely to get very, very messy indeed.

Prime Junta

May 8th, 2008, 20:49

Oh, and after that... the regional and international powers will step in. IOW, we'll be right in the middle of yet another full-blown Middle Eastern clusterfuck. Isn't this just *wonderful?*

dteowner

May 8th, 2008, 20:53

I haven't paid much attention recently, but what prompted this whole fiasco?

magerette

May 8th, 2008, 22:02

dteowner

May 8th, 2008, 23:37

Further clouding the region's stability:
Olmert in trouble, too (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24527673/)

Corwin

May 9th, 2008, 02:48

What really annoys me, is NONE of this has yet made our TV News!! They are far too concerned with whether a local football player will recover from a sore ankle in time to play this weekend!! Sport Rules!!!! :(

woges

May 9th, 2008, 02:59

Well I don't watch too much TV anymore but it has certainly hit the bbc news. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7390943.stm)

May 9th, 2008, 03:18

Corwin

May 9th, 2008, 06:49

Where I am this week, we can't get SBS!!

May 9th, 2008, 07:54

According to MSNBC (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24521469/)

The violence appeared to begin as a test of wills between political rivals who have been locked in a 17-month power struggle for control of the government. It now could be degenerating into a wider and deadlier sectarian conflict, with the Sunnis’ spiritual leader denouncing Hezbollah and appealing to a largely Sunni Islamic world to intervene.

That’s the bland answer you could substitute 17-year power struggle without sacrificing accuracy. The longer answer, and I’ll preface this by saying PJ has a better understanding of Lebanese politics that I do, is that no one really won the civil war (and if they had it would have been very ugly) the settlement they reached left the country and government divided more or less three ways between the major ethnic/religious groups, the Syrian military kept the peace (and interfered shamelessly in politics) and Hezbollah kept its arms and militia. Which was a workable solution while Israel occupied the south, Hezbollah was occupied harassing the Israelis and the other parties were happy to stay out of it. The situation changed with Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon a couple of years ago, without the Israeli presence it was less obvious Hezbollah needed to be armed and there was mounting pressure for them to disarm particularly after Hariri was assassinated (which also led to Syria being forced to withdraw their military in the face of popular and international pressure). This may have in turn been part of Hezbollah’s calculations in provoking Israel with the kidnappings that led to the last war. While that war was a qualified success for Hezbollah there’s been increased international pressure on the Lebanese government to do something about their weapons and move the Lebanese military into Southern Lebanon. With the pressure now on them it looks like Hezbollah has calculated that they’re better off fighting another civil war than disarming.

Would have been interesting to hear some of the conversations in Damascus lately – see the thread on the Syrian Golan proposal. Uncertain how they’ll react to this latest round of fighting, Syria being isolated internationally is not in a good position to openly support Hezbollah but they risk loosing what remains of their influence in Lebanon and I can’t see them sending the troops back in.

I don’t see an overt Israeli intervention being likely either, they got hurt more than they expected when they last invaded and they’re probably not too upset that Hezbollah has other distractions.

As for how long and bloody this will be I think it will come down to how committed the government is to disarming Hezbollah and restabilising control over the south. Hezbollah isn’t going to disarm and they’ve got the experience and material to fight a long guerrilla conflict, if the government keeps pushing I don’t doubt they’ll spend the next ten years fighting. On the other hand there’s not a lot for Hezbollah to gain from this so I suspect that they’d be happy to return to the uneasy stand off they’ve managed for the past decade if the government pulls back… that’s the optimistic view, the pessimistic is that this has divided the country again and no one will be able to pull back even if they wanted to.

magerette

May 9th, 2008, 08:23

Prime Junta

May 9th, 2008, 09:00

More or less what V7 said. A few things though:

(1) I don't believe the kidnappings that sparked off 2006 were a calculated provocation. The reason is simple: Tsahal soldiers aren't easy to kidnap. You can't just go "Ya Hussein, go get me a couple of Tsahal grunts, willya? I'm getting bored here, we need some entertainment." (In fact, the opposite story -- that the kidnappings were orchestrated by the Israeli side as a casus belli for an attack prepared in advance with American cooperation -- at least has the advantage of being physically possible. I don't believe it went quite that way either, but that's going off on a bit of a tangent.)

(2) The Lebanese government does not have the means to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese army is reasonably well-trained and pretty disciplined, but compared to the battle-hardened Hezbollah veterans they might as well be toting peashooters. Moreover, it consists of Lebanese with dual loyalties -- to their community and to the army. That means that in any serious confrontation between the two, the Lebanese army will (a) lose on the battlefield and (b) split.

(3) Hezbollah does not have the means to impose its will on the country either. It has the unconditional support of at least a plurality of the Lebanese Shi'ites, who are the biggest ethnic group in the country, but very little leverage with anyone else. That essentially means that they're unassailable in their strongholds, but can't do much (other than make mayhem) outside of them.

(4) No, the country can't be physically divided along sectarian lines. The geography won't work -- it's a mosaic with most areas actually mixed; there are reasonably "pure" enclaves (the Maronite heartland, the Chouf, Ba'albek, a slice along the Israeli border), but the coastal strip where most of the people live is mixed, and the mountains consist of villages with different dominant sects living next to each other. (This is one reason Lebanese civil wars get so bloody -- the belligerents start out within shooting, or even rock-throwing, distance of each other.)

So, the ultimate causes for the conflict lie in the make-up of the country, various historical injustices and grudges, and a long, sad history of foreign interference. (In this case, Bashar al-Assad's famous threat to Rafic Hariri, shortly before his assassination, of "smashing Lebanon over his head" springs to mind.)

(5) The proximate cause for the conflict is the power struggle over the presidency and the next government. They had pretty much agreed who would be president, but they hadn't managed to agree about the government, and the conditions under which it works. Specifically, Hezbollah wants a veto over any cabinet decisions, while Sa'ad Hariri's Sunni Future movement and its allies doesn't want to give it. So we have a country with a continuing standoff, no president, and tensions building ever higher. Add to this the fall of the dollar (the Lebanese pound is pegged to it) and resulting price inflation, the economic fallout caused by the instability, and general frustration, and you have a pretty explosive mix. Think of it as a pool of gasoline (the ultimate causes) evaporating in the sun (the proximate ones); all it takes is one spark to make a very big boom.

(6) The immediate cause of the conflict is the governments rock-stupid decision to dismantle Hezbollah's private telecom network. This is obviously one of Hezbollah's most important strategic assets (it's what gave them effective command and control over the 2006 summer war), so they're not about to just go "OK then, go right ahead." (It's rock-stupid because, as stated above in (2), the Lebanese government doesn't have the means to go mano a mano with Hezbollah; therefore, this was about as smart as throwing rocks at a bunch of Hell's Angels. But then if the Lebanese were smart about politics, they wouldn't be in this mess in the first place, would they now?)

Edit: (7) I don't see any external military interventions happening at this time either. Israel certainly doesn't have much stomach to go a second round against Hezbollah; Syria has nothing against the country going up in flames (their long-term plan _could_ be that after a couple of years of fighting and couple of hundred thousand dead, they can ride in again to rescue the country from itself... and re-establish dominance there.) The Americans are, um, busy, and their last trip to Beirut wasn't much fun anyway (although they might send in a battleship to parade along the coast and maybe shell a few goats, y'know, as a "show of force"), the French are too smart to get embroiled in this mess... and, well, that's about it.

Prime Junta

May 9th, 2008, 09:04

Sounds ugly, V7, and makes me even more anxious for the civilians there. So whose side is Syria supposed to be on, other than their own I mean--supporting the Sunni government or Hezbollah, or just interested in destabilizing things in general?

Syria supports Hezbollah, Amal (the other Shi'ite party, headed by the President of Parliament Nabih Berri), and the Michel Aoun-led Christian faction. However, I'm not really certain that it's on their _side_ per se. Syria is seriously sore about getting run out of Lebanon on a rail back in 2005; in addition to the loss of face (which is a BIG thing in that part of the world), they lost access to billions of dollars in revenue quietly siphoned out of the country. I figure that Damascus's priorities are to (a) preferably get Lebanon back, but (b) if this is not possible, destroy it in revenge (if it can get away with it).

Syria *was* a stabilizing influence in Lebanon after the Civil War; now it's very much a destabilizing one. If there are any good guys in this round of the fight, the Syrians aren't them.

May 9th, 2008, 09:31

The government is split between the Sunnis and the Maronites and technically Hezbollah as well although they tend to get isolated when the first two work together. Hezbollah also runs an extensive state-within-a-state social, education, health program so they've not exactly been acting in good faith with respect to the idea of a unified Lebanon (but its dizzying trying to follow the cycle of justification and counter-justification here). Syria was originally invited to intervene in the civil war by the Maronite government (Maronites are the wealthy Christian mostly urban group that dominated the country prior to the civil war) during the civil war there were pro and anti-Syrian factions but I believe they're generally less than thrilled that the Syrians stayed so long after it ended. The Sunni's are probably even less pleased with the Syrians following Hariri's assassination. Ironically, given that one of Syria's original reasons for intervening in the civil war was to get at the Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood (who opposed the secular Ba'athist government in Damascus, yes that’s the same party as in Iraq although they were captured by different strongmen in Syria and Iraq and moved away from their pan-Arabism.. but I digress) .. so, having gone in partly to dismantle the Islamist organisations active in Lebanon Syria was by the end of the war allowing Hezbollah to operate in the areas it controlled and acting allowing them to get support from their real backers in Iran. That relationship doesn't appear to have changed much following the Israeli withdrawal and there's a number of ways you could view the relationship now - Hezbollah upsets the Israelis and Syria would really like the Golan heights back, they're a spoiler in Lebanon keeping the country divided and providing an excuse for Syrian interference, they may offer an outlet for frustrated islamists in Syria itself, and Syria may just not want to upset Hezbollah and Iran.

In terms of the current conflict I don’t think the government would invite the Syrians back having only just got rid of them (nor would they want to risk the popular backlash) and while Hezbollah would probably love an international intervention supporting them I don’t see that happening either.

Prime Junta

May 9th, 2008, 09:42

There we go -- Hezbollah shut down government communications, not the other way around.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7391600.stm ]

Edit: the article says "...after the government shut down Hezbollah's telecom network." I believe that's incorrect -- they decided to do so, but I have heard no credible evidence yet that they've actually succeeded in doing so, or even acted to do so. Yesterday Sa'ad Hariri said that it was a "misunderstanding" and that in any case the operative decisions would be the army's.

Second edit: BBC amended the article; they rephrased that to "...after a move to shut down...".

May 9th, 2008, 09:54

Just some thoughts on PJs response;

(1) I don't believe the kidnappings that sparked off 2006 were a calculated provocation. The reason is simple: Tsahal soldiers aren't easy to kidnap. You can't just go "Ya Hussein, go get me a couple of Tsahal grunts, willya? I'm getting bored here, we need some entertainment." .

I dont' think they planned to make off with Israeli soldiers as a provocation but they weren't staying in Lebanon and polishing their weapons just in case Israel invaded either, there was definatly some testing of Israeli responses going on at the time.

(2) The Lebanese government does not have the means to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese army is reasonably well-trained and pretty disciplined, but compared to the battle-hardened Hezbollah veterans they might as well be toting peashooters. Moreover, it consists of Lebanese with dual loyalties -- to their community and to the army. That means that in any serious confrontation between the two, the Lebanese army will (a) lose on the battlefield and (b) split.
Agreed. Which is why I think the bloodshead will depend largely on how serious the government is in persuing this. I suspect at the moment they could probably backdown with a loss of face and not too much blood spilled but once the cycle of attacks and retaliation starts its going to be difficult to stop.

(3) Hezbollah does not have the means to impose its will on the country either. It has the unconditional support of at least a plurality of the Lebanese Shi'ites, who are the biggest ethnic group in the country, but very little leverage with anyone else. That essentially means that they're unassailable in their strongholds, but can't do much (other than make mayhem) outside of them.
There's a lot of downside for them here I'm fairly sure they'd be happy with the status quo ante.

(4) No, the country can't be physically divided along sectarian lines. The geography won't work -- it's a mosaic with most areas actually mixed; there are reasonably "pure" enclaves (the Maronite heartland, the Chouf, Ba'albek, a slice along the Israeli border), but the coastal strip where most of the people live is mixed, and the mountains consist of villages with different dominant sects living next to each other. (This is one reason Lebanese civil wars get so bloody -- the belligerents start out within shooting, or even rock-throwing, distance of each other.)
Much like Bosnia, 'winning' will involve a genocide which no one wants and (probably, I hope) no side can achieve.

Prime Junta

May 9th, 2008, 10:37

I dont' think they planned to make off with Israeli soldiers as a provocation but they weren't staying in Lebanon and polishing their weapons just in case Israel invaded either, there was definatly some testing of Israeli responses going on at the time.

That's for sure. I think it's most likely that the Hezbollah units on the border had standing orders to exploit any harassment opportunities they could see.

Agreed. Which is why I think the bloodshead will depend largely on how serious the government is in persuing this. I suspect at the moment they could probably backdown with a loss of face and not too much blood spilled but once the cycle of attacks and retaliation starts its going to be difficult to stop.

I can't see any other way for them than to back down. Whether that'll shut down the violence or not is a different question. The problem is that the civil-war period neighborhood militias have already been reactivated, and they're the ones facing off over the barricades. Even if the government backs down and Nasrallah agrees to call off the fighting, that wouldn't stop the street-level militias from doing what they're doing. Nobody controls the Sunni and Christian militias, and even Hezbollah's control over the Shi'ite militias not directly under their command is not complete. And, of course, if there's serious fighting at the street level, the bigger and more disciplined players will have to step in, so we'll have the Lebanese Army on one side and the Islamic Resistance on the other all over again.

There's a lot of downside for them here I'm fairly sure they'd be happy with the status quo ante.

Yes, they probably would be. Whether it's achievable or not is another question. I can see only three (near-term) outcomes for this: either the government steps down and a new, pro-Syrian, anti-Western, Hezbollah/Aoun government takes control (which will cause the Sunni and Christian militias to reactivate for real, paving the way for another confrontation pretty soon), the government backs down but somehow manages to stay in power, a compromise is reached about the presidency and a new government in which Hezbollah again gets what it wants (a couple of key ministries and a veto over cabinet decisions), or the violence spins out of control, in which case we're looking at easily several years more of low-intensity warfare. Of these, the second option would be the least bad, and the third the most likely.

Much like Bosnia, 'winning' will involve a genocide which no one wants and (probably, I hope) no side can achieve.

Oh, there are plenty of people there who *want* it, never fear -- I've met a quite a few of them personally, even. But nobody has the means to do it. They did their level best during the last civil war, and not much has changed since then. If this does spiral out of control, we'll certainly see some local-level ethnic cleansing -- mixed neighborhoods massacring or kicking out their minorities -- but not full-scale genocide. Just like the last time around. My wife could tell you about the time the local Sunni militia showed up and shot all the Armenian shopkeepers on Al-Qala'a street...

Prime Junta

May 9th, 2008, 11:46

Here's the best I've found on the situation on the streets there right now: [ http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2008-05-09T070601Z_01_L07425998_RTRUKOC_0_US-LEBANON-CONFLICT.xml&pageNumber=0&imageid=&cap=&sz=13&WTModLoc=NewsArt-C1-ArticlePage3 ].

Basically, Hezbollah's Islamic Resistance is going where it wants, doing what it wants, torching the buildings it wants, and then handing them back to the Lebanese army if it wants. In other words, it's making a pretty good impression of being the most effective fighting force in the country.

Edit: according the latest information, Hezbollah is now in control of West Beirut.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7391600.stm ]

FYI, West Beirut is a medium-sized city, perhaps a few hundred thousand to a million or so inhabitants, depending on how you count it. Mostly Sunni, with some Armenians and Orthodox Christians as well. Looks like they've gone too middle-class since the previous civil war to be able to set up a proper M-E style neighborhood watch program. If they move into Achrafiyeh, Sodeco, or East Beirut, there will be trouble.

Pictures from one of my trips there:

http://farm1.static.flickr.com/30/65430365_d63ad055fd.jpg?v=0
http://farm1.static.flickr.com/9/77646937_3ebdb5d2aa.jpg?v=0
That's Rafic Hariri, the assassinated PM, on the wall in that one.

http://farm1.static.flickr.com/41/77646835_996f76a716.jpg?v=0
http://farm1.static.flickr.com/38/77646713_c1aab207bd.jpg?v=0
http://farm1.static.flickr.com/27/65430382_e041b479be.jpg?v=0
This one is the Café Rawda, something of a legendary spot there. It operated all through the civil war, and served as a quiet place for Beirutis to take their children for lunch and a swim, or for various spies, terrorists, secret agents, smugglers, and what not to hatch their plots.

http://farm1.static.flickr.com/147/335439677_059c2ced50.jpg?v=0
This is Joanna having a coffee there.

POLYGON

May 9th, 2008, 14:58

I'll give a summary of what happened(or at least what Lebanese media says):
1-Lebanese Government gives orders to remove Hizbullah's private wired network which is spread in areas where Hizbullah and its headquarters is.
2-Hizbullah's supporters go down to the streets and wreck havoc in the airport highway and close the road to the airport which is closed and all flights suspended.
3- Some shooting sessions in Beirut in places where Sunnites and Sh'ites resides.
4- The next day Hasan Nasrullah states that and I quote" any hand which come near our wired network will be cut and we will defend ourselves and we will fight as if we were fighting Israel".
5-Shortly after, hell breaks in Beirut and Hizbullah fighters start taking over government offices and media and at the end of the day they control all western Beirut.

As for casualties, 11 were killed and 2x were injured.
The Lebanese army hasn't taken sides and is trying to avoid confrontations with Hizb.

Right now Hizb guys are surrounding Qraitem the house of Sa'ad Al Hariri and the house of Walid Gunblatt in Klimonso in Beirut.

Where I live in Saida there's no armed action but if this goes on it won't take long b4 it moves to the south, right now he north is the only safe area in Lebanon
Politically speaking, what happened is totally unexpected because Hizbullah changed its attitude 180 degrees, never would anyone has expected to see Hizbullah fighters doing what they are doing, but it seems this time the government has gone far by their last decesions...as this network is an integral part of Hizbullah's force thus it's untouchable

Prime Junta

May 9th, 2008, 15:05

I disagree about it being unexpected. I've been expecting something like this ever since the deadlock over the presidency started to drag on; say about a year or so. (That's why we canceled our travel plans there three times already.)

The only really unexpected thing about is the way it happened -- I cannot for the life of me understand how the Lebanese government would not realize how Hezbollah would react to a direct attack on their strategic infrastructure. They don't call it a state within a state for nothing.

Edit: OTOH nobody's ever lost predicting instability in the Middle East. It's the stable periods that are hard to predict.

Hang in there, Polygon, and let's hope those morons at the top are suddenly shocked into reason before this gets completely out of hand. Hope your house has its own water supply and generator...

Prime Junta

May 9th, 2008, 15:24

Pretty good summary of the bigger picture here: [ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7392013.stm ], although it leaves out a number of IMO very important factors, specifically the marginalization of the Shi'ites before Moussa Sadr started to organize them. That's the deep underlying resentment fueling Hezbollah's effort to build its state within a state.

dteowner

May 9th, 2008, 15:38

Very educational. Thanks, gents, and keep us informed.

Stay safe, POLYGON.

magerette

May 9th, 2008, 17:45

Ditto--thanks for the inside look at what would otherwise be just a meaningless headline. Best wishes for some sort of resolution sooner rather than later, though it doesn't sound good. And as dte says, hope POLYGON and Prime J's in-laws (and all others at risk)come through all this safely.

Squeek

May 9th, 2008, 19:45

Me too. Stay safe, everyone. You'll be in our thoughts and prayers.

Prime Junta

May 10th, 2008, 12:03

It seems things have quieted down a bit for now, and the Hezb have pulled their fighters back. Flare-ups in various places around the country, though.

I also came across a new interpretation of events. Try this on for size:

* Since the Mughniyeh assassination, relations between Hezbollah and Damascus have deteriorated: Iran and Hezb no longer trust Bashar.
* If the Syrian-Israeli peace talks succeed, they will leave Hezb hung out to dry. Damascus no longer needs it, and stopping aid to them in a verifiable way will be a precondition of any such peace deal. They will also take the Cheba'a farms pretext off the table, since they'll be transferred from Israeli control to Syrian control.
* This means that Hezb will need the Beirut airport for logistics. Specifically, they'll need enough control over it that the Tehran-Beirut cargo flights won't be inspected too closely.

The upshot is that the Hezb finds itself in a corner -- Iran still supports it, sure, but its list of allies closer to home will be a lot shorter, and it will have major logistical difficulties getting supply to its army.

Now that the Lebanese government acted to (1) remove their man on the airport, and (2) dismantle their command-and-control network, they felt they had no choice but to remind everyone who wears the pants in the country. Time is against them, and to get what they want, they need to resolve the political crisis to their liking sooner rather than later.

I don't know how much merit this theory has; it's unlikely the guy who presented it (Pierre Akel, interviewed on Al Jazeera) has any more information to go on than the rest of us. But it seems no less plausible to me than most other explanations I've heard.

May 10th, 2008, 12:58

Well for the Syrian side that sounds much like some of the ideas we were tossing round in the thread on Syria's offer. If Hezb is looking to use Beirut aprport for large scale arms shippments there's going to be more trouble and a lot of international pressure on the government to shut them down.

Hope you're still safe over there Polygon and this all blows over without further violence.

Prime Junta

May 10th, 2008, 14:24

Yep, any way you look at it, Hezb is going to be the loser in a Syrian-Israeli deal.

The trouble is that they will be able to resist that pressure. The government won't be any more capable of shutting them down than they are now.

The smart thing to do would be to find some kind of carrot to offer them to get them to climb down, and integrate their army into the Lebanese one. A "Martyrs of Bint Jbeil Brigade" in the Lebanese army wouldn't be exactly an ideal solution, but it would be an improvement over the current situation.

Prime Junta

May 10th, 2008, 17:12

Well well, looks like there's some movement again. The government appears to have faced the inevitable, although it's hiding behind the back of the army. The Lebanese army has rescinded the government's two decisions that sparked this fighting -- the ones about the telecom network and the Hezzies' man at the airport.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7393982.stm ]

This means that there is an opening for talks, but it isn't going to be easy -- there's been a huge loss of face for the government, which will make discussions very difficult. One possible way out is to blame it all on Walid Jumblatt and serve his head on a plate to Hezbollah. (Probably not physically, though, since that would seriously annoy the Druze; the Druze are another group there that you really don't want to seriously annoy. They run their own fief like Switzerland; it's very beautiful and easy to visit, but they take their own security very seriously. I understand some of Jumblatt's guys managed to shoot some Hezb guys dead when the latter showed up to pay them a visit a day or two ago. Which, of course, is also not good.)

zahratustra

May 10th, 2008, 22:15

What on earth has possesed Lebeanese government to confront Hezbollah? Anybody who know anything about situation in Lebanon could have told them folly of such an action! So how a body of people with (apparent) local knowledge and experience could overplay their hand so badly? Terminal stupidity or have they counted on something which just didn't come off?

Prime Junta

May 10th, 2008, 23:37

That's what's puzzled me too. It just doesn't make any sense. The best I can offer is that Sinioura has no military background and therefore did not realize what he was playing with when he targeted that telecom network (he's a physician, actually), while Jumblatt, who hates Hezbollah like poison and is borderline insane or on drugs, talked Sinioura and the rest into it.

Whatever it was, it was colossally stupid. My respect for Sinioura and his gang has gone down several notches. The man has his heart in the right place, but you gotta admit he's not doing a very good job leading the country, or even keeping the damn place together.

In any case, it looks like this round is winding down; the Hezb accepted the army's decision to revoke the government orders (don't ask, that's the way things work there), and is returning to its positions before the mess. Status quo ante, in other words, more or less as V7 predicted. (Boy am I glad I was wrong on this one.)

But, of course, this hasn't solved anything. As of now, the situation is:

(1) Hezbollah's position has changed pretty radically. They've lost whatever goodwill they had among non-Shi'ites -- turning their weapons on Lebanese crossed a line they have not crossed before. This will strengthen the case that they really, genuinely do need to be disarmed -- it'll be a lot harder for them to present themselves credibly as a "national" movement, acting in the interests of Lebanon. On the other hand, they've given a stark reminder to everybody just how powerful they are. They've gone with "Let them hate us, as long as they fear us" rather than a softer approach that they've also, occasionally, flirted with. This does not bode well.

(2) The government has shown just how irrelevant it is. It doesn't control the army, it can do absolutely nothing about Hezbollah or even keeping order in the country, or indeed much of anything more than pounding their fist, pouting, or weeping.

(3) The army came out of this kinda OK. They didn't split, they stayed neutral, and they actually resolved the crisis (if it is, indeed, resolved and doesn't spin out of control again, which could very well happen). Their prestige is unchanged or perhaps slightly enhanced.

(4) I predict that Jumblatt will be the big loser. He's the loose cannon in the government, and after this, the government won't have much need for him.

What next? I don't know. The power struggle over the presidency *must* be resolved, otherwise this will just happen again, and again, and again, until the country does slide into full-scale civil war. And after this, pretty much the only way to resolve it is to give the Hezb what they want. After *that,* the ball is in Hezb's court -- if they use their power responsibly, things might start to stabilize; if they act like Iran's proxy on the Mediterranean, things will turn ugly very quickly indeed.

So it looks like we may have dodged a bullet this time. But there will be others. We'll have no shortage of excitement from the Middle East.

zahratustra

May 11th, 2008, 00:51

The best I can offer is that Sinioura has no military background and therefore did not realize what he was playing with when he targeted that telecom network (he's a physician, actually), while Jumblatt, who hates Hezbollah like poison and is borderline insane or on drugs, talked Sinioura and the rest into it.
While that's possible that would also mean that Sinioura listened to Jumblatt but haven't consulted army? And if there was no consultation why have military agreed to Sinioura's plan? :rolleyes:

May 11th, 2008, 01:11

There's been a lot of pressure on the government to disarm Hezb one might wonder if this hasn't demonstrated good will and the lack of capacity to those doing to pushing, might even lead to some quiet internaitonal assistance.

It also might be worth wondering if someone in the government was drawing the same connections PJ was between Syria, Hezb and the airport and calculated the government's best shot might be to move first before any Syrian deal made the airport Hezb's only supply route.

And if you're really cynical you might wonder whether Hezb was deliberatly provoked to divide them from the rest of the country which would make for a very dangerous game of brinkmanship indeed.

zahratustra

May 11th, 2008, 03:41

There's been a lot of pressure on the government to disarm Hezb one might wonder if this hasn't demonstrated good will and the lack of capacity to those doing to pushing, might even lead to some quiet internaitonal assistance.
And you think that Sinioura's government was prepared to suffer consequences of their action just to prove the point? Besides this regime would be long gone if not for "quiet international assistance" and any less quiet one (from any side) could make already precarious sytuation worse still don't you think?

May 11th, 2008, 04:43

I'm not at all sure that that was the calculation they made, just suggesting it for consideration. If you step back and think for a moment what are the consequences?

They've shown they can't disarm Hezb but that was already known.
Hezb is now isolated politically in Lebanon and the moral arguement to disarm them strengthened.
The government looks bad, but then PJ's already suggested a scapegoat and from what I can see most of the anger about the fiascio seems to be directed at Hezb rather than the government anyway.

Basically if there's no more violence we're back to where we were with some added tension and Hezb looking more isolated and the government looking irrelevant (to use PJs word). For Hezb thats a problem, for the government thats not much of a change (they basically sat and got bombed without doing more than protesting during the last war). Graned I could well be wrong but I find it hard to belive the government would misjudge Hezb so much as to think they wouldn't respond.

zahratustra

May 11th, 2008, 05:19

May 11th, 2008, 05:33

PJ or Polygon could anwser that better but I don't think they made any friends by reminding everyone of the civil war.

Prime Junta

May 11th, 2008, 09:40

While that's possible that would also mean that Sinioura listened to Jumblatt but haven't consulted army? And if there was no consultation why have military agreed to Sinioura's plan? :rolleyes:

If there was a plan, the military clearly wasn't involved -- Sa'ad Hariri's move to kick these troublesome decisions to the army looked like an obviously improvised and rather desperate move.

Sinioura has no military background, which means that his contacts within the army are pretty limited. It's quite possible that he doesn't, in fact, consult with them. He strikes me as being a pretty weak leader -- his heart in the right place, but not devious nor strong enough to be able to navigate these waters. But as I said, I'm as puzzled as you are.

Prime Junta

May 11th, 2008, 09:51

I am not sure how isolated Hezb have actually become. Like PJ said, they took up arms against fellow Lebanese (something they said they will never do) but fighting was brief, casualties minimal and only time will tell if they have suffered any lasting damage. And let's not forget that Hezb enjoyed quite wide support among Lebenese population so, depending on how much popularity they actually did loose, it might matter or it might not.

It matters, believe me. The distrust between the communities runs very, very deep. One of Hezb's main assets has been that it is the only militia never to have turned its arms against fellow Lebanese. This gives legitimacy to its claim to being a national resistance directed against the Israeli occupation (or, since 2006, defending against any future attempts at Israeli occupation). Now that it's shown that it will, in fact, cross that line, non-Shi'ites will regard it with far greater suspicion. If Michel Aoun doesn't reconsider his alliance with it, his support among the Maronites will erode further, civil war loyalties or no.

(The Maronite Christians are split internally between supporters of Samir Geagea and Michel Aoun; this split dates from the civil war. Aoun is the very definition of a loose cannon in a country full of loose cannons, and Samir Geagea hasn't really been doing all that much, except quietly reactivating the Forces Libanaises militia. Aoun is (currently) pro-Hezbollah, Geagea is pro-government.)

But the fact remains that isolated or not, the Hezbollah can resist any pressure put on it by anyone... unless Iran suddenly decides to drop its support, which isn't going to happen unless the USA, the EU, and Tehran suddenly become bosom buddies. There simply isn't any force in the country, or even the region, that can compel it to do anything they don't want to do. That's the reality that nobody wants to acknowledge, but everybody will have to.

(Come to think of it, the upcoming US elections just might be a factor in this too. Maybe the Hezb is calculating that the Dems will win, which will lead to détente between Tehran and Washington, which will lead to Iran putting a tighter leash on them, which would cause their position to deteriorate further. So, once again, better to move now than later. But probably not; that's getting slightly far-fetched.)

Prime Junta

May 11th, 2008, 09:52

Update: Beirut is mostly quiet and they're hoping to open the airport soon, but serious fighting has erupted in Tripoli in the north. I didn't expect that.

Edit -- my interpretation of this twist: To my knowledge, Hezbollah doesn't have a presence in Tripoli. That means that the opposition and government supporters are in close contact with no disciplined and trained force in place on either side. Government supporters are probably stronger there. So what we're seeing there is probably a flare-up of uncontrolled street fighting, where the government supporters are exercising their right to bear arms against the opposition supporters, in retaliation for the crap that went down in Beirut. The result is a lot of ugly, uncontrolled street fighting. Let's hope the army (or anyone) gets that under control soon, 'cuz otherwise the real militias will step in and it'll start all over again.

Another edit: the uglier explanation would be that this is an attempt at ethnic cleansing -- the Tripoli Sunnis taking out their frustrations on the Alawite community there, which is rightly or wrongly associated with Syria (whose ruling clique are also Alawites).

Third edit: according to the latest update on BBC, this is more or less what has been happening.

POLYGON

May 11th, 2008, 11:32

At last, some electricity. As PJ states things are calm now (in Beirut at least), but in the north where it was supposed to be safe there's a lot of shooting going on. Mainly in Tripoli where Hariri's supporters are the majority.

An intersesting notice in what happened is how only Sh'ites and Sunnites fought. Maronites didn't, although Aoun's and Geagea's supporters are neighbors.
While Druze, were passionate with each other. Talal Irslan who is a Hizbullah supporter, called Walid junblatt and made sure he's alright and offered help and was too emotional with him. While now I'm watching an interview with Weam Wahab, another pro-hizbullah Durzi, he just defended Junblatt about the 3 killed Hizbullah members and said that he didn't give the order to kill them. I always thought Druze will unite when things get serious, and what happened convinced me even more.

In saida where I live only one shooting session happened and two were killed but nothing serious

magerette

May 11th, 2008, 16:42

Glad to hear things are calming down, at least in the original area of conflict, and that there were few casualties in your immediate area, POLYGON. Not so glad to hear that new fighting has erupted elsewhere. All these different groups with a violent grievance against each other makes it hard to unravel the news stories, but it helps to hear your and Prime J's explanations.

There's a huge resistance here to negotiating with Iran and Obama being willing to even consider it is a McCain talking point against him (and no one can tell where Clinton really stands, other than the obliteration remark which is hardly helpful.) It makes me wish so strongly that people could be exposed to the reality behind the news and understand that the situation is really much more complex than either the media talking heads or current administration paint it. 9-11 really has fogged the issue terribly for the average American, and we can only hope that time and disillusion will make it easier for us over here to see what works and what doesn't in this situation so that the US and other countries can do something concrete to help.

Prime Junta

May 11th, 2008, 18:28

An intersesting notice in what happened is how only Sh'ites and Sunnites fought. Maronites didn't, although Aoun's and Geagea's supporters are neighbors.

That's because not a one of them is ready to get killed over Hezbollah. Aoun or Geagea perhaps, but they don't trust the Shi'ites any further than they can spit a rat. And Aoun was noticeably quiet here. In fact, I have a feeling that unless Aoun rethinks his alliances, he's going to lose a quite a bit of support, civil war loyalties or no.

While Druze, were passionate with each other. Talal Irslan who is a Hizbullah supporter, called Walid junblatt and made sure he's alright and offered help and was too emotional with him. While now I'm watching an interview with Weam Wahab, another pro-hizbullah Durzi, he just defended Junblatt about the 3 killed Hizbullah members and said that he didn't give the order to kill them. I always thought Druze will unite when things get serious, and what happened convinced me even more.

That's for sure, the Druze have learned that they can only count on themselves. If push comes to shove, I'm pretty sure they'll unite behind Jumblatt.

In saida where I live only one shooting session happened and two were killed but nothing serious

By most standards, street fighting that leaves two dead would count as something pretty serious. Good to hear you're OK!

zahratustra

May 11th, 2008, 19:20

.While Druze, were passionate with each other. Talal Irslan who is a Hizbullah supporter, called Walid junblatt and made sure he's alright and offered help and was too emotional with him. While now I'm watching an interview with Weam Wahab, another pro-hizbullah Durzi, he just defended Junblatt about the 3 killed Hizbullah members and said that he didn't give the order to kill them. I always thought Druze will unite when things get serious, and what happened convinced me even more.

Well, according to the latest reports Druze haven't united behind Jumblatt. Talal might have been affectionate to him but he also told him that price of ceasfire is that Jumblatt's faction has to turn their weapons over to Lebanese army. AND it appears that the old man agreed... It's a huge blow to Jumblatt's prestige and it (if he goes through with it) renders his faction irrelevant in future power games. It also(unfortunatelly) appears that Hizbullah is now the only major power in Lebannon.....

Prime Junta

May 11th, 2008, 21:22

Well, according to the latest reports Druze haven't united behind Jumblatt. Talal might have been affectionate to him but he also told him that price of ceasfire is that Jumblatt's faction has to turn their weapons over to Lebanese army. AND it appears that the old man agreed... It's a huge blow to Jumblatt's prestige and it (if he goes through with it) renders his faction irrelevant in future power games. It also(unfortunatelly) appears that Hizbullah is now the only major power in Lebannon.....

So it does look like Jumblatt will be the scapegoat... and I'll have to substitute "some other Druze chieftain" for Jumblatt. Them's the breaks...

Re Hezbollah: it's not quite as simple as that. In a lovely twist of historical irony, Hezbollah's position in Lebanon isn't that different from the USA's position in Iraq. They're the strongest fighting force in the country by far -- best trained, best equipped, most cohesive, and certainly most experienced. However, they can only exert military control over the ground they stand on (other than their strongholds), and there aren't enough of them to stand on all of Lebanon. If they do choose the way of armed confrontation, they'll be facing an interesting reversal of roles -- they're the strong ones in the open, and they'll be facing much weaker opponents doing harassment and hit and run on them. I doubt they're very interested in that outcome. That means that they'll have to deal with the other factions there.

As of this writing, this means:

(1) The army. Michel Sleiman came out of this smelling like a rose. It's been said of the Lebanese army that it's actually a pretty good army, except that if you want to fight a war, you should invite some other army. That still holds. They're good at maintaining order and keeping the peace... *as long as* they don't need to go against any of the other major factions in the country. They also have plenty of boots to stand on -- meaning, they can effectively clamp down on the chaotic street-level fighting that we've been seeing in Tripoli and now east of Beirut. (I hope so anyway.) But since the army consists of people with dual loyalties all over the place, their freedom of action is very severely limited. You won't see them going against Hezbollah or Amal, probably not against the Forces Libanaises or Aoun's supporters either.

(2) Forces Libanaises. Geagea's militia has been the underdog lately, but don't count them out. If Aoun's popularity tanks, Geagea will be the big winner. He's an old fox, an old soldier, and has been quietly reactivating his forces. Expect more from him.

(3) The government. Sure, it's "irrelevant" -- the army doesn't do what it says, if the country is invaded all they can do is weep on TV, and so on. And yet... it's the "irrelevant" government that precipitated this mess. If the political deadlock can be resolved -- in *any* way -- the Lebanese government will be a player again. In particular, if we should see the unlikely situation of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the President of Parliament all pulling in the same direction and not trying to screw any of the other major players, they'll be very much in the game. In a way, this is the prize the others are angling for.

(4) The Druze. Don't count them out either -- Jumblatt may be down, but he won't be out until the fat lady sings. If push comes to shove, the Druze *will* unite, and I'm still betting it'll be behind one of their traditional chieftains, of whom Walid Jumblatt is numero uno. I would expect Jumblatt to pay some token penance, hand over a few rusty rifles, and withdraw to Mukhtar to lick his wounds. After which he'll be back. But most definitely he's a big loser here.

(5) Business interests. Specifically, the Hariri clan and the other Beirut Sunnis. They don't have that many guns, but they've got all the butter, and the Saudis to back them up. Gun power is scary, but it has its limits; money power is less obvious, but it just might win out in the end. The Hariris have that. They took one in the gut big-time here, but don't count them out either.

(6) Last but definitely not least, General Michel Aoun and his merry men. He may be old, power-mad, and mentally unstable, but he's (a) enormously popular among his base, and (b) his wacky program actually has the advantage of recognizing the reality that the other factions fail to admit -- that Hezbollah is the power that needs to be dealt with and brought on board the Lebanon project if the country is ever to vaguely resemble a country rather than Italy ca the year 1500 -- and that Hezbollah won't come aboard out of the goodness of their hearts; they need something very tangible if they're ever to play ball.

I would expect the next rounds of this chess-boxing match to be played out between these seven factions, plus the Syrians, Iranians, French, and Americans/general Western interests. But don't anyone think it's the external parties who are calling the shots -- it's the Lebanese factions who are wheeling and dealing between each other and the foreigners, and tripping all over themselves in their cleverness.

Let's just all hope that the next round will be chess rather than boxing.

POLYGON

May 12th, 2008, 01:12

So it does look like Jumblatt will be the scapegoat... and I'll have to substitute "some other Druze chieftain" for Jumblatt. Them's the breaks...

Re Hezbollah: it's not quite as simple as that. In a lovely twist of historical irony, Hezbollah's position in Lebanon isn't that different from the USA's position in Iraq. They're the strongest fighting force in the country by far -- best trained, best equipped, most cohesive, and certainly most experienced. However, they can only exert military control over the ground they stand on (other than their strongholds), and there aren't enough of them to stand on all of Lebanon. If they do choose the way of armed confrontation, they'll be facing an interesting reversal of roles -- they're the strong ones in the open, and they'll be facing much weaker opponents doing harassment and hit and run on them. I doubt they're very interested in that outcome. That means that they'll have to deal with the other factions there.

But they were smart weren't they?, as soon as they showed their point they pulled out of the streets to avoid any "hit and run"s.

As of this writing, this means:

(1) The army. Michel Sleiman came out of this smelling like a rose. It's been said of the Lebanese army that it's actually a pretty good army, except that if you want to fight a war, you should invite some other army. That still holds. They're good at maintaining order and keeping the peace... *as long as* they don't need to go against any of the other major factions in the country. They also have plenty of boots to stand on -- meaning, they can effectively clamp down on the chaotic street-level fighting that we've been seeing in Tripoli and now east of Beirut. (I hope so anyway.) But since the army consists of people with dual loyalties all over the place, their freedom of action is very severely limited. You won't see them going against Hezbollah or Amal, probably not against the Forces Libanaises or Aoun's supporters either.
The question is will the army stay united if things get rough?
They did well in the last few days to stay together, but then again the events of the last few days were not rough enough to split it. The only one that can avoid this is Micheal Suleiman, if he's strong enough the army will play a role, otherwise they won't.

(2) Forces Libanaises. Geagea's militia has been the underdog lately, but don't count them out. If Aoun's popularity tanks, Geagea will be the big winner. He's an old fox, an old soldier, and has been quietly reactivating his forces. Expect more from him.
The biggest winner in all of this IMO. He did not fight, no casualties, political victory over his fellow maronite Aoun. It was Aoun's allies who wreched havoc after all, so if anybody is losing support among Maronites it's Aoun and if u're not with Aoun and u're a maronite then u're with Geagea. IMO, he is the most dangerous leader in Lebanon, he has no ethics whatsoever.

(3) The government. Sure, it's "irrelevant" -- the army doesn't do what it says, if the country is invaded all they can do is weep on TV, and so on. And yet... it's the "irrelevant" government that precipitated this mess. If the political deadlock can be resolved -- in *any* way -- the Lebanese government will be a player again. In particular, if we should see the unlikely situation of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the President of Parliament all pulling in the same direction and not trying to screw any of the other major players, they'll be very much in the game. In a way, this is the prize the others are angling for.
Other than weeping on TV, what role will they play? a cure to the political crisis is highy highly unlikely.

(4) The Druze. Don't count them out either -- Jumblatt may be down, but he won't be out until the fat lady sings. If push comes to shove, the Druze *will* unite, and I'm still betting it'll be behind one of their traditional chieftains, of whom Walid Jumblatt is numero uno. I would expect Jumblatt to pay some token penance, hand over a few rusty rifles, and withdraw to Mukhtar to lick his wounds. After which he'll be back. But most definitely he's a big loser here.
Agreed. Just that there might a little fight their leadership between Junblatt and Weam Wahab before they unite.

(5) Business interests. Specifically, the Hariri clan and the other Beirut Sunnis. They don't have that many guns, but they've got all the butter, and the Saudis to back them up. Gun power is scary, but it has its limits; money power is less obvious, but it just might win out in the end. The Hariris have that. They took one in the gut big-time here, but don't count them out either.
Of course they are not to be counted out. When a full scale war breaks everybody will try to be their friends. They have the money to buy the equipment of ten well-equiped armies.

(6) Last but definitely not least, General Michel Aoun and his merry men. He may be old, power-mad, and mentally unstable, but he's (a) enormously popular among his base, and (b) his wacky program actually has the advantage of recognizing the reality that the other factions fail to admit -- that Hezbollah is the power that needs to be dealt with and brought on board the Lebanon project if the country is ever to vaguely resemble a country rather than Italy ca the year 1500 -- and that Hezbollah won't come aboard out of the goodness of their hearts; they need something very tangible if they're ever to play ball.
IMO he made a lot of enemies when he returned. While he also made friends, they might snub him as soon as they need someone to die for them. Then, his enemies won't offer him any help and Geagea will crunch him.

I would expect the next rounds of this chess-boxing match to be played out between these seven factions, plus the Syrians, Iranians, French, and Americans/general Western interests. But don't anyone think it's the external parties who are calling the shots -- it's the Lebanese factions who are wheeling and dealing between each other and the foreigners, and tripping all over themselves in their cleverness.

Let's just all hope that the next round will be chess rather than boxing.

IMO, you should rule out the government and probably the army and of course outside interference will be decisive.
I'me sure the next couple of rounds will be chess, but then who knows it could be a under-the-belt-punching-allowed boxing match.

Prime Junta

May 12th, 2008, 09:24

But they were smart weren't they?, as soon as they showed their point they pulled out of the streets to avoid any "hit and run"s.

They did. This time. If this spins out of control again, this might well change. These things have their own dynamic; you get drawn in even when you don't want to. That happened to Israel in the South -- they came in to kick out the PLO, but found that there was "just one more thing" to sort out, until eventually they got fed up with the Hezbollah sticking pins in them day in, day out, and left... in a way that looked like a humiliating retreat. That sort of thing is almost inevitable in a situation where there's one overwhelmingly powerful military imposing itself on a population that doesn't want it.

The question is will the army stay united if things get rough?

No, it won't., and everybody knows it. I don't think anyone wants the army to split up -- the ensuing mayhem will be too big; it'll be full-scale civil war for sure. That's why it's a stabilizing factor for the time being -- keeping neutral as the other parties slug it out, and brokering plus enforcing deals between them.

They did well in the last few days to stay together, but then again the events of the last few days were not rough enough to split it. The only one that can avoid this is Micheal Suleiman, if he's strong enough the army will play a role, otherwise they won't.

You're thinking of this a little bit differently: the army *is* playing a role, and its role is directly bound to the limits of its freedom to act. The only way the army would really be free to act as armies really do is if it splits, in which case we'd have two armies. But that doesn't mean it's irrelevant; quite the contrary. It's the most important stabilizing factor in the country today.

The biggest winner in all of this IMO. He did not fight, no casualties, political victory over his fellow maronite Aoun. It was Aoun's allies who wreched havoc after all, so if anybody is losing support among Maronites it's Aoun and if u're not with Aoun and u're a maronite then u're with Geagea. IMO, he is the most dangerous leader in Lebanon, he has no ethics whatsoever.

Yup, Geagea looks like a big winner here. However, the Maronites don't change allegiances at the drop of a hat, and Geagea started out way behind Aoun in popularity. If Aoun manages to spin this with his supporters that it was all Jumblatt's and the government's fault, he may get away with a small dent. We'll see.

Other than weeping on TV, what role will they play? a cure to the political crisis is highy highly unlikely.

Unfortunately, that's how it looks. But some kind of resolution to the political crisis is also inevitable -- either the country splits up and civil war starts in earnest, or there will be a solution. If there is a solution, the Hezbollah are the big winners there. They'll settle for nothing less.

Agreed. Just that there might a little fight their leadership between Junblatt and Weam Wahab before they unite.

Them, and Arslan. We'll see who comes out on top. Then again, Druze loyalties don't change at the drop of a hat either; that power struggle might be a nasty one. (I looked into Druze-on-Druze history a bit yesterday, and they're a lot less united than I thought.)

IMO he made a lot of enemies when he returned. While he also made friends, they might snub him as soon as they need someone to die for them. Then, his enemies won't offer him any help and Geagea will crunch him.

His new friends certainly would; however, he also has a pretty big and very hard core of Civil War period supporters. Those aren't going anywhere. Aoun has a very effective youth organization too; the next generation of Aounists is merrily growing up.

http://farm1.static.flickr.com/9/14538127_8db2ef9929.jpg?v=0

IMO, you should rule out the government and probably the army and of course outside interference will be decisive.

No, I don't think I should. They are the prizes of the contest after all, and any end to the crisis will have to come through them. Their freedom of movement is pretty narrowly circumscribed, but they have the mass to make up for it. They won't be "defeating" or "crushing" anyone just yet, but they're very much of a player here.

As to outside interference, I have long believed and continue to believe that Lebanese tend to overstate its importance by an order of magnitude. What Lebanese factions do with Damascus, Tehran, Paris, and Washington is far more important than what Damascus, Tehran, Paris, or Washington do with them. Sure, they matter, but the only traction they have on the ground is whatever the faction they sponsor is willing to give them -- and that will be limited by the freedom of movement of that faction.

I'me sure the next couple of rounds will be chess, but then who knows it could be a under-the-belt-punching-allowed boxing match.

That's what I'm afraid of too, unless there's a checkmate in this round. Which, of course, is very unlikely.

Prime Junta

May 12th, 2008, 10:27

Looks like this only rated a destroyer, not a battleship -- the U.S.S. Cole is on its way to parade up and down the coast.

In related news, Hezbollah said that they're going to get medieval on the country at any sign of American interference. I would be inclined to take them at their word. Hoo boy...

Prime Junta

May 12th, 2008, 12:52

More running commentary: the fighting hasn't entirely died down yet, and there's a real possibility it'll escalate again. Let's keep our fingers crossed. In particular, there's been some Shi'ite/Sunni violence on Hamra street in Beirut (it's a major shopping street), and some Druze/Druze/Shi'ite violence southeast of Beirut, just northeast of where POLYGON lives.

Incidentally, this exposes yet another often-repeated myth of Lebanese political life -- that "Hezbollah is the only group allowed to keep its arms after the civil war." When things start heating up, whoops out come the rifles, and we have pitched battles between Jumblatt's and Hezbollah's fighters.

IOW, when someone triumphantly proclaims that a militia has been disarmed, or has voluntarily disarmed, whether it's in Lebanon or in Iraq, don't you believe a word of it. All it takes to disarm a militia is to remove the armbands, stow the rifles under the floorboards, and rename it to the Mahdi Football Club, or whatever. When the time comes to activate it again, it's up and about in about fifteen minutes flat.

POLYGON

May 12th, 2008, 14:10

They did. This time. If this spins out of control again, this might well change. These things have their own dynamic; you get drawn in even when you don't want to. That happened to Israel in the South -- they came in to kick out the PLO, but found that there was "just one more thing" to sort out, until eventually they got fed up with the Hezbollah sticking pins in them day in, day out, and left... in a way that looked like a humiliating retreat. That sort of thing is almost inevitable in a situation where there's one overwhelmingly powerful military imposing itself on a population that doesn't want it.
That's not a good comparison, IMO. Hizbullah has headquarters and presence almost in every city in Lebanon. Yes, they vary in size and support but they can always use those as a rendez-vous. I mean Israel had to cross half of Lebanon to reach Beirut, so they can't retreat once they did what bthey came to do, while Hizbullah can take back west Beirut in one hour, do their business there then go back to the south suburbs again and again.

No, it won't., and everybody knows it. I don't think anyone wants the army to split up -- the ensuing mayhem will be too big; it'll be full-scale civil war for sure. That's why it's a stabilizing factor for the time being -- keeping neutral as the other parties slug it out, and brokering plus enforcing deals between them.
You're thinking of this a little bit differently: the army *is* playing a role, and its role is directly bound to the limits of its freedom to act. The only way the army would really be free to act as armies really do is if it splits, in which case we'd have two armies. But that doesn't mean it's irrelevant; quite the contrary. It's the most important stabilizing factor in the country today.
Once the army splits it won't remain a respected and legitimate player as it is now. So, they will lose their biggest advantage which is doing their business without being shot at. Yet, I agree they won't disappear , they will play a role though not as big as an army should.

Yup, Geagea looks like a big winner here. However, the Maronites don't change allegiances at the drop of a hat, and Geagea started out way behind Aoun in popularity. If Aoun manages to spin this with his supporters that it was all Jumblatt's and the government's fault, he may get away with a small dent. We'll see.
Yes it depends on how smart Aoun is.

Unfortunately, that's how it looks. But some kind of resolution to the political crisis is also inevitable -- either the country splits up and civil war starts in earnest, or there will be a solution. If there is a solution, the Hezbollah are the big winners there. They'll settle for nothing less.

If there is a solution, a new president will be elected thus a new government formed. I can't see how the current government will play a role. The new government is totally unpredictable. I mean this is the reason behind everything. The new government is a dilemma. A solution will mainly be the new government formation.

Them, and Arslan. We'll see who comes out on top. Then again, Druze loyalties don't change at the drop of a hat either; that power struggle might be a nasty one. (I looked into Druze-on-Druze history a bit yesterday, and they're a lot less united than I thought.)
IMO, Arslan is too weak to lead all the Druze. I know he has his supporters but in leadership traits he's weak.
You mean which era in history?
I always thought Druze would have been extinct in Lebanon if it's not for the PLO who fought their war for them against the Phalange back in the 70's. What can they do now? not much with no one to fight with or for them. They're weak IMO.

His new friends certainly would; however, he also has a pretty big and very hard core of Civil War period supporters. Those aren't going anywhere. Aoun has a very effective youth organization too; the next generation of Aounists is merrily growing up.
Indeed, but I don't think his friends are ready to lose a penny for him. He's only their ally to make them say "we are majority''. No matter how strong he can be, Geagea is still a veteran in these type of wars.

As to outside interference, I have long believed and continue to believe that Lebanese tend to overstate its importance by an order of magnitude. What Lebanese factions do with Damascus, Tehran, Paris, and Washington is far more important than what Damascus, Tehran, Paris, or Washington do with them. Sure, they matter, but the only traction they have on the ground is whatever the faction they sponsor is willing to give them -- and that will be limited by the freedom of movement of that faction.
Agreed. Except for Hizbullah who needs Iran to stay in the status of power they reached. That's why they acted quickly to revert the decision of removing Shkair(their man) from the airport. They need the airport just in case Syria shut their borders in the Hezb's face.

What you totally missed PJ, is an important player. Palestinians, although they are not in the picture now, but they will be dragged sooner or later. Did you see what Amin Al Jmail said 2 days ago? He said that Hizbullah's actions has made Lebanon a productive place for people like Al Qaida whose members have already reached Lebanon in Ein EL Helweh camp. Of course, Ein El Helweh camp is the biggest, most populated, and most armed palestinian camp in Lebanon. A few more statements like these from MAronite leaders can drag the Palestinians into the game.

That's what I'm afraid of too, unless there's a checkmate in this round. Which, of course, is very unlikely.
LMAO and also a KO is highly unlikely when the boxing match starts.

May 12th, 2008, 14:11

Prime Junta

May 12th, 2008, 14:58

Hezb may not be the only one with weapons but as far as I'm aware they're better armed, its one thing to be able to provide rifles to your irregulars and another to be able to deploy antishipping missiles. (Wonder if that had any influence in the decision not to send a battleship).

Oh, there's no question about that. As stated, the Hezb in Lebanon are like the Americans in Iraq -- they have absolute military superiority relative to anyone else in the country; indeed the only fighting force nearby whom they need to fear is the IDF -- they beat them playing defense, but they won't survive if they try to play offense.

That said, I'm quite certain Jumblatt, Geagea, and Aoun have pretty decent stockpiles of stuff that's a bit heavier than rifles -- RPG's, grenade launchers, possibly light field artillery, possibly Katyusha type rockets, possibly even light anti-aircraft missiles. Hezb is just the only one fielding heavy weaponry at this time. (Not that it'll make much difference in the event of an inter-Lebanese rumble; for that sort of thing, what counts is numbers, training, cohesion, morale, command and control, and experience, and they're miles ahead of anyone else there too.)

My point was just that news reports very often (triumphantly) state that some militia has agreed to disarm, or has stood down, or has ceded control of some area to some army, when in actual fact said militia has simply taken off the armbands, stowed away the rifles, and gone to ground temporarily.

Re the U.S.S. Cole: I kinda doubt Hezb's missile capability was a factor here; probably the Cole was the closest available. I also kinda doubt they'll actually attack it. If they did, the US would certainly retaliate with a massive bombing campaign à la 2006, and while the Hezb weathered it just fine, I'm sure they didn't much enjoy it, and aren't really looking for a re-run, especially if they have so many other things on their plate. But even so, if I was a sailor there, I would be sleeping just a wee bit lightly the next few nights.

Prime Junta

May 12th, 2008, 15:29

POLYGON

May 12th, 2008, 17:16

@POLYGON, yep, the Palestinians are another wild card in the game. I doubt AQ is very active in Ain el-Helwe (perhaps you have better info on this?), and the Lebanese Palestinians are a bit short on external support right now. It's certainly not safe to count them out, but they're not a player for the time being. What do you think will happen if they are drawn in?

Choas.
The Palestinians are not united like in the past, now there's a variety of factions(in Ain El Helweh at least). I see an inter-Palestinian struggle if they're drawn in. In Ain El Helweh, PLO(Fatah) and Osabat Al Ansar(Salafi Islamic group but not AQ) are the strongest and they agree on their hatered for Hizbullah but don't on theirr relationship with the USA.There's Hamas and Al Qeyada Al A'ama group(Ahmed Jubreil's) also, who are in terms with Hizbullah.
I can see the government dragging the army to a war on AL Ansar group(like they did in Nahr Al Bared) whcih will easily draw the rest.
I can't even imagine what will happen, this is so unpredictable.
As for AQ's presence in the camp, it's non-existent unless it's something very confidential and thus should be limited.

Prime Junta

May 12th, 2008, 18:13

Thanks, Poly. That's more or less as I pictured it. Let's hope things don't go that far.

BTW, in case there's anyone non-ME-nerd still reading, here's a short "who's who" of the major players, that might help decipher the commentary. It has a bit of a slant in the tone, but once you adjust for that, the facts and descriptions are pretty accurate: [ http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/528A3FFF-93B3-46D7-AE84-C2DD1C1F50F6.htm ]

dteowner

May 12th, 2008, 19:45

Yep, still reading, and I'm thinking a "cast of characters" could prove very useful about now. Like we've concluded elsewhere, this faction business is a little complex for us imperialist pig-dogs (or at least, this imperialist pig-dog). It's much easier to follow when there's only two major players and you can't hardly tell the difference between them (at least on a global political spectrum).

magerette

May 12th, 2008, 22:15

Yes, still here, also and that's a very helpful article. It may take a while for me to decipher the Byzantine labyrinth of parties, ethnic/religious groups and shifting positions. Makes our political infighting here look like a food fight in the kindergarten lunchroom afa relative complexity. :)

zahratustra

May 12th, 2008, 22:39

Polygon, could you possibly tell me what (if any) faction you consider yourself a part of and what are your thoughts on Hizbollah? Its a rare chance to hear insights of an insider in those matters!

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 08:58

Hey, since two of my favorite imperialist running-dogs are reading, I can't resist going into professor mode a bit. 'Cuz this mess illustrates pretty well why I feel quite strongly about a number of things.

First, Lebanon is sort of like the Middle East in microcosm. You've got all of the groups, all of the political tensions, and all of the regional tensions, except concentrated in an area about three times the size of Rhode Island. In other words, anything you see happening in Lebanon is happening in the Middle East at large. For example, the picture you see here is very much like what your guys have to deal with in Iraq, only Iraq is on a far bigger scale. So, now do you see why I've found the concept of "winning in Iraq" kinda problematic to start with?

Second, do you see why I get so irked when someone pops up to conflate "the Arabs" or "the Muslims" into some unified bloc (usually out to destroy Western civilization?)

Third, this sort of thing is why I don't buy the argument that private ownership of guns is an effective safeguard of democracy. Lebanon is a (near) universally armed society, with every group or neighborhood running, or at least capable of raising, a "well-regulated militia." You see the result: the army outgunned by a private militia, political crises turning deadly at the drop of a hat, and a democratic government in genuine and immediate danger of being overthrown by force. If there were a few less guns around, things would only get seriously violent if the army split down the middle, and the risk of that happening would be a great deal smaller than now, with the potential for escalation that all these private armies have.

And fourth, do you see the problems I have with the idea of exporting democracy in general? This is the social substrate you're dealing with. Slapping Western-style democratic institutions on top of it won't help, and if you simultaneously dismantle the existing institutions -- even if they're rather nasty ones -- you'll get chaos and civil war. If the Middle East is to evolve an open society or open societies, it'll have to do it in its own way, on its own schedule, and according to its own logic; the institutions it will evolve will look rather different from the ones we're used to too.

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 09:29

Another update: pardon my French, but I really wish Bush would STFU. He's not helping.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7397400.stm ]

(Specifically, the Lebanese army's problem isn't that it doesn't have enough guns; it's that it's composed of (gasp!) Lebanese! That means it's about half Shi'ite, which means that if you (a) arm with with the latest and greatest stuff and (b) send it against the Hezbollah, you'll end up with two armies, one fighting with Hezbollah and the other one digging in their strongholds, only *better armed*. Wouldn't *that* be an improvement!)

Edit: I *cannot* understand how the president of a major if declining power can be so completely clueless about a region he's directly involved in that he and his advisers would draw such a totally moronic conclusion from these events. Perhaps someone should point them at this thread; the information here is clearly way better than what the White House staff can provide him. GAH!

Another edit: Unless... this is pure great-power calculation. Flood Lebanon with arms, increase the pressure until full-scale civil war erupts. This will keep Hezbollah occupied and off Israel's case. Then continue supplying arms and money to whichever faction is willing to fight the Hezb. Continue until (a) everybody's dead or (b) Hezbollah cries uncle.

Third edit: this is what the Brits would have done back in the day, but the Americans never were much good at it. Not cynical enough, and care too much about who the "good guys" are.

By the way, whichever interpretation is correct, you wanna take a wild guess as to which one's going to be the default in that part of the world?

Corwin

May 13th, 2008, 09:31

Good Grief, I totally agree with everything you said!!

GothicGothicness

May 13th, 2008, 11:56

When will people ever stop fighting. I am really proud to be a swede these days, not only haven't we been in war for a very long time, we also take care of more victims than any other none neighbouring country.

What does it mater what religious branch I am in??? or if I am a hotu or a totu like in Africe. If they could just get a long and help each other to get a better life instead of figthing, how hard could it be?

Without these religions the world would certainly be a better place.

POLYGON

May 13th, 2008, 12:37

Polygon, could you possibly tell me what (if any) faction you consider yourself a part of and what are your thoughts on Hizbollah? Its a rare chance to hear insights of an insider in those matters!

5 days ago, I sympathised with Hizbullah.But now, I hate them the most.

I always thought of Hizbullah as heroes. They fought and died for Lebanon and its liberty and for the honour of its people.Yet, since 1993, they've been saying that their arms won't be raised ever against Lebanese or inside Lebanon and they kept repeating this over and over. However, in these last events, they forgot all their promises and did horrible actions against their own people.

Now, I am convinced that they are pretty much like the rest of political parties in Lebanon.
I discovered(by research) that they didn't allow anyone to fight in the south or offer them any help.Why? simply to take all the credit and owe us something.
OTOH, I won't stand with those civil war butchers like Geagea, Junblatt, Birri, and Aoun.
Simply, everybody is bad and no one is after the good of their country.

POLYGON

May 13th, 2008, 12:41

GothicGothicness

May 13th, 2008, 12:49

The problem is and was never about relegions.
I challenge anyone if any relegion urge its followers to kill anyone else.

As far as I know in the muslim religion Jihad is a part of the religion?

I also think the death punishment is a part of the koran ?

POLYGON

May 13th, 2008, 13:02

As far as I know in the muslim religion Jihad is a part of the religion?

I also think the death punishment is a part of the koran ?

It is a part.
However, it has lots of conditions to be applied.
People tend to miss those conditions and kill in the name of Jihad.
As a Muslim you can't kill any non-muslim and say it's Jihad. It's forbidden to kill a cat in Islam let alone a human. These people have given a bad image of Islam while in reality it's a relegion of amnesty and forgiveness not of violence and killing.
Death Punishment is a part of the koran. A killer must be killed. However, there's also conditions to that. I, as a muslim, can't kill a killer because I don't represent the ruler.

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 13:04

As far as I know in the muslim religion Jihad is a part of the religion?

As much as holy war is part of Christianity.

"Onward, Christian soldiers, marching as to war,
With the cross of Jesus going on before.
Christ, the royal Master, leads against the foe;
Forward into battle see His banners go!"

What jihad really means in various branches and interpretations of Islam would be a very long trek to get into, so at this point I'll just assure you that, in general and by and large, it doesn't have a great deal to do with what you have in mind (i.e., attacking infidels and converting them by force).

I also think the death punishment is a part of the koran ?

The Bible too.

Edit: Oh, and... I agree with POLYGON that religion isn't the issue in the current Lebanese crisis. It's about politics and group identity, which overlap and cross in a number of complex ways. The closest we've come to pure sectarian conflict this time around was in Tripoli, and there the Sunnis didn't attack the Alawites because they think the Alawites worship in a wrong way, follow wrong dietary rules, or celebrate the wrong festivals; they attacked them because over there the Sunnis are pro-government and they believed the Alawites, being Alawites like the Syrian president, are pro-opposition. Politics and group identity, not religion.

Come to think of it, I don't think I've ever once heard a Lebanese use a religious argument when explaining exactly why group X should be run out of the country; OTOH various class, race, and clan arguments are common, and most common is a very long-winded discussion of the wrongs suffered at the hands of group X. This applies even to overtly religious groups like Hezbollah.

Edit: scratch that, I remember a party with some Christians, most of the Aounists, where they eventually started drinking toasts to Slobodan Milosevic for having killed so many Muslims, and Adolf Hitler for having killed so many Jews. I still think even that was more about group identity (racism) than religion, though.

Corwin

May 13th, 2008, 14:06

I tend to agree. I remember for years never having a clear understanding of the troubles in Ireland because I tried to see it as a religious conflict. True Christianity doesn't preach war and killing either, just some people's interpretation of it. Christ said Love your enemies and Forgive those who persecute you. To me that's rather a clear statement from the Boss!! :)

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 14:20

There's a danger of this discussing veering seriously off topic, but what the hey.

In my view, religions give expression and meaning to a wide range of more or less fundamental human experiences. We don't need religions to give us excuses to fight wars; we can do that just fine even without them. However, religions do define what war is, when it is permissible to fight one, and how to behave when you're doing it. Jihad in Islam is one such definition; "Just War" in Christianity is another, and the completely non-religious Geneva conventions are a third. So war is a part of Islam or Christianity the same way war is a part of enlightenment secularism -- all of these systems define what it is and express rules about it.

GothicGothicness

May 13th, 2008, 14:23

I also think the death punishment is a part of the koran ?
The Bible too.

Yeah, confirming in that case that religions does preach killing. I happen to not be against death penalties though, but adultery certainly shouldn't result in death in my opinion. But that is another discussion.

. A killer must be killed. However, there's also conditions to that. I, as a muslim, can't kill a killer because I don't represent the ruler.

Who is the ruler in that case?

zahratustra

May 13th, 2008, 14:44

Thanks Polygon! That's just what I wanted to know!

dteowner

May 13th, 2008, 14:55

Re: Dubya's comments

If you really want a tinfoil hat justification, PJ, I offer you this. The one election issue where the Elephants trounce the Asses is national security, particularly as it relates to BMwB. National security isn't terribly important if there isn't a good bruhaha going. As we've seen, Lebanon seems to be a powderkeg full of all different sorts of BMwB, so what could be easier than throwing a match in the room and spotlight the resulting fireworks? It's a natural extension of my contention that political misdirection was a major player in the decision to go to Iraq.

And while we're at it, what could help our Israeli ally, Mr. Olmert, downplay his current corruption problems more than a whole lotta unrest a few miles up the road?

I suppose conspiracy theories are pretty easy to generate, but it's just too darn easy to connect these same dots over and over and over.

zahratustra

May 13th, 2008, 15:18

Edit: scratch that, I remember a party with some Christians, most of the Aounists, where they eventually started drinking toasts to Slobodan Milosevic for having killed so many Muslims, and Adolf Hitler for having killed so many Jews. I still think even that was more about group identity (racism) than religion, though.
Now, I mean it more as a general comment than a direct reply to you PJ but religion (or interpretation of a religion) IS a part of group identity. And, while religion might not always be a preeminent factor, it is always there as a part of the equation.

POLYGON

May 13th, 2008, 15:32

Yeah, confirming in that case that religions does preach killing. I happen to not be against death penalties though, but adultery certainly shouldn't result in death in my opinion. But that is another discussion.
Just like relegions ask for capital punishment, there are a lot of non rlegious people who do too. Death penalty is more of a controvertial issue. It may seem wrong to you but others think it's right just like abortion or euthanasia.

Who is the ruler in that case?
That's a very complex issue, back in the day when there was an islamic kingdom the ruler was the Khalifa. Only he can give such orders(Jihad and death penalties). But now, with no islamic kingdom or no country that rules with islamic laws there is no ruler.

May 13th, 2008, 15:52

No need for tinfoil hats, its policy based on one page executive summaries.

GothicGothicness

May 13th, 2008, 15:54

no islamic kingdom or no country that rules with islamic laws there is no ruler.

In that case it means they shouldn't be able to give any death penalties am I right? Anyway, in Europe most people think death penalties is barbaric. I am not one of those, if someone raped a child, or killed someone in cold blood, I think death penalty is the only solution. As long as there is no doubt of guilt.

Just like relegions ask for capital punishment, there are a lot of non rlegious people who do too. Death penalty is more of a controvertial issue. It may seem wrong to you but others think it's right just like abortion or euthanasia.

The problem I have is just that a book tells people who should die, it is very dangerous. We have also concluded that christianity has sometimes preached in bilbe according to PJ's post, and there are several other religions with also preach bad things :( I hope it didn't sound like I was just against islam POLYGON , I am against all religion.

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 15:54

@V7: I agree. A pretty good rule of thumb is "never ascribe to malice what can be explained by incompetence."

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 15:56

Now, I mean it more as a general comment than a direct reply to you PJ but religion (or interpretation of a religion) IS a part of group identity. And, while religion might not always be a preeminent factor, it is always there as a part of the equation.

Certainly it is, but in that role it's just a symbol like any other -- Montague, Capulet, American, German, white, black, Blood, Crip, Hell's Angel, Bandido. Removing religion from the equation won't change the picture much; you just end up substituting one set of symbols for another.

magerette

May 13th, 2008, 17:12

Prime Junta wrote:
And fourth, do you see the problems I have with the idea of exporting democracy in general? This is the social substrate you're dealing with. Slapping Western-style democratic institutions on top of it won't help, and if you simultaneously dismantle the existing institutions -- even if they're rather nasty ones -- you'll get chaos and civil war. If the Middle East is to evolve an open society or open societies, it'll have to do it in its own way, on its own schedule, and according to its own logic; the institutions it will evolve will look rather different from the ones we're used to too.

I couldn't agree with you more on this (and, indeed, the rest of your post) and the sooner this type of foreign policy from the US ends the better, IMO. I don't think the on-ground sentiment in this country has ever favored the "nation-building" model in Iraq. Latest poll(not that polls are God or anything but...) shows 82% of the country feels we have gone off on the wrong track, and a large part of it is this war, (and of course the economy it's sabotaging.)

I also think we need to quit propping up leaders and choosing the controlling elements of countries to support according to how they appear to agree with us. It would be fine if our leaders knew what they were doing and could pick a fair and logical choice that not only reflected our interests but the best interests of the people in that country, but that is far from the case atm.

Another update: pardon my French, but I really wish Bush would STFU. He's not helping.

You, me and about 70% of our population.

Edit: I *cannot* understand how the president of a major if declining power can be so completely clueless about a region he's directly involved in that he and his advisers would draw such a totally moronic conclusion from these events...

Have you listened to McCain? Our foreign policy expert? Shi'a--Sunni--WHATever--they're all BMwBs and the whole philosophy can be summed up in the old bumper sticker from the first Gulf War: "Kick their ass and take their gas." I obviously didn't always feel this way, but I don't see how anyone--even that other pig-dog ice-in-his-veins repub type ;)-- can defend it at this point.

Perhaps someone should point them at this thread; the information here is clearly way better than what the White House staff can provide him. GAH!

And thanks for that--your professor mode is very helpful, as well as everyone else's perspectives that I would otherwise never hear. The only drawback to that idea is that those people's minds are completely closed and dominated by their investment in this failure--no amount of fact will shake them loose from their position--but I'm hoping that November will at least shake them loose from the White House.

The problem is, as I was listening to Bill Moyers and Olberman (Have you listened to McCain? Our foreign policy expert? Shi'a--Sunni--WHATever--they're all BMwBs and the whole philosophy can be summed up in the old bumper sticker from the first Gulf War: "Kick their ass and take their gas." I obviously didn't always feel this way, but I don't see how anyone--even that other pig-dog ice-in-his-veins repub type ;)-- can defend it at this point.) discuss last night, that everything over here is lost in a non-informational wasteland of sensationalist journalism and apathy, and that truth only appears and is digestible when it can be reduced to simple short bursts of information, like the bumper sticker I quoted(which is indeed a sad truth for many). People want things to be easy to understand and deal with--they seem to respond to symbols and not to thoughtful or thought provoking positions. There's some hope that this is changing, though, and that's what we have to look to to get to a better realization of our world and the manifold crap that absolutely has to be better dealt with.

zahratustra

May 13th, 2008, 18:12

Certainly it is, but in that role it's just a symbol like any other -- Montague, Capulet, American, German, white, black, Blood, Crip, Hell's Angel, Bandido. Removing religion from the equation won't change the picture much; you just end up substituting one set of symbols for another.
Not in my opinion PJ. I would say that some symbols (and I count religion among those) are of more importance than others and removing (or substituting) them changes result of an equation.

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 18:28

We'll just have to agree to disagree on this point, then.

dteowner

May 13th, 2008, 19:06

Have you listened to McCain? Our foreign policy expert? Shi'a--Sunni--WHATever--they're all BMwBs and the whole philosophy can be summed up in the old bumper sticker from the first Gulf War: "Kick their ass and take their gas." I obviously didn't always feel this way, but I don't see how anyone--even that other pig-dog ice-in-his-veins repub type ;)-- can defend it at this point.Mooommmm! Somebody's poking me again!

Just keep in mind that the fact that the social structure is incredibly complex doesn't automatically preclude, "Kick their ass and take their gas."--it's the fact that we do all the refining, so all we can really do is take their oil. Of course, there's absolutely no reason to let reality get in the way of a good rhyme, so we'll excuse the minor inaccuracy.

Now, pedantry aside, half the problem we had in Iraq (and every other conflict in the last 20-some years) was trying to run a gentleman's war. It sounds well and good and keeps the UN happy, but in the long run 5 days of scorched earth is far more effective (even from a civilian casualty standpoint) than 5 years of smart bombs. It doesn't make for good TV, cuz it's really, really ugly, so it's not a popular answer. The world prefers 100 deaths every week for a year over 2000 deaths in one week. That's fine. Stupid...but fine. So, until such time as someone invents a bomb that can ring your doorbell and quiz you about your political affiliations before deciding whether to detonate, it's really not practical to single out the "bad apples", particularly when even the locals couldn't consistently tell you which folks really are the bad apples.

So where does that leave us? Clearly, the complexity of the social structure means that the cleanup phase of a conflict is going to take a huge amount of thought and planning and won't lend itself to our traditional cookie-cutter installations. Unfortunately, the US (and moreso for the Republicans and far beyond even that for Dubya) is far more adept at destruction than cleanup. We prefer to blow shit up and then hand out a lot of cash so someone else can deal with the aftermath. That's fine, as long as the social structure is simple enough that you know where to send the check. Our utter ignorance of, and general distain for, sectarian politics makes it impossible to really comprehend the short and long term implications of which hand we put that check into. And even worse, given the highly fluid interactions between the various factions, today's "good guy" often ends up being tomorrow's "axis of evil" (look no further than Saddam).

Now, I can already hear the hammered keyboards, "Then don't get involved in the first place!" We all know that's not an option for the US. People enjoy invoking our name to resolve every two-bit squabble, and isolation only works until the world knocks down the gate (See 9-11). The majority of the world is content to let the patient get gangrene and go septic. Us imperialist pig-dogs prefer to amputate, but we tend to forget the tourniquet and antibiotic. While the slow death is less dramatic, the patient still dies, folks.

zahratustra

May 13th, 2008, 20:45

You forgot carpet bombing, napalm, fuel-air explosive and agent orange from Vietnam era dte? There was no trick in the book (short of nuclear option) US hadn't tried to win that conflict. As for Iraq: false realities and planning faliures and not gentlemanly scrupules lead you to where you are now.
US administration fucked up because they were too stupid and not because they were too nice!

dteowner

May 13th, 2008, 22:07

I don't know that Vietnam is a valid data point given the political turmoil of the time. That was really the beginning of the whole gentleman's war ethic to my mind. The napalm and agent orange efforts were more about removing hiding places than good honest killin'.

I would disagree with some of your analysis, though. While there were certainly dismal planning failures for the cleanup phase (it's bad enough that even Dubya admits it), I would say we were far too gentle with the combat, which complicated the cleanup. Problems like al-Sadr could have been resolved in about 10 minutes. Instead, he's still screwing things up 5 years later because we weren't ready to withstand the international outcry that would have come from putting a 10-block-wide crater around his office. I doubt we would be dealing with as many weapons caches and snipers in the mosques if a couple of them had been flattened (now, I think you'd have to be very careful before you resorted to that so that the locals understood what was going to happen and why and give them a chance to deal with the problem themselves before calling in the ordinance). Because of the way we've gone about the combat, there are no consequences for aiding the terrorists. You've got to make our war their war or else you're doomed to failure (and I think we've proven that quite well in Iraq). This would apply to any activity in Lebanon as well (although I hope we stay far away from that quagmire).

zahratustra

May 13th, 2008, 22:17

Don't know exactly which phase you have in mind when you say "we were far too gentle with the combat, which complicated the cleanup" dte. But problem is that BECAUSE of wishfull thinking and planning faliure US did have enough troops to defeat Iraqi army (which nobody ever doubted they would) but not enough to pacify the country (make them FEEL defeated) afterwards. In short, there was never any clean-up worth speaking of!

dteowner

May 13th, 2008, 22:45

US did have enough troops to defeat Iraqi army (which nobody ever doubted they would) but not enough to pacify the country (make them FEEL defeated) afterwards.We're actually closer to agreement than you might think. It takes 6 soldiers to clear a building and then 6 more to clear it the following week. It takes one pilot to flatten it once and for all. We've got enough planes and ordinance to seperate every brick in the nation, but that would entail a lot of civilian casualties. We chose to replace indiscriminant destruction with manpower. Unfortunately, we couldn't/didn't apply sufficient manpower to pull off that trade.

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 22:48

Now, pedantry aside, half the problem we had in Iraq (and every other conflict in the last 20-some years) was trying to run a gentleman's war.

I know you like to think so, but that just ain't true. You've tried everything, from rounding up people at random and torturing them (Abu Ghraib and Haditha ring any bells?) to leveling an entire city (Falluja ring any bells?) You simply don't have, and never had, enough boots on the ground nor enough local knowledge to be able to effectively impose your will on the country. General Shinseki's estimate of 500,000 GI's was low: IMO it would take between a million and a million and a half.

(Snip rest of rambling attempt at self-justification.)

Seriously, dte -- you can do better than this. You've just recounted an explanation that salves your conscience and makes you feel better, but it doesn't have a great deal to do with the facts.

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 22:55

We're actually closer to agreement than you might think. It takes 6 soldiers to clear a building and then 6 more to clear it the following week. It takes one pilot to flatten it once and for all. We've got enough planes and ordinance to seperate every brick in the nation, but that would entail a lot of civilian casualties. We chose to replace indiscriminant destruction with manpower. Unfortunately, we couldn't/didn't apply sufficient manpower to pull off that trade.

You're also way overestimating the effect of bombing from the air. The IAF carpet-bombed Southern Lebanon in 2006 -- there was hardly a building standing there. Here's the Hezbollah stronghold in South Beirut, before and after the IAF bombing campaign:

http://static.flickr.com/71/208139199_a7ff9f1a07.jpg

The Russians did an even more thorough job of Groznyi, in their campaign against the Chechens. Guess what? The only effect was knocking over lots of buildings belonging to people who didn't have much to lose, killing some grandmothers too slow to get out of the way, and flooding the local resistance recruitment offices.

Once more: *YOU CANNOT BEAT AN INSURGENCY FROM THE AIR*. Not without going nuclear and killing literally everybody. That's a simple, basic military fact.

And I honestly can't believe that normal, intelligent people still can't get this simple, basic military fact through their heads, despite that fact that every military with air supremacy ever has tried, and failed, in it.

Prime Junta

May 13th, 2008, 23:03

Problems like al-Sadr could have been resolved in about 10 minutes. Instead, he's still screwing things up 5 years later because we weren't ready to withstand the international outcry that would have come from putting a 10-block-wide crater around his office. I doubt we would be dealing with as many weapons caches and snipers in the mosques if a couple of them had been flattened (now, I think you'd have to be very careful before you resorted to that so that the locals understood what was going to happen and why and give them a chance to deal with the problem themselves before calling in the ordinance). Because of the way we've gone about the combat, there are no consequences for aiding the terrorists. You've got to make our war their war or else you're doomed to failure (and I think we've proven that quite well in Iraq). This would apply to any activity in Lebanon as well (although I hope we stay far away from that quagmire).

Gee, dte -- I wonder why they didn't think of that?

You're starting to seriously annoy me again. I get annoyed by something called "invincible ignorance," you see. That means persisting in an incorrect belief despite mountains of evidence to the contrary.

Again, what you're repeating is a comforting lie -- "we're too damn nice to win." That ain't true -- you're too damn stupid to win. Specifically, you're too damn good at telling yourselves comforting lies, from "we'll be welcomed with flowers" now turned to "we're too damn nice to them." If you want to win, the first thing you have to do is recognize the realities. Although of course if you had, you wouldn't *be* in the mess you're in, would you now?

Do you really think that even if you had succeeded in assassinating al-Sadr (which is a big "if" -- resistance leaders are notoriously hard to track down; just ask the Mossad), another would not have stepped into his shoes? Or that resistance movements like his can be successfully intimidated by bombing buildings?

Wakey-wakey, dte. Look at everything you've *actually* tried, and everything, say, Israel has tried, in Southern Lebanon during their occupation, in the Palestinian territories, and in their numerous invasions of Lebanon.