Middle East News 3

[Prime Junta]

Since the other M-E news threads have drifted off the front page, it's time for a new one. Let's start on a high note: here's a contrarian opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, arguing that the stars are finally right, R'Lyeh will rise, and peace is about to break out over Israel:

[ http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=101194 ]

Salient points:
* The Arab states are spooked by Iran, and have realized that the conflict plays right into its hands. IOW, they (finally) genuinely want to resolve it.
* The Israeli elite has realized that the current policy (whatever it is) has reached a dead end; that there really is no military solution to the conflict.
* Only a really mean right-wing government is capable of imposing the kind of stuff on the settlers that's required for a peace treaty to stick.
* Netanyahu has personally assured the author that underneath that rugged exterior he's really a great big softy who spends most of his spare time rescuing and caring for stray kittens.
* Hillary really, really, REALLY wants a Nobel peace prize.
* Abbas would like one too.

There's more; the article's worth a read. I really wish I could share the guy's optimism.

[dteowner]

Interesting article. This guy seems to have taken a couple hits off the Hopey Change Bong, but let's take a look. I'm going to tick off your summary points (I'm not disputing the summary at all).

1) Really? I understand that Iran is supposedly stirring the pot in a lot of Arab states, but I've always taken that on roughly the same level as Ahmad-whatever and Chavez stirring the pot in the US. Worth noting, but largely pointless. Are the Egyptians and Saudis really worried about being undermined by wackos from Iran?
2) They haven't changed that policy in 50 years. Occasionally, they take a breath, but I haven't seen any real change. Why now?
3) I'll agree with that one.
4) Yeah, I'm convinced just as much as you.
5) Now THAT, I'll completely believe.
6) "A" comes before "R", "C", or "R-C". That's going to be a problem. Think they could get a new leader with a name at the end of the alphabet, pronto?

[Prime Junta]

Interesting article. This guy seems to have taken a couple hits off the Hopey Change Bong, but let's take a look. I'm going to tick off your summary points (I'm not disputing the summary at all).

More than just a couple, I'd say.

1) Really? I understand that Iran is supposedly stirring the pot in a lot of Arab states, but I've always taken that on roughly the same level as Ahmad-whatever and Chavez stirring the pot in the US. Worth noting, but largely pointless. Are the Egyptians and Saudis really worried about being undermined by wackos from Iran?

There's actually something to this notion. Iran has been on the ascendant ever since the Islamic revolution. Ever since Hafez al-Assad croaked, they appointed themselves torchbearer for the Palestinians, and backed it up with action -- e.g. bankrolling the Hezbollah big-time. The Arab street is majorly pissed off at the Egyptian government for cooperating with Israel during the Gaza dustup (which is why Egypt is now making a lot of noise about a Hezb cell it busted in Sinai, but that's another story). So yeah, the Arab elites really are a bit paranoid about the Iranians. Having the Zionists and Americans as scapegoats for everything was convenient enough as long as it lasted, but with Iran showing how it's really done, it doesn't wash anymore. So there really is some wish there to get their own house in order in order to stop Iran from dominating the landscape. There are concrete things to point at, too -- in particular, Syria's gradual reorientation of its policy; they've cooled noticeably toward Iran, liberalized their economy (although not their police state), and established pretty cordial relations with Saudi Arabia.

So yeah, this argument isn't entirely without merit. Previously none of the Arab states really had much to gain from an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord; now they do. When incentives shift, behavior changes. I think it's worth paying close attention to the noises coming out of the Arab League in the coming months.

2) They haven't changed that policy in 50 years. Occasionally, they take a breath, but I haven't seen any real change. Why now?

Good question. I think there may be more than a little wishful thinking here, but then again it's conceivable that if they keep doing the same thing for 50 years and it never nets them any more than very temporary gains, they might *eventually* decide to try something else.

3) I'll agree with that one.
4) Yeah, I'm convinced just as much as you.
5) Now THAT, I'll completely believe.
6) "A" comes before "R", "C", or "R-C". That's going to be a problem. Think they could get a new leader with a name at the end of the alphabet, pronto?

Well, they do also call him Abu Mazen. And there are always the Hamas bosses, Mahmoud Zahar and Khaled Meshaal. Zahar at least is far enough down the alphabet...

[dteowner]

You've definitely got more options if the Ice Queen graciously accepts her Nobel as simply "Clinton", but I bet she works "Rodham" in there somehow (in anticipation of her widowhood), so you're going to have to dig up Israeli and Palestinian leaders found at the very back of the phonebook. Otherwise, I think sharing is right out. Abbas hasn't got a prayer. ;)

[Pladio]

Well, not really news, but I know the person who wrote the article, so here it is:
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TRAVEL/04/27/24hours.telaviv/index.html

[Rithrandil]

Hey guys,

I went to a presentation at the Center of National Policy (http://www.cnponline.org/ht/display/EventDetails/i/12865) today. The conference was entitled "Iranian Non-Proliferation Policy: New Directions or Old Problems?" and was given by Former Ambassador Nicholas Burns, who currently teaches at... Harvard, I believe. He was the former U.S. ambassador to NATO, served in the State Department for thirty years, and was also the point man for W's Iran team. It was a fascinating presentation and I'm trying to find a video since my notes don't do it justice - if they post a video on their website I'll link to it here (I also saw CNN and CSPAN cameras as well, so you may see bits of this on the news...)

Anyways, my notes follow:

1) Greater Middle East is the most vital arena for U.S. interests.
2) Three challenges face the United States:A)Iran wants nuclear weapons.
i)No one in the diplomatic world doubts this, regardless of their country of origin.
ii)Would fundamentally change the balance of power in the Middle East.
iii)Iran refused to tell IAEA many details of their "civilian" program lends further weight to this belief.
B) Government of Iran funds and directs most of the terrorist groups in the greater Middle East
C) Iran has chosen to use its influence in Iraq and Afghanistan destructively.
3)America does not understand Iran, no relations for 30 years.
4) U.S. should try to use diplomatic engagement first and attempt to influence Iranian policy.
5) Bush Administration offered Iranians negotiations in 2006 with the pre-condition that they stop enriching uranium.
A)Was rejected by Iran
B)The Ambassador believes it is good that this condition has been dropped.
6)President will need to be very tough minded.
A)Leave force as an option on the table
B) should probably set a time table/deadline for talks so the Iranians can't drag things out until they develop a nuke.
7) Why not use force first?
A) Have not given diplomacy a chance to work in the past 30 years.
B) Iranians would hit back using asymmetrical warfare
C) Would be unconscionable to use force without trying diplomacy first.
8) Why Diplomacy?
A) Will never know if a peaceful solution is possible unless we try to create one.
B) It will give the U.S. international credibility.
C) Diplomacy has no downside.
i) If we are lucky, we will have progress.
ii) If we are unlucky, then we can institute "draconian sanctions" with a far greater likelihood of international cooperation
9) There are no bridges between the societies of U.S. and Iran. A) should try to bring Iranian students to U.S.
B) continue/expand on ecumenical conferences between religious leaders
C) increase access to more journalists and business people, etc
10) Must have Russia, China, and Arab states willing to join us in our negotiations and implement sanctions should negotiations fail.
11) Military and diplomacy need to be linked.
12) U.S. people and politicians must remain patient with process.
A) Risk of certain groups claiming negotiations have "failed" after only a few weeks or months
B) Obama needs to be given breathing room to make a solution happen if possible



There were some interesting questions asked, too - one point made was that even though Iran has the right to domestically enrich Uranium under the NPT that the U.S./negotiating partners should refuse to allow Iran to do so (for the time being) because they have proven to be untrustworthy.

Anyways, hope you guys find this interesting.

[Squeek]

Sounds like an interesting conference, Rithrandil. And it sounds like good analysis too.

I wonder how the CNP would have responded to the guy who asked McCain the "When are we going to start bombing Iran?" question. "Bomb, bomb, bomb...bomb, bomb Iran" obviously didn't cut it for McCain.

[Rithrandil]

Sounds like an interesting conference, Rithrandil. And it sounds like good analysis too.

I wonder how the CNP would have responded to the guy who asked McCain the "When are we going to start bombing Iran?" question. "Bomb, bomb, bomb...bomb, bomb Iran" obviously didn't cut it for McCain.

Thanks. Someone asked him what the upper time limit for talks should be and he didn't want to give an answer - as he put it, the Obama administration has a lot of smart people working on this and they don't need free advice from him. He honestly thinks that diplomacy or tough sanctions w/ the backing of other powers could work - and I have to agree with him.

He also gave a quick mention of why he/everyone believes Iran is developing nukes - he said the recent IAEA reports have shown many, many areas where Iran refused to cooperate with the IAEA about inspections, that Iran has rejected multiple plans (including ones put forth by Russia and China) that would involve international help building civilian nuclear facilities, but that enrichment would take place in another country (probably Russia) and that either France, Germany, or Russia would take in the spent nuclear material from the reactors. The Ambassador said that these things raised giant red flags and make little sense to do unless you have some other designs for your nuclear program.

[dteowner]

There were some interesting questions asked, too - one point made was that even though Iran has the right to domestically enrich Uranium under the NPT that the U.S./negotiating partners should refuse to allow Iran to do so (for the time being) because they have proven to be untrustworthy.

Anyways, hope you guys find this interesting.Very interesting analysis. It's this bit at the end that really troubles me, though. This is also at the root at my disagreement with PJ over Saddam. It's Dubya-grade logic, but it's enthusiastically endorsed. A scene, if you will:

Expert: OK, that country over there has proven time and again they cannot be trusted, so keep in mind that the best way to tell when they're lying is when their lips move. Half of what they tell you will be damn lies, but the other half will just be completely untrue.

"Enlightened" Euro/UN leader: Well, shit fire, boys, the only way we're going to accomplish anything is to spend the next couple years negotiating with them. Using our awesome powers of oral grati...errr...persuasion, we'll get them to pinky-promise. Maybe, if things go really well, we'll sign a non-binding agreement or two!

Expert: Ummm, did you hear the part about "cannot be trusted"?

OK, OK, that's a little snarky. But seriously, somebody has got to explain this logic to me.

[coyote]

I am sure everyone is aware of this already, but another important point is that Iran's policy is primarily focused inwards: even for moderate Iranians -- that is the vast and politically relevant majority -- a nuclear weapons program is both a matter of national pride and of security through deterrence. Even more generally, ask anyone in the Arab world, and they are likely to applaud the idea of Iran having the atomic bomb. Therefore, it makes perfect sense at least for their domestic policy to create the illusion of a nuclear weapons programme even if this is not their primary goal. No one knows for sure how far they have progressed in producing weapons-grade uranium due to lack of cooperation with the IAEA and regardless of their real ambitions, they will want to keep it that way.

Of course, the need for nuclear weapons as a deterrent will decrease if the US keeps a more peaceful stance, also for the general population, and the idea of a nuclear weapons program will be slightly less useful. Still, to give them enough incentive to drop this likely project openly and fully cooperate with the IAEA must take a major diplomatic effort. Quick success is not likely, as Amb. Burns noted.

[Rithrandil]

I am sure everyone is aware of this already, but another important point is that Iran's policy is primarily focused inwards: even for moderate Iranians -- that is the vast and politically relevant majority -- a nuclear weapons program is both a matter of national pride and of security through deterrence. Even more generally, ask anyone in the Arab world, and they are likely to applaud the idea of Iran having the atomic bomb. Therefore, it makes perfect sense at least for their domestic policy to create the illusion of a nuclear weapons programme even if this is not their primary goal. No one knows for sure how far they have progressed in producing weapons-grade uranium due to lack of cooperation with the IAEA and regardless of their real ambitions, they will want to keep it that way.

Of course, the need for nuclear weapons as a deterrent will decrease if the US keeps a more peaceful stance, also for the general population, and the idea of a nuclear weapons program will be slightly less useful. Still, to give them enough incentive to drop this likely project openly and fully cooperate with the IAEA must take a major diplomatic effort. Quick success is not likely, as Amb. Burns noted.

I have to disagree with a lot of your points - most Iranians are in favor of a civil nuclear program, not a military weapons program. Also, I can't think of a single Arab state (except possibly Syria) that wants Iran to have a bomb - Arabs and Persians don't get along, after all. In fact, if Iran gets a bomb, the next likely outcome is Egypt and/or Saudi Arabia developing their own as well. The Arabs stand to lose as much as we do (or more, honestly) from a nuclear-armed Iran.

[Prime Junta]

Very interesting recap, thanks again, Rith.

Not surprisingly given his background, the speaker talked a quite a bit about the "military option." There's at least one major problem with this thinking: America has no credible military options regarding Iran at this time, and Iran knows it. That means that "keeping it on the table" -- as in, talking about it -- will simply irritate rather than put real pressure on anyone.

To elaborate: the American public isn't in the mood for another ground war, and the military -- especially the Army and Marines -- are already fully committed, if not over-committed, between Iraq and Afghanistan. The American surface fleet is extremely vulnerable in tight waters like the Persian Gulf. That means that the only thing America could do is an air campaign -- and given that Iran's nuclear program is dispersed, hidden, and hardened, this would be at most a temporary setback to it. And, of course, Iran would make the USA pay a very high price for it on all fronts. It's also virtually certain that such an attack would cause the Iranians to drop their differences and rally around the flag; hoping for a spontaneous uprising and revolution is a pipe dream.

So, until these things change, the USA simply does not *have* a military option vis a vis Iran, which makes "keeping it on the table" rather pointless IMO.

Second, I believe the odds of being able to successfully deter Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon are low, and until the structural reasons that make them want it change, they're as good as nil. They want the bomb because Israel has the bomb, and they perceive (rightly, IMO) that of all the nuclear countries in the world, Israel has the itchiest trigger finger. From the Iranian POV, nuclear weapons are a deterrent against a first strike by Israel.

That means that if we want Iran to give up the bomb, we must somehow get them to believe that Israel will never use theirs against it, even if they have no retaliatory capacity of their own. I have no idea how we could do that, but it certainly can't be done without resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict -- and quite likely not even then.

A possible alternative is that Iran is given explicit security guarantees against an Israeli nuclear strike by a third country. For example, if Russia gave credible guarantees that it will retaliate with a nuclear strike against Israel should Israel make a nuclear strike against Iran, the picture might look rather different. However, I don't think this is realistic, and even if it was, the Iranian paranoia about foreign interference make it less than certain to succeed.

So, in my opinion:

(1) Yes, we should most definitely continue to use all diplomatic avenues to pressure, bribe, cajole, or trick Iran to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions. I think the odds of this succeeding are fairly slim, though.

(2) No, I don't think there's any point keeping the "military option" on the table, for the simple reason that there isn't one available right now.

(3) I believe our best remaining option is to make it as costly as possible for Iran to actually test a nuclear weapon -- which is something they cannot do in secret. This, I believe, is an achievable objective. (Of course, it's impossible to get to the final stage of having a deployable weapon without testing a proof-of-concept device first.)

First, we should integrate the Iranian economy with the global economy as deeply as possible, and engage with the Iranian government as broadly as feasible. Iran should receive immediate and tangible benefits from this engagement. The less they have to lose, the less leverage we have, so we must give them something to lose. This is why North Korea is such a PITA -- they don't WANT to engage with anyone, which means they can do whatever the hell they want, and there's not a whole lot we can do to pressure them to do otherwise. The huge difference is that Iran WANTS to engage with the world. This is something we have totally failed to exploit, and should.

Second, we make it absolutely clear that if they ever test a nuclear weapon, all these benefits will be immediately taken away, and the country will be put under sanctions every bit as tight as North Korea's.

Third, we should work as hard as possible to defuse the tensions motivating Iran to pursue a nuclear weapons program, and to build confidence with it, in the hopes of getting it to deprioritise it, and then allow better and more stringent inspections. If we're successful, by the time Iran does have nuclear capability, it won't be much more dangerous than France's.

And fourth, we should prepare for the eventuality where, despite our best efforts, Iran does get a nuclear weapon. That won't be the end of the world. When it comes to nukes, two are better than one: the only use of atomic bombs in anger happened when one country had the global monopoly on them. Israel has had nuclear weapons for a quite a while now, it's in a very bad neighborhood, and it hasn't used them. Nuclear parity between Israel and Iran would have a deterrent effect, and therefore Iranian nukes might not spell the end of the world after all.

[Prime Junta]

To counter dte's scenario, I'd offer this one:

The scene: The UN General Assembly, televised to the world:

Rainbows Unicorns (spokesman for the Free World): Yo, bearded dudes with turbans! Here, we want to conclude a free trade agreement, visa waiver agreement, and cultural exchange program with you right now. Hell, we'll even throw in a Starbucks in every hamlet. We really like your pistachios or whatever it is you grow there, you know. No strings attached. Nothing. Nuh-uh. What d'you say?

Them: Wow, dudes! That's really big of you. Sure, we're in!

The scene: Smoky back room in some embassy somewhere, six months later, after the public celebrations in Teheran of the broad range of agreements proposed above.

Dagger Velvet: Mr. Mullah, there is something that's so obvious Mr. Unicorns completely forgot to mention it in his inspiring speech yesterday. While we have no doubts at all about your sincerity regarding your intentions in your pursuit of nuclear technology, if to our chagrin it turns out that you are, in fact, developing nuclear weapons -- a nuclear test picked up by our instruments, say -- you do understand that as painful as it would be to us, we would be forced to immediately terminate all the agreements so graciously offered by Mr. Unicorns yesterday. In fact, it is likely that you will have hurt Mr. Unicorns' feelings so deeply that he would, despite the pain this would cause him, be forced to impose a complete economic blockade upon Iran on the North Korean model. I am quite confident this situation would never arise, am I not right?

[coyote]

I have to disagree with a lot of your points - most Iranians are in favor of a civil nuclear program, not a military weapons program.

Thanks for your criticism. My position on this is mostly from talking to Arab people a while back. I found this article on the net, but it is even older, from 2003: http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/20753/story.htm

Did this change in the meantime? Keep in mind that I am not disputing that Iranians are in favor of a civil nuclear programme, I am just saying that they are also in favor of the nuclear weapons programme, even if they will probably adopt their countries stance in part and not shout this out to any random journalist / western official who looks in their direction.

Also, I can't think of a single Arab state (except possibly Syria) that wants Iran to have a bomb - Arabs and Persians don't get along, after all. In fact, if Iran gets a bomb, the next likely outcome is Egypt and/or Saudi Arabia developing their own as well. The Arabs stand to lose as much as we do (or more, honestly) from a nuclear-armed Iran.

Completely agree here. However, I was not talking about governments at all, but about the people on the street. If you have any polls / articles to back up either of our claims I would be very interested.

By the way, I agree that Iran and its people will be worried about Israel mostly, therefore the value of the nuclear bomb as a deterrent can not be diminished by much by the US alone. Still, among the population, I think a lot of people are looking towards the US; by its economic power, overarching media presence and influence in the rest of the world it might have a larger impact among the population than is more rationally perceived by the Iran government.

[coyote]

Alright, I looked a little further and found two interesting articles:
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/527.php?lb=btis&pnt=527&nid=&id=
and on the same site:
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/469.php?lb=btis&pnt=469&nid=&id=

According to the latter article, "only" 20% of the Iran population openly supports a nuclear weapons programme. It is difficult to say how many oppose an Iranian nuclear weapons programme, since this question was unfortunately not asked directly. (You probably want to read the article yourself, since the question is asked indirectly in several ways, which makes it look like people oppose nuclear weapons. This is largely illusionary in my opinion, though.)

The former article goes into more detail, and I think it shows why polls on this subject are particularly difficult, and the answer depends largely on how you state the question:Both polls also show that the Iranian public's support for the development of nuclear weapons is considerably less than that for nuclear energy, but how much less depends considerably on how the question was posed. TFT asked about Iran's government developing nuclear weapons immediately after its question on nuclear energy and found a slim majority in favor (51% vs. 39% opposed). WPO asked several questions about Iran foregoing nuclear weapons in the context of different international proposals that did not limit Iran's nuclear energy program. Each of these questions found a clear majority willing to accept the proposal. For example, 58 percent favor (vs. 26% oppose) the following offer:

"Suppose the U.N. Security Council were to say that it would accept Iran having a full fuel cycle nuclear program limited to the enrichment levels necessary for nuclear energy, if Iran agrees to allow the IAEA permanent and full access throughout Iran to ensure that its nuclear program is limited to energy production."

TFT found large majorities of Iranians saying they would be willing to forego developing nuclear weapons in return for "trade and capital investment to create jobs" (70% support vs. 22% oppose) and "technological assistance for developing peaceful nuclear energy" (71% vs. 20%).

Well, good news as far as I am concerned. 20% in favor of military weapons is still very relevant for domestic policy, 59% in favor vs. only 39% opposed* also, and I am assuming that support for a nuclear weapons program is considerably higher if an Iranian asks the questions, but overall it is obviously not as big an issue for the people as I believed. Understandably, economic issues take precedence, and this should be highly important for any diplomatic solution.

*) slyly taking the question that supports my earlier position most

[Prime Junta]

On a completely unrelated note, I came across this cool site: [ http://sendamessage.nl/ ]

"You pay, the Palestinians spray." Thirty euros will get you your message sprayed onto the West Bank separation wall, and three digital photos of it to prove it. There's also an option to sponsor the spraying of a really long letter onto it.

Word of warning: I haven't thoroughly background-checked the site, so it's possible (although IMO unlikely) that it's a scam to relieve well-meaning people of their hard-earned. (I very much doubt it's related to any of the established Palestinian political, let alone paramilitary, movements.)

[Rithrandil]

Thanks for your criticism. My position on this is mostly from talking to Arab people a while back. I found this article on the net, but it is even older, from 2003: http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/20753/story.htm

Did this change in the meantime? Keep in mind that I am not disputing that Iranians are in favor of a civil nuclear programme, I am just saying that they are also in favor of the nuclear weapons programme, even if they will probably adopt their countries stance in part and not shout this out to any random journalist / western official who looks in their direction.
Most of my information comes from either US or foreign officials. I've seen stories done on Iranians not wanting nukes on the news, but that was a year or two ago and I don't remember the specifics.


Completely agree here. However, I was not talking about governments at all, but about the people on the street. If you have any polls / articles to back up either of our claims I would be very interested.

By the way, I agree that Iran and its people will be worried about Israel mostly, therefore the value of the nuclear bomb as a deterrent can not be diminished by much by the US alone. Still, among the population, I think a lot of people are looking towards the US; by its economic power, overarching media presence and influence in the rest of the world it might have a larger impact among the population than is more rationally perceived by the Iran government.
Well, the street has two issues going on. Arabs and persians traditionally don't get along, and the Sunni and Shia also have their own...issues. It really depends - who does the street hate more, America or Iran?

[Rithrandil]

Very interesting recap, thanks again, Rith.

Not surprisingly given his background, the speaker talked a quite a bit about the "military option." There's at least one major problem with this thinking: America has no credible military options regarding Iran at this time, and Iran knows it. That means that "keeping it on the table" -- as in, talking about it -- will simply irritate rather than put real pressure on anyone.

To elaborate: the American public isn't in the mood for another ground war, and the military -- especially the Army and Marines -- are already fully committed, if not over-committed, between Iraq and Afghanistan. The American surface fleet is extremely vulnerable in tight waters like the Persian Gulf. That means that the only thing America could do is an air campaign -- and given that Iran's nuclear program is dispersed, hidden, and hardened, this would be at most a temporary setback to it. And, of course, Iran would make the USA pay a very high price for it on all fronts. It's also virtually certain that such an attack would cause the Iranians to drop their differences and rally around the flag; hoping for a spontaneous uprising and revolution is a pipe dream.

So, until these things change, the USA simply does not *have* a military option vis a vis Iran, which makes "keeping it on the table" rather pointless IMO.

Second, I believe the odds of being able to successfully deter Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon are low, and until the structural reasons that make them want it change, they're as good as nil. They want the bomb because Israel has the bomb, and they perceive (rightly, IMO) that of all the nuclear countries in the world, Israel has the itchiest trigger finger. From the Iranian POV, nuclear weapons are a deterrent against a first strike by Israel.

That means that if we want Iran to give up the bomb, we must somehow get them to believe that Israel will never use theirs against it, even if they have no retaliatory capacity of their own. I have no idea how we could do that, but it certainly can't be done without resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict -- and quite likely not even then.

A possible alternative is that Iran is given explicit security guarantees against an Israeli nuclear strike by a third country. For example, if Russia gave credible guarantees that it will retaliate with a nuclear strike against Israel should Israel make a nuclear strike against Iran, the picture might look rather different. However, I don't think this is realistic, and even if it was, the Iranian paranoia about foreign interference make it less than certain to succeed.

So, in my opinion:

(1) Yes, we should most definitely continue to use all diplomatic avenues to pressure, bribe, cajole, or trick Iran to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions. I think the odds of this succeeding are fairly slim, though.

(2) No, I don't think there's any point keeping the "military option" on the table, for the simple reason that there isn't one available right now.

(3) I believe our best remaining option is to make it as costly as possible for Iran to actually test a nuclear weapon -- which is something they cannot do in secret. This, I believe, is an achievable objective. (Of course, it's impossible to get to the final stage of having a deployable weapon without testing a proof-of-concept device first.)

First, we should integrate the Iranian economy with the global economy as deeply as possible, and engage with the Iranian government as broadly as feasible. Iran should receive immediate and tangible benefits from this engagement. The less they have to lose, the less leverage we have, so we must give them something to lose. This is why North Korea is such a PITA -- they don't WANT to engage with anyone, which means they can do whatever the hell they want, and there's not a whole lot we can do to pressure them to do otherwise. The huge difference is that Iran WANTS to engage with the world. This is something we have totally failed to exploit, and should.

Second, we make it absolutely clear that if they ever test a nuclear weapon, all these benefits will be immediately taken away, and the country will be put under sanctions every bit as tight as North Korea's.

Third, we should work as hard as possible to defuse the tensions motivating Iran to pursue a nuclear weapons program, and to build confidence with it, in the hopes of getting it to deprioritise it, and then allow better and more stringent inspections. If we're successful, by the time Iran does have nuclear capability, it won't be much more dangerous than France's.

And fourth, we should prepare for the eventuality where, despite our best efforts, Iran does get a nuclear weapon. That won't be the end of the world. When it comes to nukes, two are better than one: the only use of atomic bombs in anger happened when one country had the global monopoly on them. Israel has had nuclear weapons for a quite a while now, it's in a very bad neighborhood, and it hasn't used them. Nuclear parity between Israel and Iran would have a deterrent effect, and therefore Iranian nukes might not spell the end of the world after all.

To be fair, he even admits the military option would be "really bad". I think he used the word "catastrophic" but that could be me misremembering. But he ALSO said, and I agree with, if we take the military option off of the table, it'll be viewed as a sign of weakness and then we shouldn't even waste our times with a negotiation. I (and he, and the US government) view the aftermath of a military strike as a better situation than a nuclear armed Iran. If Iran goes nuclear, then non-proliferation is dead, pure and simple. Iran becomes the hegemon of the region, balance of power shifts dramatically against us, Egypt and Saudi Arabia start their programs if they haven't already, etc. Even a massive air bombing campaign that sparks retaliation from Iran is better then that.

[Prime Junta]

Well, the street has two issues going on. Arabs and persians traditionally don't get along, and the Sunni and Shia also have their own...issues. It really depends - who does the street hate more, America or Iran?

I think the crucial difference is that Arab/Persian animosity goes back centuries, whereas Arab/American animosity only goes back about 60-80 years or so. The only thing the Iranians have done to reduce that animosity is to stand by the Palestinians, and that's nowhere near enough.

I believe that if they made a serious effort, the Americans would find it easier to turn the Iranians around than the Arabs would -- but, of course, that would mean a real risk of alienating the Arabs even more. If they felt that the Iranians, Israelis, *and* Americans are all ganging up on them, that wouldn't be good either.

The current big (Sunni) Arab bogeyman is an "Axis of Shi'ites" taking over the region. This would consist of Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, with Syria playing a supporting role. They could make life very difficult for the Gulf countries, Jordan, and Egypt. I don't know how realistic this fear is, but the fear itself is real.

It's a very delicate situation, and patience and finesse is required.

[Prime Junta]

To be fair, he even admits the military option would be "really bad". I think he used the word "catastrophic" but that could be me misremembering. But he ALSO said, and I agree with, if we take the military option off of the table, it'll be viewed as a sign of weakness and then we shouldn't even waste our times with a negotiation. I (and he, and the US government) view the aftermath of a military strike as a better situation than a nuclear armed Iran.

I would too -- if it wasn't a false choice. I don't believe the US can prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by military means; at best, they can retard it. In other words, you'd have an incredibly pissed off Iran that would *still* get the nuclear bomb. That would be the worst of all possible options.

If Iran goes nuclear, then non-proliferation is dead, pure and simple. Iran becomes the hegemon of the region, balance of power shifts dramatically against us, Egypt and Saudi Arabia start their programs if they haven't already, etc. Even a massive air bombing campaign that sparks retaliation from Iran is better then that.

I don't think so. It takes a lot more than nukes to become a hegemon -- North Korea is nuclear, after all, and it's nowhere near hegemony on even the Korean Peninsula. Nor is Israel the hegemon in the Middle East, despite having complete military supremacy and nuclear monopoly.

My point is, really, that the problem isn't a nuclear-armed Iran per se, but a nuclear-armed and violently hostile Iran. I think the odds of preventing the former are slim, especially if we rely on coercion for it. Conversely, the advantage of persuasion and incentives are that (1) it can at least retard Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, and it will simultaneously (2) lessen tensions that would lead to a nuclear and violently hostile Iran.

Re non-proliferation, IMO it's already dead, killed by Abdul Qadeer Khan. I don't see how you can get that particular genie back in the bottle.

And finally, re the balance of power -- I can't see any scenario in which the balance of power *won't* shift to your disadvantage in the Middle East. The USA simply isn't the power it was back in Gulf War 1, neither in absolute nor certainly in relative terms. The US is in a state of relative (and quiet possibly absolute) decline; the quadrillion-dollar question is how you manage that decline. Attempting to fight it, or pretending it isn't happening, is a losing proposition.

If you're looking at historical parallels, it's worth comparing how Britain and France handled the decline of their empires -- IMO the Brits were much smarter about it, and emerged much stronger.

[Rithrandil]

I would too -- if it wasn't a false choice. I don't believe the US can prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by military means; at best, they can retard it. In other words, you'd have an incredibly pissed off Iran that would *still* get the nuclear bomb. That would be the worst of all possible options.
I don't view it as a false choice - I don't think we can physically stop Iran from developing a nuke but we could delay it and/or punish them so hard they stop. Besides, I don't see a pissed off Iran w/ a nuke as more dangerous than Iran now with a nuke. It's not like they're going to use it against us or Israel.



I don't think so. It takes a lot more than nukes to become a hegemon -- North Korea is nuclear, after all, and it's nowhere near hegemony on even the Korean Peninsula. Nor is Israel the hegemon in the Middle East, despite having complete military supremacy and nuclear monopoly.
They also have China right next door and South Korea and Japan bottling it in as well. And they have no economy. If Iran developed a nuke and then they faced a COMPLETE and total embargo (with participation and enforcement from the Arab states, Russia, and China), then I would possibly concede this point.

Israel also has a much smaller population than Iran. Iran has like 100 million people, controls/funds most of the terrorist groups in the area, has some level of control over Syria and Lebanon, etc.


My point is, really, that the problem isn't a nuclear-armed Iran per se, but a nuclear-armed and violently hostile Iran. I think the odds of preventing the former are slim, especially if we rely on coercion for it. Conversely, the advantage of persuasion and incentives are that (1) it can at least retard Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, and it will simultaneously (2) lessen tensions that would lead to a nuclear and violently hostile Iran.

Re non-proliferation, IMO it's already dead, killed by Abdul Qadeer Khan. I don't see how you can get that particular genie back in the bottle.

And finally, re the balance of power -- I can't see any scenario in which the balance of power *won't* shift to your disadvantage in the Middle East. The USA simply isn't the power it was back in Gulf War 1, neither in absolute nor certainly in relative terms. The US is in a state of relative (and quiet possibly absolute) decline; the quadrillion-dollar question is how you manage that decline. Attempting to fight it, or pretending it isn't happening, is a losing proposition.

If you're looking at historical parallels, it's worth comparing how Britain and France handled the decline of their empires -- IMO the Brits were much smarter about it, and emerged much stronger.

I think the military option should be the last last last resort. As in, negotiations failed, sanctions failed, etc. Not "last resort" in the Iraq sense, but an actual last resort. Once again, I see sitting back and allowing Iran to get a nuke as far worse than anything that would come from us/NATO/others attacking them.

[Pladio]

On a completely unrelated note, I came across this cool site: [ http://sendamessage.nl/ ]

"You pay, the Palestinians spray." Thirty euros will get you your message sprayed onto the West Bank separation wall, and three digital photos of it to prove it. There's also an option to sponsor the spraying of a really long letter onto it.

Word of warning: I haven't thoroughly background-checked the site, so it's possible (although IMO unlikely) that it's a scam to relieve well-meaning people of their hard-earned. (I very much doubt it's related to any of the established Palestinian political, let alone paramilitary, movements.)

From their FAQ:
Kan ik alles schrijven wat ik wil?

U kunt bijna alles schrijven wat u wilt. Maar kwetsen en beledigen (van Israeli's of Palestijnen, of wie dan ook), is niet toegestaan. Ook checken wij verwijzingen naar (aanstootgevende) websites. Dat soort mededelingen komt niet op de Muur. En: géén geld terug!

Translation (mine):

Can I write anything I want?

You can write almost anything you would like to. But hurting or insulting (neither Israelis nor Palestinians or anyone else) is not allowed. We also check if websites are offensive. All of these do not get written on the wall AND we won't send you your money back!

Waar gaat het geld naar toe?

Een deel van uw geld blijft in Nederland, om de (minimale) operationele kosten te dekken. Het overgrote deel gaat naar de Palestijnse NGO's (onafhankelijke stichtingen) die het werk daar doen. Zij financieren met de opbrengst kleine sociale, culturele en educatieve projecten (van een sportveldje tot een wasserette voor studenten)

Translation:
Where does the money go to?

Part of it stays in the Netherlands to cover minimal operational costs. The majority of the money goes to Palestinian NGO's who do work there. They finance anything from small social, cultural and educative projects (a small playing court to a laundry-mat for students).

Gaan ze wapens kopen?

Nee. Wij werken met organisaties die in Palestina legaal zijn en daar mogen werken - ook van de Israelische autoriteiten. Onze lokale partners vonden wij via het netwerk van ICCO, een grote Christelijke NGO uit Nederland. De opbrengst van dit project wordt in Palestina besteed aan kleinschalige sociale, culturele en educatieve projecten. Voor up to date informatie: Projecten in Palestina.

Would they buy weapons?

No, we work with organizations in Palestine, which are there legally and are allowed to work there - even from the Israeli authorities. We found our local partners via the ICCO network, which is a large Christian NGO from the Netherlands. De profit is spent on small-scale cultural, social and educative projects. For up-to date information visit the link...

I hope they don't have an English FAQ otherwise I'm really wasting my time here.
Well, I'll do the rest if someone tells me there isn't one and are interested in everything.

[Prime Junta]

I think the military option should be the last last last resort. As in, negotiations failed, sanctions failed, etc. Not "last resort" in the Iraq sense, but an actual last resort. Once again, I see sitting back and allowing Iran to get a nuke as far worse than anything that would come from us/NATO/others attacking them.

Right, I think the only area where we disagree is how realistic the military option is. You believe that the most likely outcome of a military strike would be a hugely pissed-off Iran that would nonetheless be sufficiently intimidated that it would be unwilling or unable to pursue its nuclear weapons program; I believe that the most likely outcome would be a hugely pissed-off Iran that would still be capable and much more determined to get one.

N.b.: I'm by no means saying that the former outcome is impossible -- I just believe it's unlikely enough that risking the latter outcome is too dangerous, regardless of the situation.

Put another way, I believe the only military means likely to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon would be a full-scale land invasion followed by an occupation, and I'm sure we agree that nobody right now has the will nor the ability to do that.

[Prime Junta]

I hope they don't have an English FAQ otherwise I'm really wasting my time here.
Well, I'll do the rest if someone tells me there isn't one and are interested in everything.

They do have an English FAQ: [ http://www.sendamessage.nl/your-message-on-the-wall/about/ ], click on FAQ. I read it; I just didn't fact-check it from an independent source -- after all, anyone can put up a website and write anything they like on it.

[Pladio]

Arg lol :D

Yeah, I know. I just wanted to be helpful...
Well,ok.

[Rithrandil]

Right, I think the only area where we disagree is how realistic the military option is. You believe that the most likely outcome of a military strike would be a hugely pissed-off Iran that would nonetheless be sufficiently intimidated that it would be unwilling or unable to pursue its nuclear weapons program; I believe that the most likely outcome would be a hugely pissed-off Iran that would still be capable and much more determined to get one.

N.b.: I'm by no means saying that the former outcome is impossible -- I just believe it's unlikely enough that risking the latter outcome is too dangerous, regardless of the situation.

Put another way, I believe the only military means likely to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon would be a full-scale land invasion followed by an occupation, and I'm sure we agree that nobody right now has the will nor the ability to do that.

Yeah. Like... I think a military option would be really really really really bad to have to use - I just think the outcome of NOT using it (if that was honestly and truly the last card we would have to play) would be worse than using it. I don't think we would go in, blow up the heavy water reactor at Arak, and then the democracy fairy would appear and turn Iran into the United States Junior or anything.:P It really would be the "ultimate last option" in my mind (and Obama's as well I am assuming).

I think I'd be willing to forego it if we really could issue worldwide sanctions against the Iranians. At that point I think that scenario could work and even if they did develop nukes, we could get them willingly disarm like South Africa did.

[Prime Junta]

I think I'd be willing to forego it if we really could issue worldwide sanctions against the Iranians. At that point I think that scenario could work and even if they did develop nukes, we could get them willingly disarm like South Africa did.

I can see only one scenario where that could happen: Israel (plus any other countries in the region that may have acquired nukes) would willingly disarm at the same time. If the region ever is in a state where such an option is even up for serious discussion, the world will already be a much, much safer and better place.

[coyote]

Nuclear deterrence is all about perception, obviously. From that point of view, would it do any harm to Israel if they disarm their nuclear weapons arsenal, but stay under the (nuclear deterrence) protection of the US?

Nuclear deterrence is pointless against nuclear terrorism without visible attacker, which might be the most likely scenario. There is little point in having the atomic bomb for Israel here.

As reaction to a nuclear missile attack and considering US nuclear submarines, reaction times would stay approximately equal regardless of who fires the retributive missiles. On the other hand, a swift reaction by US policy makers is less likely than a swift reaction of the Israel military. Also, any state using nuclear weapons will incur the risk of massive retaliation. From this angle, the US might prefer if Israel will be the one seen as an attacker.

Is there any fear in the Arab / Persian world that Israel will use nuclear weapons against a combined attack with conventional forces? In this case, having them would also be beneficial for the state of Israel, with the counterpoint of providing everyone else with an incentive of building nuclear weapons themselves. This is offset by an already effective conventional military in Israel. Is there any need for nuclear deterrence against conventional attacks?

What else am I missing?

[Prime Junta]

Is there any fear in the Arab / Persian world that Israel will use nuclear weapons against a combined attack with conventional forces? In this case, having them would also be beneficial for the state of Israel, with the counterpoint of providing everyone else with an incentive of building nuclear weapons themselves. This is offset by an already effective conventional military in Israel. Is there any need for nuclear deterrence against conventional attacks?

It's not a fear, it's a certainty. Israel *would* retaliate with a nuclear attack should it face the prospect of losing in a full-scale conventional war. I don't think anybody has the least bit of doubt about that, in or out of the Arab world. I also believe that there's no way Israel will give up its nuclear arsenal unless and until it has stable peace deals and normal relations with all other countries in the region.

IOW, we return once more to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the festering sore at the side of all efforts to bring peace to the region.

[dteowner]

To counter dte's scenario, I'd offer this one:

The scene: The UN General Assembly, televised to the world:

Rainbows Unicorns (spokesman for the Free World): Yo, bearded dudes with turbans! Here, we want to conclude a free trade agreement, visa waiver agreement, and cultural exchange program with you right now. Hell, we'll even throw in a Starbucks in every hamlet. We really like your pistachios or whatever it is you grow there, you know. No strings attached. Nothing. Nuh-uh. What d'you say?

Them: Wow, dudes! That's really big of you. Sure, we're in!

The scene: Smoky back room in some embassy somewhere, six months later, after the public celebrations in Teheran of the broad range of agreements proposed above.

Dagger Velvet: Mr. Mullah, there is something that's so obvious Mr. Unicorns completely forgot to mention it in his inspiring speech yesterday. While we have no doubts at all about your sincerity regarding your intentions in your pursuit of nuclear technology, if to our chagrin it turns out that you are, in fact, developing nuclear weapons -- a nuclear test picked up by our instruments, say -- you do understand that as painful as it would be to us, we would be forced to immediately terminate all the agreements so graciously offered by Mr. Unicorns yesterday. In fact, it is likely that you will have hurt Mr. Unicorns' feelings so deeply that he would, despite the pain this would cause him, be forced to impose a complete economic blockade upon Iran on the North Korean model. I am quite confident this situation would never arise, am I not right?Not sure if this was the attempt I requested to explain the logic or not. If so, I must say I'm not convinced. You mention in another post that the nuclear facilities are "hidden and hardened", so I'm not sure how we're going to detect anything short of a test, at which time it's too late anyway. Let's not even go into confirming less visible things which I'd assume we'd want to control, such as biologicals, human rights violations, or terrorist funding. Without a smoking gun (non-smoking guns don't qualify in Euro circles, mind you), you'll never be able to motivate the entire world to do your DPRK-esque embargo (see events leading up to Iraq). You've got no hammer for Dagger Velvet to swing. Which means you gave away the farm, lost a couple years, and ended up in worse shape than when you started.

Honestly, I want someone to explain this to me. It doesn't have to be PJ, either, although he's certainly eligible. I'm not the sharpest knife in the drawer, but there's a lot of folks subscribing to logic that appears to me to be obviously and fatally flawed. Seriously, I need some help on this one, folks.

[Squeek]

The part that doesn't fit into your analysis is the rest of the world's view of the US and what's fair in regard to it. It's one of those, "that's not fair, which is fair when you really think about it" kind of things.

I don't relate much to Americans who are anxious to start bombing Iran, but they're right about one thing. Americans are in the best position to judge what's right for America. Too bad too. It would be nice if everyone could just sit down and discuss their differences.

We might be stupid, ignorant, selfish big fat bullies, but we still have the best perspective on our own interests, despite all that. IMO, the only thing standing in the way of this country kicking even more middle eastern ass is its sense of decency (and thank goodness for that).

[coyote]

Anyone know a good translation for the German word "Selbstüberschätzung"?

I found sophomoric and hubris, but neither seems to fit right...

[Squeek]

That really could be it, I suppose. It must be nice to be you, coyote.

[Pladio]

The part that doesn't fit into your analysis is the rest of the world's view of the US and what's fair in regard to it. It's one of those, "that's not fair, which is fair when you really think about it" kind of things.

I don't relate much to Americans who are anxious to start bombing Iran, but they're right about one thing. Americans are in the best position to judge what's right for America. Too bad too. It would be nice if everyone could just sit down and discuss their differences.

We might be stupid, ignorant, selfish big fat bullies, but we still have the best perspective on our own interests, despite all that. IMO, the only thing standing in the way of this country kicking even more middle eastern ass is its sense of decency (and thank goodness for that).

Well, and the fact that it can't afford another ground offensive of Iran or any other country for that matter. Of course, some people seem to forget about that.

[Rithrandil]

Nuclear deterrence is all about perception, obviously. From that point of view, would it do any harm to Israel if they disarm their nuclear weapons arsenal, but stay under the (nuclear deterrence) protection of the US?

Nuclear deterrence is pointless against nuclear terrorism without visible attacker, which might be the most likely scenario. There is little point in having the atomic bomb for Israel here.

As reaction to a nuclear missile attack and considering US nuclear submarines, reaction times would stay approximately equal regardless of who fires the retributive missiles. On the other hand, a swift reaction by US policy makers is less likely than a swift reaction of the Israel military. Also, any state using nuclear weapons will incur the risk of massive retaliation. From this angle, the US might prefer if Israel will be the one seen as an attacker.

Is there any fear in the Arab / Persian world that Israel will use nuclear weapons against a combined attack with conventional forces? In this case, having them would also be beneficial for the state of Israel, with the counterpoint of providing everyone else with an incentive of building nuclear weapons themselves. This is offset by an already effective conventional military in Israel. Is there any need for nuclear deterrence against conventional attacks?

What else am I missing?

Well, Israel may not trust us to launch a nuclear war over them - which is a decently fair assumption, I guess. You COULD prove who gave a terrorist group a bomb, by the way - there's that whole "nuclear forensics" thing that goes way over my head but you can supposedly test the 'aftermath' and prove where it came from/who built it?

[Rithrandil]

Not sure if this was the attempt I requested to explain the logic or not. If so, I must say I'm not convinced. You mention in another post that the nuclear facilities are "hidden and hardened", so I'm not sure how we're going to detect anything short of a test, at which time it's too late anyway. Let's not even go into confirming less visible things which I'd assume we'd want to control, such as biologicals, human rights violations, or terrorist funding. Without a smoking gun (non-smoking guns don't qualify in Euro circles, mind you), you'll never be able to motivate the entire world to do your DPRK-esque embargo (see events leading up to Iraq). You've got no hammer for Dagger Velvet to swing. Which means you gave away the farm, lost a couple years, and ended up in worse shape than when you started.

Honestly, I want someone to explain this to me. It doesn't have to be PJ, either, although he's certainly eligible. I'm not the sharpest knife in the drawer, but there's a lot of folks subscribing to logic that appears to me to be obviously and fatally flawed. Seriously, I need some help on this one, folks.


Well, we actually have the EU on our side about Iran. They're all lined up with us in terms of negotiations or sanctions at this point. The argument is if we DON'T try to negotiate, we may lose their support, and we DEFINITELY will not have support from China and Russia (and may indeed face opposition from them). We didn't honestly try negotiations with Iraq and that was already a battle no one wanted any part of. Iran is a different matter and pretty much everyone but Russia/China are with us when it comes to this. Besides, if it comes to military operations, it's not like we'd be able to handle Iran by ourselves. We'd need NATO support. If we negotiate (or attempt to), and work out deals with the Russians and Chinese, we may be able to put the DPRK sanctions in place if they don't play ball.

On the other hand, if we just bomb the shit out of Iran now, we've started our third war in the region, opened up the US/its allies to massive retaliation from terrorist groups, further inflamed the Muslim world, killed off any support we may have had from our Allies, and we pretty much would have to give up on any effort to stabilize Iraq. Do you see Iran NOT considering a bombing run an act of war? I honestly don't know if we could take them - their military outnumbers us, their state is relatively stable, and they have a functioning government and economy. It's not like Iraq which was falling apart and held together by one man's persona.

[Prime Junta]

Not sure if this was the attempt I requested to explain the logic or not. If so, I must say I'm not convinced. You mention in another post that the nuclear facilities are "hidden and hardened", so I'm not sure how we're going to detect anything short of a test, at which time it's too late anyway.

Yes, that's exactly my point: there's nothing we can do to prevent them from getting to the point that they have a testable device. Thing is, a testable device is not yet quite a weapon, and you can't make it into one without testing it. Therefore, the idea behind my strategy is to (a) engage with them without preconditions at all levels, and (b) make it clear that all that will stop if we find indisputable evidence that they are pursuing a weapon -- e.g. a nuclear test.

IOW, we would make doing that test as costly for them as we possibly can, and *not* doing that test as beneficial as we possibly can.

Let's not even go into confirming less visible things which I'd assume we'd want to control, such as biologicals, human rights violations, or terrorist funding. Without a smoking gun (non-smoking guns don't qualify in Euro circles, mind you), you'll never be able to motivate the entire world to do your DPRK-esque embargo (see events leading up to Iraq). You've got no hammer for Dagger Velvet to swing. Which means you gave away the farm, lost a couple years, and ended up in worse shape than when you started.

Again, you're pretty much restating my argument right back at me. Hard, concerted action -- North Korean style sanctions, Rith's military strike, whatever -- is only feasible if there is a smoking gun. That's why saber-rattling beforehand is doubly pointless.

Honestly, I want someone to explain this to me. It doesn't have to be PJ, either, although he's certainly eligible. I'm not the sharpest knife in the drawer, but there's a lot of folks subscribing to logic that appears to me to be obviously and fatally flawed. Seriously, I need some help on this one, folks.

Well, I tried, but apparently I failed. You seem to have entirely missed the whole idea behind my strategic reasoning, though, so here it is again, slightly simplified:

(1) Premise: There's nothing we can do to force Iran to abandon their nuclear weapons program if they really want to do so.

(2) Premise: Hard, concerted, international action -- DPRK style sanctions or a military strike -- is only possible if there's a smoking gun, such as an actual nuclear test.

(3) Premise: Iran wants to engage with the world, politically, economically, and culturally.

(4) Strategic goal: Prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear test threshold.

(5) Policy: Give Iran maximal incentives not to do the test, and maximal disincentives to do it.

(6) Proposed action: Engage with Iran politically, economically, and culturally, in ways that give them immediate, tangible benefits for the engagement. We don't even have to tell them this will be replaced with DPRK-style sanctions and a possible military strike if they do test a nuclear device.

(7) Proposed action: Simultaneously, work to defuse tensions in the entire region, to reduce their need for a nuclear deterrent.

(8) Proposed action: Add further carrots to entice them to agree to a more stringent inspection regime, which would further retard their progress towards a nuclear weapon.

(9) Proposed action: Attempt to get Israel to scale down or, if possible, entirely dismantle its nuclear deterrent, e.g. by explicit guarantees by a third party (e.g. the USA).

I believe this strategy is likely to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear test threshold unless tensions in the region escalate much further than they are even now. People do respond to incentives, you know -- and the more they have to lose, the more leverage we have over them.

Oh, and, I believe the other things you listed -- human rights, sponsorship of terrorism and what not -- must take a back seat to the nuclear issue. In any case, at least the ones bothering us (e.g. sponsorship of terrorism) will resolve themselves should tensions in the region be brought down.

[Prime Junta]

I honestly don't know if we could take them - their military outnumbers us, their state is relatively stable, and they have a functioning government and economy. It's not like Iraq which was falling apart and held together by one man's persona.

Not to mention that it's a mountainous country, which gives defenders a massive advantage, and puts a motorized army relying on air strikes followed by armored pushes at a big disadvantage.

I'm fairly sure that if it was a war game, you would eventually defeat the Iranian regular military (although in a real war it could get too costly politically), but then you'd get stuck trying to suppress a really, really, REALLY nasty insurgency with far too few boots on the ground and a population that hates your guts. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard rewrote the book on asymmetrical warfare; they trained the Hezbollah and have been trying out all their fancy new tactics in Lebanon and the OT. I don't believe you could beat that insurgency even with NATO support -- you just don't have the numbers.

[Prime Junta]

Anyone know a good translation for the German word "Selbstüberschätzung"?

I found sophomoric and hubris, but neither seems to fit right...

There isn't a single word I can think of, but we were just talking about in the education thread -- it's what happens to kids if you continuously tell them that they're the best in the world even if all they do is sit on their asses and watch TV. "Inflated self-esteem" would be one way to express it.

[Rithrandil]

Not to mention that it's a mountainous country, which gives defenders a massive advantage, and puts a motorized army relying on air strikes followed by armored pushes at a big disadvantage.

I'm fairly sure that if it was a war game, you would eventually defeat the Iranian regular military (although in a real war it could get too costly politically), but then you'd get stuck trying to suppress a really, really, REALLY nasty insurgency with far too few boots on the ground and a population that hates your guts. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard rewrote the book on asymmetrical warfare; they trained the Hezbollah and have been trying out all their fancy new tactics in Lebanon and the OT. I don't believe you could beat that insurgency even with NATO support -- you just don't have the numbers.

Precisely right. They ALREADY have a crapload of irregular forces whose sole job it is to carry out insurgent warfare - so I'm sure even the "twenty-to-one thousand" ratio for fighting off insurgencies would be even worse in Iran - which means you'd need at least 1.4 million boots on the ground at any one time to to wage a successful anti-insurgency campaign. I'm sure that number would balloon when you consider the 100K+ IRGC forces plus the other guys they've trained for this sort of thing.

[dteowner]

I need to clarify my request. Let's take the specific situation of Iran out of the discussion (even though the question applies to then). I'm really asking about the folly of negotiating with a partner that cannot be trusted over issues that cannot be verified, backed by a "global sanction" that will not happen (as soon as you say, "without Russia and China", you might as well say "pointless and useless sanction"). That is the logic I'm questioning.

[Squeek]

The two points I like best about the CNP analysis are numbers nine and twelve, that there are no bridges between the US and Iranian societies and the need for patience (and that implies trust) in the peace process. IMO, fostering a culture of peace between the US and Iran is the first step toward avoiding what almost seems to be certain conflict.

That human connection should begin with dialogue between leading thinkers, but not just political and religious thinkers, and not even just intellectuals -- thinkers who also represent the thinking of each culture’s average Joes. An exchange of simply-stated honesty, and lots of it, would go a long way toward achieving peace. We need to build lots of bridges, big ones and little ones.

For years I’ve been one of those fools who dreams of world peace. Whenever I do, I imagine a complete abandonment of nuclear weapons, a concerted effort by everyone to remember the experiences of war, a new world view resulting from restored human connections between cultures everywhere and dialogue driven by both that and a determination to prepare ourselves together (for peace instead of war).

There’s too much hatred and suspicion between the US and Iran for any of that right now. I’d like to see leaders on both sides aim for something better, something like actual peace (and not just a pause between fighting).

[Rithrandil]

I need to clarify my request. Let's take the specific situation of Iran out of the discussion (even though the question applies to then). I'm really asking about the folly of negotiating with a partner that cannot be trusted over issues that cannot be verified, backed by a "global sanction" that will not happen (as soon as you say, "without Russia and China", you might as well say "pointless and useless sanction"). That is the logic I'm questioning.

Russia and China might be able to be brought on board, though - the Ambassador is definitely a realist (as is everyone else I hear talking about this issue - you can't be a serious member of the DC foreign policy crowd and be a liberal idealist) and they think there are steps we can take to bring Russia/China in on this. The plan that Bush offered to Iran about off-site enrichment was a plan from Putin. They don't want a nuclear Iran running around any more than we do. They DON'T stand to benefit.

EDIT: Hit send to soon, sorry:

But see, DTE, you CAN verify these things. We did it with South Africa. Basically Iran would just have to let the IAEA go where it wants. It is possible to arrange a system that would verify the nuclear issue - I asked my Boss that question (he worked for State writing the nuclear test ban treaty) and he worked for the NRC) and he said that "yes, you can verify they are not making nuclear weapons with proper inspections." I tend to believe him and waht the guys at DOD and State told me when I asked.

[Rithrandil]

The two points I like best about the CNP analysis are numbers nine and twelve, that there are no bridges between the US and Iranian societies and the need for patience (and that implies trust) in the peace process. IMO, fostering a culture of peace between the US and Iran is the first step toward avoiding what almost seems to be certain conflict.

That human connection should begin with dialogue between leading thinkers, but not just political and religious thinkers, and not even just intellectuals -- thinkers who also represent the thinking of each culture’s average Joes. An exchange of simply-stated honesty, and lots of it, would go a long way toward achieving peace. We need to build lots of bridges, big ones and little ones.

For years I’ve been one of those fools who dreams of world peace. Whenever I do, I imagine a complete abandonment of nuclear weapons, a concerted effort by everyone to remember the experiences of war, a new world view resulting from restored human connections between cultures everywhere and dialogue driven by both that and a determination to prepare ourselves together (for peace instead of war).

There’s too much hatred and suspicion between the US and Iran for any of that right now. I’d like to see leaders on both sides aim for something better, something like actual peace (and not just a pause between fighting).

Yup. We don't know if negotiations will work unless we try. And if they fail it's not like they'll "double develop nuclear weapons". We don't have anything to lose by trying that road.

[dteowner]

Except some number of years of unmolested mischief while the negotiators trade BS. A couple years of free reign, open checkbooks, and easy procurement can go a long way in a direction you're supposedly avoiding.

[Prime Junta]

I need to clarify my request. Let's take the specific situation of Iran out of the discussion (even though the question applies to then). I'm really asking about the folly of negotiating with a partner that cannot be trusted over issues that cannot be verified, backed by a "global sanction" that will not happen (as soon as you say, "without Russia and China", you might as well say "pointless and useless sanction"). That is the logic I'm questioning.

Your problem is your usual one -- you think in binaries. Either something is verifiable, or it's not. Either sanctions work, or they don't. A war is either won, or lost. The good guys win, or they lose. Iran develops a nuclear weapon, or it doesn't.

The real world rarely works like that. Inspections may not give 100% certainty over something, but they might give 70% certainty, or the effort needed to foil them might make progress towards a nuclear weapon slower by five years. A threat of sanctions combined with an offer of engagement might induce Iran to accept better inspections that would yield 80% certainty and slow down their program by ten years. A certain set of incentives and disincentives might cause Iran to get all the way to the point where they have a nuclear device they think will work, but they won't be able to test it, because doing so would have consequences that would wreck their economy. And a war may be won but the peace may be lost, or a war may end up in a stalemate, or a war may end up as a qualified victory, with some but not all of the strategic objectives met.

In this kind of real world, it makes sense to pursue these small gains, partial victories, and what not. We'll never see the kind of closure you like to get on TV or the movies, but we'll never see the cathartic, apocalyptic war to end all wars either. And sometimes that just has to be good enough.

[Rithrandil]

Except some number of years of unmolested mischief while the negotiators trade BS. A couple years of free reign, open checkbooks, and easy procurement can go a long way in a direction you're supposedly avoiding.

They're going to get that anyways. And like the guy said - timetable. It gives us time to build a coalition. Unlike Iraq this isn't something we can handle alone - and I don't relish the notion of a draft - especially since women STILL don't have to sign up for selective service (which, in my view, should make them ineligible to vote).

[dteowner]

OK, let me attempt to summarize.

Our stated goal is to avoid a specific event, so our plan is to pave the road toward that specific event because we believe that we'll be better equipped to put up a roadblock when they're within spitting distance of a finish line we've been facilitating for several years.

Yes, Mr. Tyson, I'm going to let you beat the dogcrap out of me for 11 rounds because I'm coinvinced you'll feel so sorry for me in round 12 that you'll forfeit the fight because you've gained new-found respect my refined and enlightened ways.

[Rithrandil]

OK, let me attempt to summarize.

Our stated goal is to avoid a specific event, so our plan is to pave the road toward that specific event because we believe that we'll be better equipped to put up a roadblock when they're within spitting distance of a finish line we've been facilitating for several years.

Yes, Mr. Tyson, I'm going to let you beat the dogcrap out of me for 11 rounds because I'm coinvinced you'll feel so sorry for me in round 12 that you'll forfeit the fight because you've gained new-found respect my refined and enlightened ways.

No, our goal is to stop that event. Negotiations with out partners + sanctions + possible last resort military strike is a better plan then what you are (i guess?) proposing, which is:

Immediate strike + lack of any international support + Iran getting a nuke anyways + massive asymmetrical retaliation against our forces in Iraq/Afghanistan + new wave of terror attacks against us and our allies in the region + further inflammation of tensions between US/Arabs + driving Iranian population right into the arms of their radical leaders = fun.

I'm saying if we decide not to negotiate, we might as well just carpet bomb the country into the stone age and kill everyone there, because that will be the only way to stop them from developing a nuke.

We don't know if negotiations or sanctions will work. We don't know if they won't work. But they have a better chance of accomplishing our myriad of goals with Iran than an immediate strike against the country.

And once again, I'm not willing to be drafted over this.

[Prime Junta]

Yes, Mr. Tyson, I'm going to let you beat the dogcrap out of me for 11 rounds because I'm coinvinced you'll feel so sorry for me in round 12 that you'll forfeit the fight because you've gained new-found respect my refined and enlightened ways.

dte, are you being intentionally obtuse? This isn't about "respect" or "pity," it's about incentives.

Imagine an Iran that's economically, politically, and socially integrated with the rest of the world.

It'll be much richer than now. Iranians will be traveling to Europe and the USA. Europeans and Americans will be traveling to Iran. European and American corporations will have set up shop in Tehran and Isfahan and Shiraz and wherever. Iranian oil companies will be selling petrol in the EU and the USA. And so on and so forth.

And -- *we* will have the power to pull the plug on that. We'll lose too, for sure, but Iran will be worth, what, a half a percentage point of our foreign trade -- in any case, so small it'll almost be lost to statistical noise. But that very same integration will account to 30% or 50% or whatever of the Iranian economy -- not to mention the cultural and social consequences of getting used to being able to travel, study, and work abroad.

IOW, in such a situation we will have a genuinely big stick to wield. Right now we don't, which makes all talk of sanctions let alone military strikes sound pretty hollow.

Soft power isn't a joke. Economic power is even less of a joke. Military power that is backed by neither is a paper tiger. Just ask Kim Jong Il.

Or hell, just ask the ghost of Eisenhower -- the USA didn't get to the peak of its global power by bombing the shit out of everybody until they did what it said; it did so by presenting a political, social, economic, and cultural model that was a damn sight more attractive than most things out there. In fact, most wars the USA fought after the end of WW2 *eroded* its power rather than extending it, with Gulf War 1 the only clear exception.

[Rithrandil]

dte, are you being intentionally obtuse? This isn't about "respect" or "pity," it's about incentives.

Imagine an Iran that's economically, politically, and socially integrated with the rest of the world.

It'll be much richer than now. Iranians will be traveling to Europe and the USA. Europeans and Americans will be traveling to Iran. European and American corporations will have set up shop in Tehran and Isfahan and Shiraz and wherever. Iranian oil companies will be selling petrol in the EU and the USA. And so on and so forth.

And -- *we* will have the power to pull the plug on that. We'll lose too, for sure, but Iran will be worth, what, a half a percentage point of our foreign trade -- in any case, so small it'll almost be lost to statistical noise. But that very same integration will account to 30% or 50% or whatever of the Iranian economy -- not to mention the cultural and social consequences of getting used to being able to travel, study, and work abroad.

IOW, in such a situation we will have a genuinely big stick to wield. Right now we don't, which makes all talk of sanctions let alone military strikes sound pretty hollow.

"Soft power" isn't a joke. Economic power is even less of a joke. Military power that is backed by neither is a paper tiger. Just ask Kim Jong Il.


See Smart Power: http://www.csis.org/smartpower/

[dteowner]

Actually, my personal opinion is that you're right about the end being inevitable with respect to Iran. I'd be a little more supportive of a surgical bombing run or two just to let the Iranians know we aren't screwing around and to slow their progress a bit (it's hard to concentrate when you've got to keep an eye on the sky), but boots on the ground is not a viable option in any way.

But let's at least be honest about what we're about, if that's the case. We're not negotiating to prevent this--we're negotiating to manage the loss. That's fine, but that's not how the UN and/or its more strident supporters like to paint their talkie talkie. We've run up the white flag and we're hoping not to take one in the shorts in the peace treaty. Sometimes, that's the best you're going to get, but it still looks like an insane option for our "enlightened first and foremost tecnique of choice".

[Rithrandil]

Actually, my personal opinion is that you're right about the end being inevitable with respect to Iran. I'd be a little more supportive of a surgical bombing run or two just to let the Iranians know we aren't screwing around and to slow their progress a bit (it's hard to concentrate when you've got to keep an eye on the sky), but boots on the ground is not a viable option in any way.

But let's at least be honest about what we're about, if that's the case. We're not negotiating to prevent this--we're negotiating to manage the loss. That's fine, but that's not how the UN and/or its more strident supporters like to paint their talkie talkie. We've run up the white flag and we're hoping not to take one in the shorts in the peace treaty. Sometimes, that's the best you're going to get, but it still looks like an insane option for our "enlightened first and foremost tecnique of choice".

I want to negotiate because it may work. We may be able to use negotiations and sanctions to force them to the table. On the other hand, surgical bombing runs right now all but guarantees that Iran develops a bomb and is in a much better international position.

[Prime Junta]

Actually, my personal opinion is that you're right about the end being inevitable with respect to Iran. I'd be a little more supportive of a surgical bombing run or two just to let the Iranians know we aren't screwing around and to slow their progress a bit (it's hard to concentrate when you've got to keep an eye on the sky), but boots on the ground is not a viable option in any way.

But let's at least be honest about what we're about, if that's the case. We're not negotiating to prevent this--we're negotiating to manage the loss. That's fine, but that's not how the UN and/or its more strident supporters like to paint their talkie talkie. We've run up the white flag and we're hoping not to take one in the shorts in the peace treaty. Sometimes, that's the best you're going to get, but it still looks like an insane option for our "enlightened first and foremost tecnique of choice".

Binaries again, dte -- either we "won" or we "lost." Somehow the option of managing the situation -- "containing" it, to pick another word I've used in another context -- indefinitely if need be, doesn't even seem to register in your brain.

I'm starting to suspect that this kind of thing has a neurological basis -- certain personality types just aren't wired for certain kinds of concepts, and their brains just reject them a priori before they're even able to consider them. I think certain types of religious thinking have the same underpinnings -- not merely a need for absolutes, but an inability to conceive of the world as consisting of anything other than absolutes.

IOW, if you say that you're not able to understand the reasoning, you may be stating a simple fact, the same way that a colorblind person would say that they aren't able to distinguish between red and green. If this is the case, then we'll all just have to agree to live with it.

Edit: N.b.: I've no doubt I have similar blind spots. I certainly have major problems understanding the reasoning of some people here, where others claim they can follow them just fine.

[dteowner]

If the score is 75-25, you lost. You might be happy with the 25 you got. If you think that your 25 is actually a victory, then you're operating under different criteria that assigns different weight to the various victories/defeats/partials/pushes that come out of any real world situation.

It's a question of honesty. Your conditions of victory are not what you state up front. For the Iran situation, you say you're negotiating to keep Iran from getting a nuke (that's a generic "you", btw), but in fact you're negotiating to be in better position to deal with them already having a nuke. It applies to the broader approach that I pointed out in getting this whole line of questioning started. You're lying about your goals, which allows you to lie about your score when it comes time to tally up. Because we always look back on history to determine who won. We don't look back to determine who "managed".

Now, it's entirely possible for both sides to win since each side will assign different weights to all the aspects of the conflict. Mr. Tyson will win because they raise his hand at the end of the fight; I will win if I don't require a body bag. But that doesn't preclude the concept of winning and losing. And I shouldn't be telling the world that I'm going to win the fight if my actual victory condition is simply to survive.

[coyote]

There isn't a single word I can think of, but we were just talking about in the education thread -- it's what happens to kids if you continuously tell them that they're the best in the world even if all they do is sit on their asses and watch TV. "Inflated self-esteem" would be one way to express it.

Hmm, I think in regard to Squeek's earlier post, "inflated sense of military superiority" was more or less what I was looking for, although it is a bit long and cumbersome to say.

There is a thread on education? Sounds interesting, but I could not immediately find it.

@Squeek: no insult intended, but I had to keep it short because I was leaving at that time. Nice post about building bridges -- I can agree with this at least.

It's a question of honesty. Your conditions of victory are not what you state up front. For the Iran situation, you say you're negotiating to keep Iran from getting a nuke (that's a generic "you", btw), but in fact you're negotiating to be in better position to deal with them already having a nuke. It applies to the broader approach that I pointed out in getting this whole line of questioning started. You're lying about your goals, which allows you to lie about your score when it comes time to tally up. Because we always look back on history to determine who won. We don't look back to determine who "managed".

Now, it's entirely possible for both sides to win since each side will assign different weights to all the aspects of the conflict. Mr. Tyson will win because they raise his hand at the end of the fight; I will win if I don't require a body bag. But that doesn't preclude the concept of winning and losing. And I shouldn't be telling the world that I'm going to win the fight if my actual victory condition is simply to survive.

Maybe I misunderstood, but Prime Junta does not seem to say that the diplomatic solution aims at dealing with a nuclearly armed Iran. It aims at economically integrating Iran in order to provide bargaining power in order to stop them from pursuing their nuclear weapons programme. Right?

I think we all agree that military occupation is not possible at this time. A surgical strike is possible, but it will also inhibit diplomatic attempts and it will not be effective in halting military nuclear development. While it will postpone development for a time, it will also destabilise the region* and make Iran even more dangerous when it finally does get the bomb. A diplomatic solution could be effective, but it will not be a short term solution. The fact is that diplomacy is the only course of action with any chance of "winning", as you put it.

*) maybe I am being a bit too pessimistic there, but it will certainly worsen relations significantly for a long time.

[dteowner]

My apologies in advance for invoking Godwin's Law.

What was the end result of WW2? Did Germany "manage"? What if Hitler's victory condition was to kill a million Jews before he himself was killed? What if Hitler's victory condition was to take a country completely crushed following WW1 and build sufficient economy and national pride to compete on a global scale? Do we need to re-write all the history books? Of course not--we deal in binary win/lose all the time.

Underneath that generalized win/lose are hundreds of specific instances (battles within the war, as it were) with a wide variety of results. Some are clear victories for one side or the other, some are stalemates, and some are "yeah, but" mixers. We still put it all together and come up with an "aggregate score" and say that the Allies won the war. I don't see that as strictly binary thought.

So, once again, the stated goal for Iran is to keep them from having nukes (the war). The proposed solution (the battle) is to negotiate to convince them to decide on their own to walk away from the program. Known fact is that negotiations with Iran will be hamstrung from day one by the determination (by our side) that they do no negotiate in earnest. So we're choosing a battle that we know is crippled before we ever get started. Negotiation is the enlightened approach.

OK, in the case of Iran, I'm conceding that a crippled battle plan might be the best option we've got. But to turn around and say that our goal all along was to let them have nukes but persuade them not to use them is dishonest. That's not the original stated goal; that's not our stated victory condition.

And, once again, let's take this back to the general case. I don't think it's out of line to say that negotiation is being held up as the end-all and be-all solution to every problem. So, in the case where one side does not negotiate in earnest, you're going to the job site with a broken wrench when there's another perfectly good wrench on the table. That doesn't strike me as enlightened in any way--that's just plain stupid.

[Squeek]

@Squeek: no insult intended, but I had to keep it short because I was leaving at that time.Well, if you were in a hurry, then OK. It's perfectly understandable (and I'm just a rube, anyway). My wife read it and called you an ass, though.

There may be an exception or two, but just about everywhere I've ever been it turned out that the folks there had a much better understanding of themselves and their situation than I did. It's that way here too.

As to the ability of our military, I was talking about nasty stuff (like bombing). There are some Americans who think America is too nice when it comes to making war and want this country to crank it up several notches. Their votes count the same as everybody elses (and the rest of us really ought not to forget that, IMO).

I like to think I'm fairly smart. My wife is even smarter, btw (but I would never tell her that, of course).

[Rithrandil]

So, once again, the stated goal for Iran is to keep them from having nukes (the war). The proposed solution (the battle) is to negotiate to convince them to decide on their own to walk away from the program. Known fact is that negotiations with Iran will be hamstrung from day one by the determination (by our side) that they do no negotiate in earnest. So we're choosing a battle that we know is crippled before we ever get started. Negotiation is the enlightened approach.

OK, in the case of Iran, I'm conceding that a crippled battle plan might be the best option we've got. But to turn around and say that our goal all along was to let them have nukes but persuade them not to use them is dishonest. That's not the original stated goal; that's not our stated victory condition.

And, once again, let's take this back to the general case. I don't think it's out of line to say that negotiation is being held up as the end-all and be-all solution to every problem. So, in the case where one side does not negotiate in earnest, you're going to the job site with a broken wrench when there's another perfectly good wrench on the table. That doesn't strike me as enlightened in any way--that's just plain stupid.

Here's where you're wrong. We don't know if they negotiate in earnest because we have not negotiated with them in thirty years. We're sure they're lying about building a nuke, yes - but they haven't pulled a Saddam or Kim Jong Il and made some deal with us only to break it later. Our negotiations with Saddam and Kim Jong Il were/are hampered by the lack of international support for our position.

This, however, is not the case with Iran. Pretty much no one wants Iran to get a nuke. Russia and China are taking advantage of the situaiton to make our lives more difficult, but "Tehran with a Bomb" is not in their interests either. I'm flat out saying our goal is to prevent Iran from getting nukes. This may be an impossibility. They may not respond to negotiations or sanctions, at which point I'm in favor of using a military option as I view the resulting blowback from that as less of a threat then a nuclear-armed Iran (as does virtually every expert in the U.S., I may add). The Ambassador even said that we should keep the military option on the table, because if we take it off then it will be viewed as a sign of weakness by Tehran and they'll just do whatever they want.

However, negotiations (or super duper sanctions) may indeed work. Our main issue is getting Russia/China on board. Obama may be able to do this, he may not. The point is, we won't know if we don't try. There would be a time table to this too, like the Ambassador said, probably. We wouldn't just sit around for six years and let the Iranians waste time while they build a nuke. His point is that negotiations cost us nothing, may give us a net benefit (even if they fail - we'll be more likely to get international support for sanctions or a military strike), and might possibly succeed in their goal (Iran stopping nuke program).

On the other hand, your immediate military strike gives us a possible benefit of delaying the bomb by an uncertain amount of time (but most likely not a significant one - they have spread out their facilities quite well, it will not be like the Israelis blowing up Iraq's heavy water plant), gives us massive losses in terms of blowback from Iran, loss of international support, and futher destruction of US reputation overseas. Oh, and China and Russia will make a lot of money off the ensuing increased arms sales to Iran.

[dteowner]

http://www.rpgwatch.com/forums/showpost.php?p=1060947683&postcount=9

I'll refer you back to the post that started this tangent in the first place. I'm accepting the Ambassador's judgment as accurate, lacking any evidence to the contrary. Given the games Iran has played with the UN on this nuke think over the past several years, I feel confident that there's far more evidence that the Ambassador is correct than his being wrong.

[Rithrandil]

http://www.rpgwatch.com/forums/showpost.php?p=1060947683&postcount=9

I'll refer you back to the post that started this tangent in the first place. I'm accepting the Ambassador's judgment as accurate, lacking any evidence to the contrary. Given the games Iran has played with the UN on this nuke think over the past several years, I feel confident that there's far more evidence that the Ambassador is correct than his being wrong.

I don't think I clarified that point well (and this is why i am annoyed the video is not up yet since I think his speech would be far better than the hurried notes I took). He said proven untrustworthy in the context of they're denying they are building a nuke but none of their actions are compatible with that fact. Specifically, he mentioned things like "if they really didn't want a nuke they'd take the deals Russia and China have offered to help build nuclear power plants but have uranium enrichment take place somewhere else". He didn't mean untrustworthy in the Kim Jong Il sense of agreeing to a deal with us, then kicking everyone out and demanding something because of our imperial aggression etc etc etc.

He was saying that one of our policy goals should be to get Iran to stop enriching uranium in their country (for the time being) because they haven't shown that they really don't want a nuclear weapon. However, he also followed this up by saying that it should not be a precondition for any diplomatic efforts.

...the video of the talk should be up early this coming week so when it pops up I'll put a link here.

[Pladio]

There isn't a single word I can think of, but we were just talking about in the education thread -- it's what happens to kids if you continuously tell them that they're the best in the world even if all they do is sit on their asses and watch TV. "Inflated self-esteem" would be one way to express it.

I guess, no one word but: "Overrating ones self" or "Exaggerating ones self esteem"

[Pladio]

My apologies in advance for invoking Godwin's Law.

What was the end result of WW2? Did Germany "manage"? What if Hitler's victory condition was to kill a million Jews before he himself was killed? What if Hitler's victory condition was to take a country completely crushed following WW1 and build sufficient economy and national pride to compete on a global scale? Do we need to re-write all the history books? Of course not--we deal in binary win/lose all the time.

Underneath that generalized win/lose are hundreds of specific instances (battles within the war, as it were) with a wide variety of results. Some are clear victories for one side or the other, some are stalemates, and some are "yeah, but" mixers. We still put it all together and come up with an "aggregate score" and say that the Allies won the war. I don't see that as strictly binary thought.

So, once again, the stated goal for Iran is to keep them from having nukes (the war). The proposed solution (the battle) is to negotiate to convince them to decide on their own to walk away from the program. Known fact is that negotiations with Iran will be hamstrung from day one by the determination (by our side) that they do no negotiate in earnest. So we're choosing a battle that we know is crippled before we ever get started. Negotiation is the enlightened approach.

OK, in the case of Iran, I'm conceding that a crippled battle plan might be the best option we've got. But to turn around and say that our goal all along was to let them have nukes but persuade them not to use them is dishonest. That's not the original stated goal; that's not our stated victory condition.

And, once again, let's take this back to the general case. I don't think it's out of line to say that negotiation is being held up as the end-all and be-all solution to every problem. So, in the case where one side does not negotiate in earnest, you're going to the job site with a broken wrench when there's another perfectly good wrench on the table. That doesn't strike me as enlightened in any way--that's just plain stupid.

That's the point though. They're lying because they have nothing to lose if they do right now. PJ's plan means they would have a large chunk of their economy tied into the US, EU and other nations... By then letting them know that they're going to get heavily sanctioned if they ever do get the possibility to even test their first device (nuclear device, that is) they would have to think twice about doing it and without one of these tests, they would not be able to get their hands on nuclear weapons.

I hope this helped.

[dteowner]

Indeed, lying has worked quite well for them over the past few years when dealing with the UN. But this time will be different, eh? Sorry, but I'm just not buying it. Trust is a tricky thing--it takes many, many years to build and a single moment to destroy. We've got the past few years of destroying trust. But this time we're going to trust, eh?

As for your sanction hammer, it only works if you've got 100% participation. Are you really that certain you're going to get it? What if Putin is wanting to poke the US with a stick when the time rolls around? What if China picks that time to have another Tiananmen Square moment? Your hammer just went kaput after you spent a few years enabling the very event you're wanting to avoid. Wouldn't that be a kick in the ass? So, the sum total of teeth for the entire plan hinges on the entire world agreeing to sanction Iran. Talk about wishful thinking. You couldn't get that when the entire world watched the DPRK fire a missle. You think you'll get it because Iran maybe might sorta possibly be doing some naughty things under a sand dune somewhere? How'd that theory hold up in Iraq?

[Prime Junta]

It's a question of honesty. Your conditions of victory are not what you state up front. For the Iran situation, you say you're negotiating to keep Iran from getting a nuke (that's a generic "you", btw), but in fact you're negotiating to be in better position to deal with them already having a nuke.

No, dte. We're still trying to find an arrangement in which they don't get a nuke. Did you even read what I wrote?

The central plank of my proposal is that we make crossing the red line of testing a nuclear device as expensive as we possibly can, and we work as hard as we can to get them to accept an inspections regime that retards their progress towards a weapon as much as humanly possible -- which, as Rith pointed out, is much more than simply having to keep an eye on the sky in case someone makes a random air strike.

A secondary effect is that yes, indeed, we will be in a better position if we fail and Iran does, in fact, get a nuke. I entirely fail to see how that is a bad thing.

It applies to the broader approach that I pointed out in getting this whole line of questioning started. You're lying about your goals, which allows you to lie about your score when it comes time to tally up. Because we always look back on history to determine who won. We don't look back to determine who "managed".

No, I'm not. My primary goal is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon if at all possible, and my secondary goal is to minimize the negative impact of a nuclear-armed Iran if I fail in my primary goal. Where am I lying about that? Accepting that a policy may not succeed and taking into consideration what that would mean isn't lying; it's realism.

Saying "failure is not an option" and therefore failing to plan for it is doubly pernicious -- it makes discussing the risk of failure more difficult (and therefore makes it more likely that the risk is underestimated), and it leaves you with your pants down in case you do fail.

Now, it's entirely possible for both sides to win since each side will assign different weights to all the aspects of the conflict. Mr. Tyson will win because they raise his hand at the end of the fight; I will win if I don't require a body bag. But that doesn't preclude the concept of winning and losing. And I shouldn't be telling the world that I'm going to win the fight if my actual victory condition is simply to survive.

This isn't a game, dte. We don't count points. This is about trying to find a way in which can muddle along on this planet while killing as few people as possible in the process.

Another consideration is that loudly trumpeting that we'll be OK even if plan A fails might make plan A more likely to fail. That's why we need Velvet Dagger and Rainbows Unicorns, and that's why I don't expect the people actually involved in the process to be entirely upfront about all of their motives. On either side of the dispute.

[Prime Junta]

Maybe I misunderstood, but Prime Junta does not seem to say that the diplomatic solution aims at dealing with a nuclearly armed Iran. It aims at economically integrating Iran in order to provide bargaining power in order to stop them from pursuing their nuclear weapons programme. Right?

Right.

Specifically: the "speak softly and carry a big stick" rule works pretty well, but right now we don't have the stick. My proposed policy would work two ways: on the one hand, it would reduce the tensions that cause Iran to want a nuke in the first place, and on the other hand it would give us a big stick by giving them more to lose, with us holding the power to take it all away from them.

[Prime Junta]

My apologies in advance for invoking Godwin's Law.

You're forgiven. Since the analogy is so obviously and patently silly, though, I won't even bother to address it. Skipping...

So, once again, the stated goal for Iran is to keep them from having nukes (the war). The proposed solution (the battle) is to negotiate to convince them to decide on their own to walk away from the program.

Close, but no cigar. The objective is to establish an unambiguous red line -- testing a nuclear device, or some similar "smoking gun" evidence of an advanced weapons program --, and make it so expensive for them to cross it that they won't. The minimal acceptable outcome is that they keep a super-secret weapons program going indefinitely, but they're never able to cross the nuclear test threshold and therefore produce an actual warhead. If they decide to make like Libya or South Africa and voluntarily come clean and shut it down, that'd be groovy, but it's not a success criterion.

Your binary mode of thinking is still handicapping you -- this time, you're looking for a nice, clean closure: Iran sees the error of its ways and makes like South Africa or Libya and voluntarily comes clean about and gives up its weapons program, or there's a big, cathartic war, or Iran goes nuclear. Either way, we get it over with. I'm saying that it's a better option to accept that there may not *be* any closure. Iran might be forever poised on the edge of going nuclear, and we might forever be dancing our little minuet to keep them from going over that edge.

Sure, *eventually* everything ends -- Rainbows Unicorns wins out and there's Peace In The Middle East where everybody (including Iran) gives up their nukes, there's another revolution in Iran and they decide to join the European Union (and give up their nukes), or tensions in the region go up so high that Iran goes over the edge anyway. But any of these closures would require massive changes in the conditions over there. We can wait for them to happen or try to nudge things in one direction or other, but we can't force the issue.

Known fact is that negotiations with Iran will be hamstrung from day one by the determination (by our side) that they do no negotiate in earnest. So we're choosing a battle that we know is crippled before we ever get started. Negotiation is the enlightened approach.

I think I addressed this in my other posts just now.

OK, in the case of Iran, I'm conceding that a crippled battle plan might be the best option we've got. But to turn around and say that our goal all along was to let them have nukes but persuade them not to use them is dishonest. That's not the original stated goal; that's not our stated victory condition.

And, once again, let's take this back to the general case. I don't think it's out of line to say that negotiation is being held up as the end-all and be-all solution to every problem. So, in the case where one side does not negotiate in earnest, you're going to the job site with a broken wrench when there's another perfectly good wrench on the table. That doesn't strike me as enlightened in any way--that's just plain stupid.

What's the perfectly good wrench?

[Prime Junta]

As for your sanction hammer, it only works if you've got 100% participation.

Absolutes again, dte. I assure you that sanctions can be extremely effective even if you only get 50% participation -- assuming you have a good base to work from. If Finland, for example, was put under international sanctions and we lost, say, just the US and EU markets, we would be ruined, even if we can still trade with Russia and China to our heart's content. Circumventing trade sanctions isn't that easy, because it costs money -- and the point of trade sanctions is that they cost money.

Are you really that certain you're going to get it? What if Putin is wanting to poke the US with a stick when the time rolls around? What if China picks that time to have another Tiananmen Square moment? Your hammer just went kaput after you spent a few years enabling the very event you're wanting to avoid. Wouldn't that be a kick in the ass? So, the sum total of teeth for the entire plan hinges on the entire world agreeing to sanction Iran.

What if the US economy collapses and it can no longer afford to make military strikes all across the world? What if Iran develops or acquires anti-aircraft capability good enough to foil any air strikes? What if your entire army catches the swine flu and is home sick for the invasion? What if the American public just flat-out refuses to fight? Your "perfectly good wrench" isn't immune to contingencies either, you know.

Talk about wishful thinking. You couldn't get that when the entire world watched the DPRK fire a missle. You think you'll get it because Iran maybe might sorta possibly be doing some naughty things under a sand dune somewhere? How'd that theory hold up in Iraq?

Well, there is the little matter that Iraq *wasn't* doing naughty things under a sand dune somewhere.

Second, I believe that a threat of concerted action is credible *if there is smoking-gun evidence of an advanced weapons program.* A credible threat is better than a non-credible threat, and we can work to make that threat more... threatening. Iran would suffer comparatively little from sanctions now *because it's already isolated.* They just don't have all that much to lose.

This is a far cry from "not at all," by the way -- a trade blockade by the EU would still hurt them, so it's not like we're entirely without sticks at this time. I'd prefer to have a bigger one, though, which is why I want to give them more to lose from behaving badly.

[dteowner]

You're repeatedly accusing me of binary thinking and then snipping away the parts that prove you wrong. Perhaps we'd better move on.

[Prime Junta]

Fair enough, dte -- I'll take that as conceding the debate, then.

Better luck next time, and no hard feelings, I hope!

[dteowner]

A nice lure, but I'm not taking the bait.

[Prime Junta]

Funny, that's pretty much exactly what I was thinking when you trotted out Hitler. It's not only a cliché, it's also a really bad analogy, and a guaranteed way to sidetrack the discussion. Iran is nothing like Nazi Germany, and the insanely complex and multifaceted situation you're facing in the M-E is nothing like World War II. I'm just not going to go anywhere near that territory!

[Prime Junta]

Meanwhile, back at the ranch: it seems something big is being attempted in the M-E on the Israeli-Arab front. King Abdullah of Jordan gave an interview to BBC where he's being anxious, threatening, and hopeful all at the same time. He says that there's a ginormously ambitious peace plan in the works, which would involve all 57 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The process is being led by the Hopey-Hildebeest tag team. If true, this is the most serious push for peace since... well, since for ever, basically.

He's also saying that if it doesn't pan out, there'll be another Arab-Israeli war in 12-18 months. Either way, we'll have plenty to talk about.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8043144.stm ]

N.b.: Iran is a founding member of the OIC. Think of that for a moment. (Don't get too optimistic, though -- the odds are that this too will fizzle out.)

[Pladio]

All in all good, but only if everything works according to plan, which is a very ideal case. So, maybe trying to get a casus belli to go at war with Israel again ? What do you think ?

[Benedict]

All in all good, but only if everything works according to plan, which is a very ideal case. So, maybe trying to get a casus belli to go at war with Israel again ? What do you think ?

Reads to me more like giving Israel one last chance to establish itself as a going concern in the middle east, even if they will inevitably throw it all away in favour of long term demographic trends spelling their ultimate destruction.

The arab states don't want to go to war with israel, they want Israel (and its western allies, or mostly just ally now) there as a demon figure to rally their people against in distraction from their ongoing social and economic issues. If the talks go the way they're almost certain to go unless netanyahu really suprises everyone and Obama takes some serious risks with reelection then arab nations will get exactly the pr tool they want for now.

Still, might turn out well. There's a papal visit to the area (http://www.thedailymash.co.uk/news/international/pope-to-see-where-it-all-didn't-happen-200905111752/) planned as well for all the good it'll do.

[Benedict]

Seems that journalist has been released by Iran link (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/11/roxana-saberi-sentence-cut)

Bodes well IMO, there are a still a far few swivel eyed loons in Iran but at least there's a decent moderate lobby capable of over-ruling them.

[Prime Junta]

All in all good, but only if everything works according to plan, which is a very ideal case. So, maybe trying to get a casus belli to go at war with Israel again ? What do you think ?

Like who, Jordan? I guess they could send those bagpipers over and really scare the willies out of the IDF.

Seriously, no Arab state, nor Iran, would win in a conventional war against Israel, and they know it. (Not to mention they'd be shat upon by the EU and the US, which they don't want either.)

It's not like they need a casus for a bellum in those parts anyway. I think he was referring to yet another Hezb-Hamas-style flare-up.

[Prime Junta]

Still, might turn out well. There's a papal visit to the area (http://www.thedailymash.co.uk/news/international/pope-to-see-where-it-all-didn't-happen-200905111752/) planned as well for all the good it'll do.

We can always hope. -- I really wonder what the hell they were thinking when they picked this loon for the papacy. It doesn't really help that he looks just like Darth Sidious, either -- you practically expect him to start shooting blue flames from his hands when does that Papal wave thing.

[Corwin]

The Pope's the Anti-Christ didn't you know!! :)

[Prime Junta]

I thought the Anti-Christ was supposed to be a tad more effective than Old Ben Cenobite here. Wasn't I promised a world government or something?

[coyote]

We can always hope. -- I really wonder what the hell they were thinking when they picked this loon for the papacy.

"Let's choose someone old and wrinkly, and if it turns out to be the wrong choice, chances are we won't have to cope with him for too long."

Of course it is always possible that the old and wrinkly guy is surprisingly healthy, and the younger guy dies 33 days later...

[Prime Junta]

Hey, Corwin -- I did some research, and you're wrong. Benedict IV isn't the Antichrist. John Paul II is. He's about to claw his way back out of his marble sepulcher, get himself re-elected Pope (or does he actually need re-election? I wonder what RCC canonical law says about undead primates?) and then start the Millennium. Read all 'bout it here: [ http://worldslastchance.com/articles/next-and-last-pope-will-be-a-devil-impersonating-john-paul-ii.html ]

[Rithrandil]

The video for the presentation I went to on Iran is up, for those interested: http://www.cnponline.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/13209

[Pladio]

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1085619.html

Very good read.
I'm still reading, but if anyone wants to offer their opinions or thoughts on it.

PJ, you're good at analysing stuff, so...

[Rithrandil]

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1085619.html

Very good read.
I'm still reading, but if anyone wants to offer their opinions or thoughts on it.

PJ, you're good at analysing stuff, so...

Interesting. It's pretty much what I thought - that Israel could attack Iran, but even if they carried out the attack perfectly there's still not a great chance of it slowing/stopping the Iranian program and it would have blowback of epic proportions.

[Prime Junta]

Damn, it feels good to be vindicated. That's *exactly* what I've been saying all along, only backed up with hard data and detailed information. Go Cordesman!

In a nutshell:

(1) Israel is unlikely to be able to destroy or seriously damage the Iranian nuclear program through military means.
(2) The attempt will cause the excrement to hit the ventilator in the region big-time, and Israel would bear the brunt of it.
(3) In case diplomatic efforts to stop Iran from acquiring a nuke fail, Israel needs a strategy to deter and contain a nuclear-armed Iran.
(3b) A nuclear-armed Iran does not mean the end of the world, and it can be deterred exactly the same way that all current nuclear-armed countries are and have been deterred.

I would add that while the USA does have a much greater strike capability and therefore has somewhat better (but by no means good!) odds of seriously damaging the Iranian program, everything else applies as well to a scenario of an American strike.

IOW: our best chance of stopping Iran from going nuclear is to (1) work for a comprehensive peace deal in the region, and (2) figure out how to make and use the best possible economic and diplomatic sticks and carrots. If it ever does come down to military action, it means we have already failed.

[Benedict]

Wasn't Obama supposed to be meeting netanyahu on Monday? Did anything interesting happen then or was it just business as usual.

If anyone did read something interesting about it then hook a brother up please :)

[Pladio]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090518/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_iran_election

It's quite interesting too. About Iran's election and Khamanei's statements...

This struck as particularly important as it would stand against PJ's proposed plan. If I understand it correctly.

"(Don't vote for) those who would provoke the greed of the enemies of the Iranian nation and be used by them to create divisions within the nation and take people away from their religion, principles and their revolutionary values."

IIRC, PJ's tactic was to take Iran in and out of isolationism. Make them have things to lose and so on...
If Khamanei can stop Iran from electing a pro-West (Obama) leader then this wouldn't work. :(

[Prime Junta]

Khamene'i holds the real power anyway, whoever wins the elections -- he's one of the reasons Khatami's reforms never got all that much traction. The big problem is to win him over. That's very much of an uncertain prospect -- but then so is bringing Netanyahu round to supporting a two-state solution, and there seems to be some movement on that front.

Khamene'i is old and intensely suspicious, and he's been burned several times. If he can be brought around at all, it'll take more than a few months of happy talk. However, I don't think it's an impossible prospect, and there's little downside to trying.

[dteowner]

Perhaps he could have an accident? Maybe while he's visiting a probable nuclear weapon development site? :plotting:

Bah! You guys won't let me have any fun.

[Prime Junta]

In case anyone was getting optimistic about Palestine/Israel, Stratfor is here to deliver a nice dose of cold water. Here's his take on Netanyahu's visit to DC:

So the peace process will continue, no one will expect anything from it, the Palestinians will remain isolated and wars regularly will break out. The only advantage of this situation from the U.S. point of view it is that it is preferable to all other available realities.

[ http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090518_israeli_prime_minister_comes_washington_a gain/?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_campaign=none&utm_medium=email ]

[dteowner]

That's a heck of a wet blanket. Seems to make quite a few assumptions (albeit logical ones) about the motivations of quite a few players, though. Perhaps some of those positions have been built in previous articles?

The level of gloom and cynicism feels very comfy to me, I must admit.

[Prime Junta]

The guy who writes those things always makes for interesting reading. I'd say he's right about 90% of the time, and mistaken about 10% of the time -- but the kicker is that he tends to be mistaken about the really humongous stuff. For example, he got most things right for 2008 -- but entirely missed the financial crisis; he was denying it had ever happened until November or so.

The thing you need to know is that he looks at things through a very strict theoretical framework and a very narrow perspective. Namely, geopolitics. His assumptions are that the room for maneuver that an actor on the world stage has is determined by geography, demographics, and relatively permanent economic factors, and that each actor pursues its self-interest in a coldly calculating, rational way. In a way, he treats world politics like (new) classical economists treat the economy. That approach works great most of the time, but it's fundamentally an equilibrium model -- it doesn't allow for stupidity, idealism, rigid ideologies, sudden shifts in public sentiment, charismatic leaders, nor unintended consequences. It also tends to lead to the (usually pretty accurate) method of predicting that whatever is happening today will continue to happen tomorrow.

IOW, his method would have worked great to predict how, say, decolonization panned out -- but it wouldn't have had room for a Hitler, a Khomeini, nor a Mahatma Gandhi.

So I'm not quite as relentlessly pessimistic as he is. Especially with the Middle East, the only constant is change; it tends to spring things at you without a lot of warning.

He's IMO also missing one slow, major shift: namely, the effect of the rise of Iran on Arab-Israeli relations. The Palestinian conflict with an ineffective but noisy peace process has served the Arab regimes well (it's very handy to be able to blame everything and anything on the Zionists and the Americans). However, lately things have changed in a way that the conflict is making the Iranians look good, and the Arab regimes look ineffective, weak, and corrupt -- and they're getting very concerned about Iran. IOW, the conflict no longer has the value for them that it used to have, and it's strengthening Iran. So I think there may be a genuine will to do something about it now that there wasn't before.

The main cause for his pessimism is a reality that few people seem ready to acknowledge, though: the economic dependency of the Palestinian territories on Israel. That does make independence somewhat fictional, and it makes the practical arrangements of any two-state solution extremely complicated. However, symbols are powerful, and the trappings of a state, even one that's an effective economic colony of Israel, might do a great deal to defuse tensions in the area -- especially if it's part of a comprehensive, regional peace deal.

So while I'm highly pessimistic about the prospects for peace too, I'm not quite as pessimistic as the author. He thinks it's impossible; I merely think it's unlikely.

[Prime Junta]

Another data point about the Iran nuke issue: there was an interesting interview of Mohammed el-Baradei, the IAEA head honcho, in Salon. (And you can't fault the interviewer for being too sympathetic towards him, or Iran, as you'll find out if you read it.)

[ http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2009/05/20/elbaradei/index1.html ]

That interview contained a bit of a bombshell. El-Baradei says that they were very close to an agreement on freezing the Iranian nuclear program on two occasions around 2005. The first attempt would have frozen the number of Iranian centrifuges at 36. The second, at 360. Both of these are far too few for a weapons program, although useful for research.

Both occasions came to nothing because the USA refused to even negotiate on that basis. Instead, their precondition for talks was zero centrifuges. *Precondition,* mind, not objective.

From where I'm at, this represents stupidity on a criminal scale -- the US had at least a decent chance at stopping the Iranian program or slowing it down by an order of magnitude (yes, any accord would have required them to submit to a much more intrusive inspection regime), but it... threw it away. If Iran does eventually develop a nuke, and if el-Baradei's account holds up, I this would be the single greatest foreign policy mistake the Bush presidency made -- which is something that hardly seems possible, given the hash they made of everything else.

[coyote]

Another data point about the Iran nuke issue: there was an interesting interview of Mohammed el-Baradei, the IAEA head honcho, in Salon. (And you can't fault the interviewer for being too sympathetic towards him, or Iran, as you'll find out if you read it.)

[ http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2009/05/20/elbaradei/index1.html ]

That interview contained a bit of a bombshell. El-Baradei says that they were very close to an agreement on freezing the Iranian nuclear program on two occasions around 2005. The first attempt would have frozen the number of Iranian centrifuges at 36. The second, at 360. Both of these are far too few for a weapons program, although useful for research.

Both occasions came to nothing because the USA refused to even negotiate on that basis. Instead, their precondition for talks was zero centrifuges. *Precondition,* mind, not objective.

From where I'm at, this represents stupidity on a criminal scale -- the US had at least a decent chance at stopping the Iranian program or slowing it down by an order of magnitude (yes, any accord would have required them to submit to a much more intrusive inspection regime), but it... threw it away. If Iran does eventually develop a nuke, and if el-Baradei's account holds up, I this would be the single greatest foreign policy mistake the Bush presidency made -- which is something that hardly seems possible, given the hash they made of everything else.

Thank you, a very interesting read. Just as a side remark, the suspension of all uranium enrichment as a precondition of talks was confirmed by Ambassador Nicholas Burns in the presentation Rithrandil went to:

The video for the presentation I went to on Iran is up, for those interested: http://www.cnponline.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/13209

Also, I think the chances of el-Baradei bending the truth on this are exceedingly slim: in my opinion, he is one of the most respectable people around, even if he does not receive the credit he deserves.

Barack Obama has turned U.S. policy around by 180 degrees. For instance, he announced plans to double the IAEA budget in the next four years. The Europeans, including Germany, want to freeze the budget, which I find alarming.

Well, that was one nice thing about Bush Jr.: we Europeans loved to feel superior. Hell, even a little child could recognise his utter incompetence and stupidity, when US voters apparently could not. He made every other politician stand out as a genius in comparison. Now, it seems that the US are actually clevering up! And the Europeans just muddle on. (Sorry for the rant.)

[V7]

here's an alternative view on Iran;
http://www.newsweek.com/id/199147

[coyote]

@V7: one point that is possibly overrated is Ayatollah Khomeini's statement that nuclear weapons are "un-Islamic". Of course they are! Killing innocents is "un-Islamic". Sacrificing children to clear minefields is "un-Islamic". Religion is a means to justify the regime and control the state, but Iranian politics is, and will be, motivated by much more pragmatic and worldly goals and ambitions. I think the rest of the article nails this down, though.

[V7]

... but Iranian politics is, and will be, motivated by much more pragmatic and worldly goals and ambitions.

Which is pretty much what I've argued elsewhere on this forum, just thought I'd post an article that didn't start and end with 'they're going to destroy the world because they're crazy'.

[Prime Junta]

@V7: one point that is possibly overrated is Ayatollah Khomeini's statement that nuclear weapons are "un-Islamic". Of course they are! Killing innocents is "un-Islamic". Sacrificing children to clear minefields is "un-Islamic". Religion is a means to justify the regime and control the state, but Iranian politics is, and will be, motivated by much more pragmatic and worldly goals and ambitions. I think the rest of the article nails this down, though.

Overrated, underrated, I don't know -- but it is significant. Khamene'i has used his religious authority to issue fatwas that declare nuclear weapons un-Islamic. If Iran does develop a nuke, he's going to have to make a U-turn on that, which will not be without cost. He didn't have to issue those fatwas -- he could simply have stated that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear bomb and left it at that.

[Prime Junta]

Well, that was one nice thing about Bush Jr.: we Europeans loved to feel superior. Hell, even a little child could recognise his utter incompetence and stupidity, when US voters apparently could not. He made every other politician stand out as a genius in comparison. Now, it seems that the US are actually clevering up! And the Europeans just muddle on. (Sorry for the rant.)

Given a choice between a smart Europe and a stupid USA or vice versa, I'll take vice versa. A stupid Europe just doesn't have the capability to cause mayhem at the scale of a stupid USA. I'll be quite happy to set aside my feeling of superiority on that score for a few years, until you 'murricans elect another stupid administration.

Of course, I'd rather have a smart Europe as well, but with the kind of politicians we have, I don't think that's too bloody likely. The best we can hope for is "not apocalyptically stupid," so we'll have to make do with that.

[coyote]

Which is pretty much what I've argued elsewhere on this forum, just thought I'd post an article that didn't start and end with 'they're going to destroy the world because they're crazy'.

You are correct, of course, and this point cannot be reiterated often enough at this time. Nevertheless, the first part of this otherwise good article tries a bit too hard to give Iran an appearance of nuclear innocence in my opinion ;)

Overrated, underrated, I don't know -- but it is significant. Khamene'i has used his religious authority to issue fatwas that declare nuclear weapons un-Islamic. If Iran does develop a nuke, he's going to have to make a U-turn on that, which will not be without cost. He didn't have to issue those fatwas -- he could simply have stated that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear bomb and left it at that.

This is from an Iranian statement (http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/iaea_iran/200508_iran_statement1.doc) to the August 2005 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors: The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei has issued the Fatwa that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.

So far, so good. One should keep in mind that this is not only intended to assure the Board that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons, it is also an attack against the only state that actually used nuclear weapons in a war, the USA. At the time, this was a very redundant statement, completely in line with the rest of their negotiating tactics. It goes on like this (emphasis by me): President Ahmadinejad, who took office just recently, in his inaugural address reiterated that his government is against weapons of mass destruction and will only pursue nuclear activities in the peaceful domain. The leadership of Iran has pledged at the highest level that Iran will remain a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT and has placed the entire scope of its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and additional protocol, in addition to undertaking voluntary transparency measures with the Agency that have even gone beyond the requirements of the Agency’s safeguards system.

We all know how that particular promise played out. More documents can be found here: http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/iaea_iran/index.htm

I do not think that placing too much value in what was said at that time is very productive, and this includes the Fatwa as well as the broken promises. It will only hinder future negotiations, which will need to establish trust from both sides, probably in small and awkward steps initially.

Given a choice between a smart Europe and a stupid USA or vice versa, I'll take vice versa. A stupid Europe just doesn't have the capability to cause mayhem at the scale of a stupid USA. I'll be quite happy to set aside my feeling of superiority on that score for a few years, until you 'murricans elect another stupid administration.

Of course, I'd rather have a smart Europe as well, but with the kind of politicians we have, I don't think that's too bloody likely. The best we can hope for is "not apocalyptically stupid," so we'll have to make do with that.

Heh - agreed.

[Prime Junta]

A brilliant piece of acerbic commentary from my favorite Zionist, Jerry Haber:

[ http://themagneszionist.blogspot.com/2009/04/zionist-hysteria-over-iran.html ]

Israel's own liberal hawk columnist, Ari Shavit, has produced an extraordinary rant, a scare-scenario with the typical, glatt kosher Israeli message to Obama (tinged with the customary Israeli condescension to African Americans). The message? Stop talking about dialogue with Iran; they may not be Arabs, but they sure act like them; they only understand force. If you don't act now, it will be the END OF CIVILIZATION AS WE KNOW IT, or, at least, the END OF YOUR REGIME.

[Prime Junta]

This is something highly unusual, perhaps even unprecedented: Lebanese counterintelligence appears to have busted the Israeli spy network operating in the country:

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8074848.stm ]

Accusations of spying for Israel are par for course in Arab countries, of course, but this seems unusual. For one thing, there's no obvious political or sectarian bias to the arrests, and the people getting busted aren't (mostly) even active in politics -- you have people from all religions and all walks of life, from small shopkeepers to the general in charge of special forces training. For another, we've seen people pre-emptively escaping to Israel, which is kinda sorta off the table if they're not really on their payroll -- Israel isn't in the habit of receiving random Arabs wandering over their borders.

In other words, I think it's highly likely that this is the real thing: a wholesale collapse of a human intelligence network set up over years or even decades. A huge strategic setback for Israel, a major gain for Hezbollah, and something that may be entirely unprecedented in the history of espionage.

It would also be an indicator that the Mossad and the Shin Bet aren't what they used to be -- a cutting-edge intelligence agency just doesn't have this kind of disaster happen to them.

Perhaps somebody will write a book about it, in another 20-30 years or so. Until then, we're gonna have to keep guessing.

If this does pan out, my guess is that the Hezb's cointel people are deeply involved; they're very very good at it, and were taught by... if not the best in the business, at least people who are very good at it. The Iranians, that is.

[Pladio]

It doesn't seem very plausible in my mind, especially since like they said in the article, espionage cells, like terrorist cells usually don't have anything to do with one another.
It would make sense for them to catch one or two people, but not everyone.

Something like this :
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=725940&contrassID=1&subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=0

[Prime Junta]

But what is it, then? It's not a political purge. The Lebanese intelligence agencies don't have a habit of arresting and "disappearing" random people (like some other Arab countries I could mention). If it's not what it appears to be, what is it?

[Rithrandil]

Could it just be a random witch hunt? A bunch of random/plausible people being declared spies to reinforce faith in the government?

[Prime Junta]

Could it just be a random witch hunt? A bunch of random/plausible people being declared spies to reinforce faith in the government?

That doesn't make sense either.

First off, the big winner in this operation isn't the government -- it's the opposition, i.e. Hezbollah.

Second, we've had stories of people fleeing over the southern border: if they weren't real spies, Israel wouldn't let them in. (Of course, these stories could turn out to be fabrications; we don't know enough yet to be certain.)

Third, the profiles of the people being arrested don't fit. In a witch-hunt, you'd see people first getting denounced, their reputations and careers suffering, them being boxed out of politics and weakened, and finally arrested and executed. This time, the arrests were completely out of the blue.

Fourth, you can't pull this sort of thing off without having at least two organizations that are usually at least somewhat at odds with each other cooperating: the Hezbollah cointel organs, and the Lebanese state intelligence organs. It's also likely that some of the Syrian intelligence/secret police organizations would be involved too. That would be... difficult and unlikely, to put it mildly. Then again, so is a genuine bust like this.

I can't rule anything out, of course -- the whole thing seems extremely unlikely; if it was in a movie or a spy novel I'd think it frankly ridiculous. However, from where I'm at the least ridiculous and unlikely explanation is that it is more or less what it seems.

There is one possibility that occurred to me, though.

Suppose that Lebanese/Hezb cointel had managed to co-opt a couple of well-placed Israeli spies, turning them into double agents. Suppose that they'd subsequently managed to finger a number of others at various levels -- say, a half-dozen to a dozen.

Then suppose they wanted to flush out the rest. What's the best way to do that? I dunno, but one way that might work would be to spectacularly arrest all the ones you know of plus a large number of completely random people, and then put Nasrallah on TV saying that the Lebanese state will be merciful to any others that turn themselves in, and feed the media with stories of spies fleeing across the border to Israel. There's at least a good chance that some more will panic and either run to Israel or turn themselves in.

IOW, it just might be a genuine -- major but not unprecedented -- cointel success wrapped in a really bold bluff. It may even be working.

[coyote]

Might be a case of Israel underestimating the Lebanese and relying on outdated technology for too long. To quote the article PJ linked (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8074848.stm): "Explaining the sudden spectacular rash of arrests, Lebanese officials have said that unspecified technological breakthroughs made it all possible."

Either way, there seems to be hardly enough data for any good speculations. Too bad they still have the death sentence over there, though, especially if innocents got cought up in it, which is not unlikely at all in the largely paranoid "intelligence" business and considering the usually dirty methods of "recruiting" informants. And how are you going to defend yourself if accused as a spy? People will expect you to have a solid alibi, after all.

[Prime Junta]

Could be. Perhaps the spies used some fairly old-fashioned communications technology to stay in touch with their handlers; if the Lebs managed to turn one of the spies, he'd spill the beans on it. While that probably wouldn't allow them to listen in, it might make it possible to use technological means to pinpoint others using the same technology, and then put them under surveillance.

[coyote]

Yeah, at first I was thinking along the lines of using mobile phone GSM tracking in combination with a computer algorithm for relating phones with people plus some cluster analysis to determine the likely spy network, but considering how well known cell phone surveillance is, and has been for years, this is far too primitive.

Of course, internet communication is also pretty vulnerable and easy to analyse on a grand scale if you have access to the service providers. Since most people do not encrypt their internet communication, encrypted channels can be used to spot likely suspects.

I really have no idea WHAT they are using to stay secure. Maybe satellite phones, or the old fashioned way: sending people.

[Prime Junta]

I'm pretty sure they'll have to have had some electronic means of communication. It's not all that easy to send people over, and it takes time.

There might be something to that GSM thing, though. The first time I was there, something very strange happened to me. My phone rang, and a friendly-sounding guy -- a stranger who introduced himself rather quickly, and spoke in perfectly fluent but slightly accented English -- told me that he and some friends of his wanted to start a Finland-Israel import-export circle, and would I be interested in joining? I politely declined and heard nothing more of it.

I'm fairly certain that it was some intelligence agency making contact in order either recruit me or check whether I'm up to something fishy. If they're tapping into the GSM network, they'll be able to see that my phone is a Finnish one, as well as when it first connected to the network, and that it had not been there before. I have absolutely nothing to do with any import-export business of any kind, and I've never had similar calls anywhere else.

I've no idea who it might've been -- the Syrians were pretty much running the phone network at the time, so they'd be the logical suspects; OTOH the Israelis might easily have someone inside as well, as could the Hezbollah, the Lebanese intelligence, and just about anyone else.

Another thing that points to GSM's is that in the early stages of the Rafic Hariri assassination investigation -- back when they were actually doing some serious work in order to figure out what happened -- they managed to get pretty far by tracking down suspicious cell phone caller info, eventually traced down to a handful of pre-paid cards bought at a single location in (IIRC) Tripoli.

Would the Mossad have used GSM's for communication even after all that? I've no idea, but sometimes people do incredibly stupid things, through laziness, underestimating the other guy, or simply because it always worked before. So I wouldn't rule it out either.

[coyote]

Interesting, that was a funny call! Someone probably messed up when he did not ask where you are from, first. And I am quite certain that to politely refuse was the only right thing to do, too. Possible motivations for fishing people with talk about an Israel-<insert country> import-export circle are plenty (spies might take the bait if they are looking for additional communication channels, local law enforcement and intelligence might simply want to know if you go to Israel on a regular basis, etc.).

As far as I can imagine, encrypted mobile phone communication has the advantages of being a mass medium and of being easy to set up, so you can have a lot of handlers with very small cells or even 'one-spy cells'. The first advantage is greatly diminished by automated data-mining applications. Maybe the Mossad assumed that more care in the distribution of pre-paid cards would solve the problem already, who knows.

Thanks for the additional insight!

[Prime Junta]

Interesting, that was a funny call! Someone probably messed up when he did not ask where you are from, first. And I am quite certain that to politely refuse was the only right thing to do, too. Possible motivations for fishing people with talk about an Israel-<insert country> import-export circle are plenty (spies might take the bait if they are looking for additional communication channels, local law enforcement and intelligence might simply want to know if you go to Israel on a regular basis, etc.).

I think he mentioned that I had been recommended to him by someone, i.e. he wanted to give the impression that he already had some information about me. If there was a mistake, it was in calling me when I was still in Lebanon -- it would've been less suspicious just to log my number and then call me once my phone had left the system. That way it would've felt slightly less suspicious.

As far as I can imagine, encrypted mobile phone communication has the advantages of being a mass medium and of being easy to set up, so you can have a lot of handlers with very small cells or even 'one-spy cells'. The first advantage is greatly diminished by automated data-mining applications. Maybe the Mossad assumed that more care in the distribution of pre-paid cards would solve the problem already, who knows.

Thanks for the additional insight!

Just speculating, but thanks for the thanks.

[dteowner]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090531/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_palestinians_violence_11

What the heck is going on over there? Could the mopup of Israeli spies (assuming that's what it is) be going as a political offset to getting after Hamas? With that in mind, let me tinfoil just a bit--is it even conceivable that Israel would sell out their network in return for Abbas going after Hamas?

[Prime Junta]

I doubt they're connected. Since Abbas doesn't have the means to neutralize Hamas, Israel would be really stupid to sacrifice a major strategic asset, if the best it can expect is that Fatah makes some reassuring gestures and maybe offs/nabs a few low-level Hamas operatives.

In isolation, the latest Hamas/Fatah dust-up doesn't mean much. We'll see what happens next -- it'll either escalate or die down. Neither will fundamentally change the power relations or picture on the ground, unless third parties become involved.

[dteowner]

The Qalqiliya clash began late Saturday when Palestinian troops surrounded a hideout of Mohammed Samman, a leader of Hamas' military wing, and his assistant, Mohammed Yassin. Both had been on Israel's wanted list for six years, Palestinian security officials said.I'm not sure you call those guys "low-level Hamas operatives". I'm certainly reaching, but it's strange to get two "out of the blue" events with no obvious triggers happening so quickly. Particularly given that Abbas is largely an also-ran in the big picture, it's strange that he's feeling his oats all of a sudden.

[Prime Junta]

Okay, mid-level. They don't have any senior people in the West Bank, and losing a few mid-level guys will only fire up their base and make it easier to recruit new people to replace them.

[Prime Junta]

I just read the transcript of Obama's speech in Cairo.

It was a good one. A very good one, even.

* Very careful choice of words: the speech was clearly vetted by people who understand exactly how Muslims use language. For example, we usually say that Islam was founded; Muslims say that it was revealed. Similarly, we have turns of phrase like "the sons of Abraham" and the "peace be upon them" after mention of the prophets. The Qur'an references also sounded like he (or his speechwriter anyway) knew what he was talking about. Stuff like this matters -- we have a long tradition of talking down to Arabs and Muslims, and simply expressing things in their terms gives a completely different feel to the message.

* It didn't shy away from tough topics. Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, and extremism were all discussed pretty frankly. At the same time, he acknowledged American responsibility in creating the mess we're in -- the Mosaddeq coup, for example.

* It was surprisingly concrete on a number of points: the unequivocal condemnation of Israeli settlements, and the demands that Muslim countries must rise to their responsibilities in forging a peace, and that Muslim communities must act to discredit extremism among them.

It was a fine line to walk, but I think he pulled it off well. Fadlallah's comment that it was a "sermon on morality" doesn't quite ring true to me, and the Qaeda people seem genuinely spooked, or so the shrill tone of their latest propaganda suggests anyway.

[magerette]

Thanks for the analysis, Prime J. You've picked up overtones I wasn't aware of. We've been bombarded with Obama's presence over here since the election;there's not a day he isn't on television addressing something. Sometimes it's only a few prepared remarks, but often when any kind of topic he is concerned with addressing comes up, he gives a speech. I enjoy his literacy, dry humor and engagement with issues, even his professorial approach to explaining his reasons for supporting a particular position. It really is one of his great gifts. But I want more from him than words, and in your precis above, you show how words can also be actions.

[dteowner]

Well, of course his Muslim references will be correct--Barack's a Muslim himself, right? :rotfl:

[vanedor]

Something I wonder is... How far can Obama go to "convince" Israel to stop colonizing the West Bank if he is actually serious about it(which I believe, he is)?

Stop selling them weapons, stop giving them funds, stop supporting them with their veto at the UN security council. I wonder.

[Prime Junta]

Well, of course his Muslim references will be correct--Barack's a Muslim himself, right? :rotfl:

It's clear that someone in his administration is -- or, if not, is intimately familiar with Islam and Muslims. I'm pretty familiar with it myself, but I couldn't pull that off without making at least a couple of gaffes.

[Prime Junta]

BBC had a bunch of "man (or woman) on the street" blurbs from the M-E about the speech. Looks like I wasn't the only one impressed.

For me and all Arabs this speech was like a dream! Obama addressed all the sensitive issues for the Arab world and he showed a grasp of detail that I respect.
He didn't go too far on the Israeli or Palestinian side. He was moderate.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8082730.stm ]

[magerette]

Nice read, Prime J. Over all, it's being well-received here as well for the most part, though as usual it's being put under the microscope for any shred of divisive news material it might be able to generate. The question of course is what will be the follow up.
Here's a similar bunch of mostly positive reactions over at the normally moderate to conservative Arena blog at Poltico. (http://www.politico.com/arena/)

And here's a link to the full transcript of the speech (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31102929/) for those who haven't had a chance to read it.

[Prime Junta]

Yup, good read, Politico. I especially liked the scandalized wingnuts.

http://images.politico.com/global/arena/dorinson_patrick.jpg

"I'll be sleeping with one eye open, one hand on my Colt .45, and a fast horse nearby." If these guys weren't for real, you'd have to invent them.

[Prime Junta]

David Brooks takes a slightly jaundiced view of the speech. I can't help thinking, though, that the world just might need exactly what he's accusing Obama of being:

This speech builds an idealistic facade on a realist structure. And this gets to the core Obama foreign-policy perplexity. The president wants to be an inspiring leader who rallies the masses. He also wants be a top-down realist who cuts deals in the palaces. There is a tension between these two impulses that even a sharp Chicago pol is having trouble managing.

[ http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/opinion/05brooks.html?ref=opinion ]

[Zaleukos]

Idealistic facade on a realist structure is almost exactly the opposite of what the previous administration had to offer.:D

[Benedict]

Hahaha . . . I like the daily mash news brief on Obama's speech:

Obama praises Islam's penmanship
"You're really good at calligraphy and maths and stuff - please stop killing us," says US president

[dteowner]

U.S.Navy releases Al Qaeda Terrorist - I can' t believe it!!!!!

The US Navy today announced that it has released a senior Al Qaeda terrorist after questioning him extensively for 27 days while being held prisoner aboard a US aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea.

In a humanitarian gesture, the terrorist was given $50 US and a white 1962 Ford Fairlane automobile upon being released from custody. The attached photo shows the terrorist on his way home just after being released by the Navy.
---------------
It's a kinder, gentler nation under Barack. This is what happens when you can't send them to Gitmo anymore. :p

[Squeek]

Oh, well isn't that just great? The government just gave away fifty more of our dollars and another one of our Ford Fairlanes, two things we're running low on at the moment.

All kidding aside (and yes, that was kidding), this does seem new and different. Maybe there were hugs exchanged and tears shed when they released him. "I love you, man!"

(Oh, that was more kidding.)

[magerette]

Make sure you look at the image, Squeek. :)

[dteowner]

Don't confuse the issue with facts, magerette. ;)

[Squeek]

Make sure you look at the image, Squeek. :)Spot on comment, magerette. The way my browser is set up, I sometimes need to do a little work to see certain images, and I responded to this post before taking a look at it. I considered editing it afterwards but didn't deem it necessary (it's all in fun after all). But yeah.

My guess is he was in a hurry and couldn't wait for the ship to dock. ;)

[Prime Junta]

Preliminary results for the Lebanese elections are in. Looks like March 14 (the pro-Western bloc) won by a hair. It also looks like March 8 (the Hezb-led bloc) is conceding defeat.

From where I'm at, the first item is good news, but relatively unimportant; the second item is VERY good news, and extremely important.

The upshot is that nothing much will change. By Lebanese standards, this is a pretty good outcome; what the country desperately needs is boring politics with nothing much changing for a while.

This oughta make proponents of democracy in the Arab world happy, too -- not only were the elections free and fair and the result accepted, the people voted like they're supposed to. ;)

[Prime Junta]

By the way, if you're curious about how a calm, well-organized, and successful election day looks in Lebanon -- and how it would look in most Arab countries should they have free elections -- these two articles are rather instructive:

In a news conference, Interior Minister Ziyad Baroud said the security plan was "a success."

He added that "all breaches were not a cause for concern and were quickly contained by army soldiers and police control."

"I praise the Lebanese people and security forces in preserving security," he said.
...
Meanwhile, four people were arrested Sunday in different regions for trying to cast their votes using fake identity cards.

Examining Magistrate Said Mirza ordered the arrest of two men in Bourj Hammoud and three others in Metn and Tripoli for using forged IDs.

Separately, the army patrolled Sassine Square in Achrafieh after clashes erupted over party flags.

Meanwhile, a man was arrested in the southern town of Abbasiyya for the illegal possession of documents belonging to one of the candidates inside the polling station.

The National News Agency reported that a clash erupted in the town of Talbibeh in Akkar between supporters of the Future Movement's list and those of the opposition's list. Army soldiers resolved the problem and calm was restored to the area, the NNA added.

Another security problem broke out at a polling station the town of Kherbet Rouha in the district of Rashaya. The fist fight halted the voting process for half an hour. The army intervened to resolve the problem.

An LBC reporter and camera crew were attacked in the Beirut area of Basta by unidentified assailants. The army immediately intervened and the crew was not harmed.

A fight erupted in Borj al-Barajneh between the supporters of MP Bassem Sabaa and people from other parties. Army soldiers interfered and put an end to the clash.

The army arrested five people who were involved in a clash in the area of Hadath. The people arrested had sharp tools.

Security problems in the area of Jezzine were immediately resolved by army soldiers, according to the NNA.

Media reports also said the army contained a clash in the area of Ain al-Rummaneh, where gunfire was heard.

Meanwhile, the NNA reported that clashes broke out between the supporters of former Prime Minister Omar Karami and those of MP Mohammad Kabbara in Bab al-Tabbaneh in Tripoli. The clashes led to the injury of one person. The army deployed and contained the situation.

In other developments, media reports said a fight erupted in Sidon between Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's supporters and those of opposition candidate MP Osama Saad. Security forces and army soldiers put an end to the clash.
...

Saad's supporters reportedly burned tires on roads in Sidon, as poll returns showed results in favor of Education Minister Bahia Hariri and Siniora.

Meanwhile, media reports also said shots were fired at Future News TV station in the Beirut area of Kantari and the Lebanese Army cordoned off the area.

Also Sunday, one person was injured in a scuffle that erupted in front of the Future Movement's office in Clemenceau.

Media reports also said that unidentified people surrounded the house of the head of the Lebanese Option Gathering Ahmad Assaad in Marjayoun.

The media also reported attacks at the house of Baabda candidate MP Bassem Sabaa, while gunshots were reportedly heard close to the house of Baabda candidate Salah Harakeh.

If you have the chance, people, vote. It's a hard-won privilege, and one that's easy to lose.

[ http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=102789 ]
[ http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=102788 ]

[Zaleukos]

Preliminary results for the Lebanese elections are in. Looks like March 14 (the pro-Western bloc) won by a hair. It also looks like March 8 (the Hezb-led bloc) is conceding defeat.

From where I'm at, the first item is good news, but relatively unimportant; the second item is VERY good news, and extremely important.

That second item is pretty much a cornerstone of functioning democracy and very good news indeed:)

[vanedor]

"Army soldiers interfered and put an end to the clash." uhm, the army sure is efficient...

By the way, there is no police in lebanon or something?

[Prime Junta]

"Army soldiers interfered and put an end to the clash." uhm, the army sure is efficient...

By the way, there is no police in lebanon or something?

There is. They have some really cool cars and motorcycles donated by the United States of America. You can often see them looking important in traffic intersections, pretending to direct traffic, and driving around motorways with their lights flashing.

Okay, they do also (try to) catch criminals and investigate crimes, and sometimes they even succeed.

Public order (such as it is), however, is maintained by the Army and the Ministry of the Interior special forces. They're actually rather good at it, and can usually handle anything smaller than an organized militia attack. As somebody put it, "the Lebanese Army is a pretty good army, except if you want to fight a war, in which case it's better to ask some other army."

[vanedor]

I guess that's a problem with such a divided country and soldiers that are of so diverse political alliances... It remembers me the Yugoslavian army. It only began to have some power in the yugoslavian civil war the day it became basically a serbian army.

Still, the lebanese army actually managed to succesfully wage a minor war against a palestinian organisation, last year or so, no?

[Prime Junta]

I guess that's a problem with such a divided country and soldiers that are of so diverse political alliances... It remembers me the Yugoslavian army. It only began to have some power in the yugoslavian civil war the day it became basically a serbian army.

Still, the lebanese army actually managed to succesfully wage a minor war against a palestinian organisation, last year or so, no?

A very minor one, yes. Thoroughly nasty, but militarily not much of a contest -- the biggest challenge was how to avoid killing everybody in the camp. Fatah al-Islam was a small movement and, while it had outside funding and support (according to Sy Hersh, this included Dick Cheney, btw), it didn't have a big support base, no support base at all in the army, nor maintainable supply lines.

[Prime Junta]

A very interesting analysis of Obama's play in Cairo re the Israeli settlements:

[ http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090608_west_bank_settlements_and_future_u_s_isra eli_relations/?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_campaign=none&utm_medium=email ]

Main points:

* Obama wants a confrontation with Netanyahu. His objective is to break the Israeli right's back in order to force through a peace deal with the Palestinians, resulting in a two-state solution with a viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.
* He picked the question of the settlements, because it does not endanger Israeli security, and support for the settler movement in the US is lukewarm at best.
* Netanyahu's options are limited: he can't cave on the issue without breaking his coalition and (probably) getting forced into opposition; OTOH if he doesn't cave and the result is an open rift with the US, the Israeli left and center will scream bloody murder, and he'll very likely be facing a no-confidence vote, and loses again. And if neither of these happens, Israel will find itself internationally isolated, and Obama's standing in the Arab world will be suitably enhanced.
* From Obama's POV, this is a can't-lose play: all of the likely outcomes will make him look good.

We'll see how this plays out. In any case, it's interesting to see skilful diplomacy in action, whether it succeeds or no. Personally, I've been struck by the way Obama put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict near the top of his agenda so early on; until now, American presidents have left it near the end of their second term, simply because the cost of losing is so big. The guy has balls.

[vanedor]

Yep, it's very interesting to see.

And fortunately so far, the palestinians have been helping him(mayhaps, against their will) : no significant terrorist attacks since quite a long time.

A bus exploding in western jerusalem is something could only weaken Obama's position.

If only he was succesful in this conflict and finally bring a solid and final solution... all the prestige the US would gain, so much tension in the world finally dissolved... Even the Afghan situation would be helped. It's nice dreaming!

[Pladio]

If Obama manages to achieve peace in his first term he's getting elected for life like Augustus :)

[magerette]

What are everyone's thoughts about:
1) The recent Lebanon elections?
2) The upcoming Iran elections?

Are they in any way a test for Islamic extremists, or Obama for that matter? Here the results of Lebanon's elections are said to be pro-Western, and there's speculation that Ahmadinjehad is on his way out, which would seem to indicate that things may be shifting a bit.

[Prime Junta]

What are everyone's thoughts about:
1) The recent Lebanon elections?

For my take, flip back a page. :)

2) The upcoming Iran elections?

I haven't been following them very closely. The stakes there are lower than in Lebanon, since the system is much more stable, and the issue of somebody not accepting the result won't arise. I'd expect turnout to be fairly low, since the system ensures that there isn't much genuine choice involved; this, of course, favors firebrand rabble-rousers like Ahmadinejad.

Are they in any way a test for Islamic extremists, or Obama for that matter?

In Iran's case, no, not really. It's more of a test of the general level of disillusionment. If Obama's hopiness has managed to radiate as far as Tehran, we may see a shift; if they're as cynical as usual, it'll be more of the same.

Here the results of Lebanon's elections are said to be pro-Western, and there's speculation that Ahmadinjehad is on his way out, which would seem to indicate that things may be shifting a bit.

It would've been more ... interesting had the opposition won in Lebanon. This way it's just more of the same; I find it unlikely that any of the real problems in the country will get resolved (e.g. disarming Hezbollah, or doing something about the refugee camps, or abolishing confessionalism). With Iran, a different figurehead would definitely make things easier on the international scene.

[dteowner]

Think there might be a "devil we know" advantage to Ahmad-whatever sticking around? His more wacko positions make it easier to discredit anything legitimately uncomfortable he might come up with. Plus, for all his failures, Obama is far more adept at picking up verbal nuance than Dubya ever was (low bar, that), making him less likely to get played in a Columbia U redux, which is Ahmad-whatever's primary weapon.

[Prime Junta]

Think there might be a "devil we know" advantage to Ahmad-whatever sticking around? His more wacko positions make it easier for discredit anything uncomfortable he might come up with. Plus, for all his failures, Obama is far more adept at picking up verbal nuance than Dubya ever was (low bar, that), making him less likely to get played in a Columbia U redux, which is Ahmad-whatever's primary weapon.

That would depend on how things play out. Here's how I see it:

(1) Why do we even care?

Nukes and Hezbollah, in a nutshell.

(2) How could we solve those problems?

There are two potential approaches: persuasion and coercion. Neither is certain to succeed, but IMO persuasion is more likely to do so.

(3) What does the Iranian president matter?

If there's an opening for persuasion and the West seizes it, Ahmadinejad would be a liability. A more sensible Iranian figurehead would make it easier to dial down tension, and it's just possible that we could find a compromise that would make everyone if not happy, at least not so unhappy there would be any shooting involved.

OTOH if no such opening presents itself, or if the persuasion fails, we're right back to coercion. In that case, the challenge becomes mobilization of an international consensus broad and deep enough to put enough pressure on Iran to either get it to stop its nuclear program and/or general troublemaking, or make it physically impossible for it to do so. In this case, Ahmadinejad would make things easier, since he doesn't have too many friends abroad.

[V7]

Think there might be a "devil we know" advantage to Ahmad-whatever sticking around? His more wacko positions make it easier to discredit anything legitimately uncomfortable he might come up with. Plus, for all his failures, Obama is far more adept at picking up verbal nuance than Dubya ever was (low bar, that), making him less likely to get played in a Columbia U redux, which is Ahmad-whatever's primary weapon.

Depends where you sit politically I suppose if you're happy with continued hostility and confrontation with Iran the current government is obligingly hostile and outragous and can be relied on to come up with a good soundbite for the news. The oposition is more likely to take a softer aproach be open to negoation but they're not likly to really rock the boat - still the clerics arn't as molithic as they're often painted and depending on the international response there's certainly a posibility of a moderate ascendancy.

[magerette]

For my take, flip back a page. :)

Oops--being absent digging and planting my herb garden, disciplining the roses and retiring to my bed to take drugs for my back has put me behind in several threads. Should have known this wasn't a subject you'd be silent on.

I haven't been following them very closely. The stakes there are lower than in Lebanon, since the system is much more stable, and the issue of somebody not accepting the result won't arise. I'd expect turnout to be fairly low, since the system ensures that there isn't much genuine choice involved; this, of course, favors firebrand rabble-rousers like Ahmadinejad.

Hasn't he had some reverses in popularity over the last year, though? In addition, my leftie channel says the gossip is Ahmadinejad is encountering some political flak due to making derogatory comments about his opponent's wife and a you-tube that's circulating in farsi where he speaks about the light emanating from his body causing people to be unable to blink during some speech he gave. Conclusion: maybe he's now being seen as a bit of a goofus? Of course, that might be a plus for him with the more traditionalist elements.

In Iran's case, no, not really. It's more of a test of the general level of disillusionment. If Obama's hopiness has managed to radiate as far as Tehran, we may see a shift; if they're as cynical as usual, it'll be more of the same.
Time is moving on, though, even without the Big O extending the hand--the world is becoming smaller, moving forward more evenly, for anyone who can access the internet--you've probably seen this BBC article(Rap, Blogs and the Political Mix) (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8088042.stm), for instance.


It would've been more ... interesting had the opposition won in Lebanon. This way it's just more of the same; I find it unlikely that any of the real problems in the country will get resolved (e.g. disarming Hezbollah, or doing something about the refugee camps, or abolishing confessionalism). With Iran, a different figurehead would definitely make things easier on the international scene.
I have to say I don't have the background, memory cells left, or possibly even the inate political smarts to understand Lebanese politics. If you'd like to explain further what would have happened had the opposition won, though, I'd be interested.

[Prime Junta]

Hasn't he had some reverses in popularity over the last year, though? In addition, my leftie channel says the gossip is Ahmadinejad is encountering some political flak due to making derogatory comments about his opponent's wife and a you-tube that's circulating in farsi where he speaks about the light emanating from his body causing people to be unable to blink during some speech he gave. Conclusion: maybe he's now being seen as a bit of a goofus? Of course, that might be a plus for him with the more traditionalist elements.

He's not all that popular. Trouble is, the people with whom he IS popular, always vote. His opponents, OTOH, tend to be apathetic, discouraged, and cynical, and therefore most of them don't even bother voting.

So Ahmadinejad's popularity won't actually affect the election much; what matters is whether everybody else can be bothered to drag themselves to the polls to vote for some other candidate they don't like either.

I have to say I don't have the background, memory cells left, or possibly even the inate political smarts to understand Lebanese politics. If you'd like to explain further what would have happened had the opposition won, though, I'd be interested.

First off, it wouldn't have mattered anywhere near as much as some people make it out to be. The field is so fragmented that some kind of coalition government would have had to emerge, no matter what the result; that means that the losing side would have had at least veto power, if not more. This was the case before the elections, and it's the case now; it would also have been the case if Mustaqbal had been in the opposition. Hezbollah would not have been in a position to start wars or turn Lebanon into an Islamic republic.

Second, it would've reshuffled the deck internationally. The Lebanese government is backed by the US/EU. If the Hezb was in charge, this would, at the very least, have been significantly diluted.

Third, and this is where we get into severely speculative territory, it just might have made it possible to break the deadlock paralyzing the country. Specifically, the only scenario in which I see the Hezb agreeing to disband its militia (i.e., merge it with the Lebanese Armed Forces) is if it feels politically so secure that it doesn't need it. An opposition win just might have achieved this.

(OTOH the international backlash might well have had the opposite effect, causing the Hezb to dig in its heels and not budge -- given the way stuff works there, this is by far the more likely outcome. Or, of course, Aoun might just have flipped sides, or something else could've reshuffled the deck and sent everyone back to square one, more or less.)

I'm not saying I would've *liked* the opposition to win -- in particular, I detest General Aoun -- but I would've been... curious to see what would've happened. As it is, we're likely to see a lot more talkie-talkie with no progress on any issues whatsoever; a reshuffling of the deck with the opposition in power would've resulted in different power relations, which might have led to progress on some issues. OTOH probably not.

It's perhaps a dte-ish kind of thinking here; there's basically been a lot of talkie-talkie with no progress whatsoever, so forcing a crisis has a certain attraction. March 8 has been doing its damnedest to stop anyone from governing, so there'd be a certain poetic justice to dropping it in their lap and going 'here, you deal with it then.'

Still, there have been plenty of crises there as well, and they haven't solved anything either -- usually there's just been lots of people killed and things broken, after which everything goes back to where it started. Frustrating as hell.

[Prime Junta]

As a postscript, I don't really have much to add to BBC's analysis on the election and what it means.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8089990.stm ]

[magerette]

Thanks for both your clear analysis and the bbc link, Prime J. I'll try to digest and retain them both.

Actually my husband is a great one for your crises theory; he often says nothing gets done when people are complacent, or alternatively, totally disillusioned, or until people are severely personally affected by something, which is also part of our problem here in the US of course.

Then again, when that doesn't work, he usually falls back on the highly sophisticated "Shoot 'em all and let God sort em out' argument. :)

[dteowner]

My kinda guy. Clearly wise, even if he did get hitched to a lefty.

[magerette]

My kinda guy. Clearly wise, even if he did get hitched to a lefty.

He's fortunately more of an independent than the republican he's registered as (albeit with a libertarian flavor) so most of the time we pretty much agree on politics, but sometimes I do get The Look.O_O

Edit: And just because this is one of the few threads on the board that usually manages to stay on topic, here's a link to the latest BBC stuff on the Iran elections:
Iran election row fires up rivals (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8093480.stm)
which says the race is tightening.

[Prime Junta]

Walp, the elections are on in Iran. Turnout seems to be very high. This ought to favor Mir Hossein Mousavi, the challenger. There was also a last-minute twist when Ahmadinejad attacked some senior clerics and got duly sat upon, which, in my uninformed opinion, seems like something of a stupid political move in a country like Iran.

This might yet get interesting.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8096411.stm ]

[magerette]

I heard they're projecting something like a 60% turnout. MSNBC last night had some footage of the streets of Tehran full of thousands of mostly young Iranians bedecked in green paint, flags and even baseball caps(I gather green is Mousavi's color)--it looked very cosmopolitan--like a huge soccer fan demonstration or something--for a hardcore Islamic state.

Even if Ahmadinehad does win, this seems like a hopeful sign(providing the military doesn't institute reprisals, etc.)

[Rithrandil]

You know more about this than I, PJ - Say Ahmadinejad doesn't win. If Moussavi wins, how much change will this actually cause? Will it just be less aggressive rhetoric? What "constituonal" powers does the President have? And, more importantly, what "actual" powers does the President have? Can't Khameini/the clerics just overrule anything Moussavi would want to do?

Or would it potentially lead to a situation where a popular reformer with mainly symbolic power might be able to leverage that popularity into a powerful bargaining chip Khameini and the clerics would be afraid of?

[Prime Junta]

I numbered your questions for easy reference:

You know more about this than I, PJ - Say Ahmadinejad doesn't win. 1. If Moussavi wins, how much change will this actually cause? 2. Will it just be less aggressive rhetoric? 3. What "constituonal" powers does the President have? 3. And, more importantly, what "actual" powers does the President have? 4. Can't Khameini/the clerics just overrule anything Moussavi would want to do?

1. Only time will tell. Iran consists of a bunch of relatively independent power centers. The room for each of them depends on the relations and coalitions they, and their rivals, manage to form.

2. Certainly that. There will be other changes as well -- both Khatami and Ahmadinejad did have real influence on Iranian policies, despite the limitations of their powers. Again, the extent of their influence will depend on the other factions, their power relations, and their degree of activity.

3. The President is in charge of the executive. In particular, he gets to initiate action on a lot of things. However, the Guardian Council can veto/overrule him.

4. Yes, they can. However, they're not all-powerful either, nor are they a monolithic, unified body, and should they do so, they risk overreaching *their* authority. They're not all that popular, and if they get too ham-fisted about things, they risk destabilizing the system, which is something they will want to avoid at all costs.

Or would it potentially lead to a situation where a popular reformer with mainly symbolic power might be able to leverage that popularity into a powerful bargaining chip Khameini and the clerics would be afraid of?

It's not quite that extreme. The Guardian Council attempts to stay above the fray of daily politics, and only steps in when (in their view) the Islamic Revolution, or Iran itself, is being endangered. So the President of Iran is a lot more than a figurehead, but a lot less than, say, the POTUS.

A lot depends on his skill -- if he knows how far he can push the Guardian Council without getting them to crack down, he can make a good deal of difference. Having popular support will, obviously, help; however, as Khatami learned, that can cut two ways, since it may lead to the Basiji or other such factions to work to actively undermine that support, by violence if necessary.

However, this isn't as simple as all that either. There's a range of opinion within the Guardian Council as well, and they're far from the apocalyptic fanatics some people like to paint them. I believe it's likely that there's a "peace faction" among them as well -- a group that believes that Iran should seek a rapprochement with the West, either for tactical or strategic reasons. It's quite possible that a convincing Moussavi win would strengthen the hand of that faction, which could lead to real and substantive changes in Iranian policy.

But, again, I'm not nearly as knowledgeable about Iran as I'd like to be, so this is all a bit speculative. I'm really hoping Moussavi does win; if he does, there will be changes, and who knows where those might eventually lead?

[Rithrandil]

Thanks for the overview, PJ!

I'm somewhat conversant in the military or geopolitical consequences of what happens in Iran, but their political system is a giant mystery to me. I always wonder "who actually is in charge?", especially because the message you see on the news here in the states is "WHO KNOWS!" I've heard everything ranging from "Ahmadinejad controls nothing and is just a puppet of Khameini and the guardian council" to "he's in charge and the guardian council isn't very pro active".

[Squeek]

CNN has a cool story (http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/06/12/iran.elections.voting/index.html) featured on its Web site today about Iranians living in America and their excitement with the election. I've worked with a few Iranians and once roomed with one, and I'm certain they're excited now too (and that's cool).

Mexico recently made it especially easy for Mexicans living over here to participate in one of their important national election, and the story was very similar.

[Prime Junta]

Okay, they're done voting. Both candidates claim victory, and national TV announces that Ahmadinejad got 69% of the vote.

Next up: counting the ballots.

[Corwin]

Okay, they're done voting. Both candidates claim victory, and national TV announces that Ahmadinejad got 69% of the vote.

Next up: counting the ballots.

I love it!! That could easily become someone's sig!! :)

[magerette]

Okay, they're done voting. Both candidates claim victory, and national TV announces that Ahmadinejad got 69% of the vote.

Next up: counting the ballots.
And then, disputing the ballot count for six months.
Looks like Democracy has come to Iran. :)

[txa1265]

And then, disputing the ballot count for six months.
Looks like Democracy has come to Iran. :)

And after the recount we will find out that Al Franken is in fact, the new president of Iran ...

[Prime Junta]

Well well: with about 80% of the vote counted, Ahmadinejad is said to have won with 65% of the vote. Mousavi is calling foul, citing massive vote rigging.

Again, I haven't been following this too much, and information from Iran is notoriously unreliable, but... this doesn't seem right. Mousavi was surging in the polls, and the latest ones put them close enough that there should have been a run-off. Turnout was extremely high; this should have favored the challenger.

This is the kind of thing that sparks revolutions, if the conditions are present. We might soon find out just how stable the Iranian political system is. My guess is that it's pretty stable -- that there will be some disturbances followed by a crackdown, and then it's back to business as normal. You never know, though; another, and clearly popular, revolution in Iran could solve a whole raft of issues rather neatly. Keeping my fingers crossed...

[Rithrandil]

Could this be a "DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN" incident? Something similar happened in the VA Democratic primary the other day - the 3rd place guy completely wrecked the two front runners. He was down like 50 points in the polls a few weeks/months ago and handily won the primary.

Different circumstances, though, I guess. Sorry, it's been a long night.

[Prime Junta]

It could be anything, really. The problem is that the Iranian election system isn't very robust; it's not transparent at all, which means that there's huge room for vote-rigging by all kinds of parties on a massive scale. The higher-ups can simply disqualify entire districts because of "problems" (=the wrong candidate getting too many votes); people on the ground can just stuff (or "lose") ballot boxes, and so on.

Add to this the widespread perception that Ahmadinejad is the candidate of the Powers that Be, and the whole thing looks extremely dodgy. That sort of thing pisses off people. The "bazaaris" -- small businessmen -- were behind Moussavi, and they're the traditional revolutionary force in Iran. We'll see in the coming days what they'll do.

[Rithrandil]

Hrm. I was talking to my friend at dinner tonight - she's Persian (her mother and father escaped sometime around the Revolution) and she expressed very little hope at all about the whole situation. She told me that in the 90's they were all excited when they elected a reformer and then (in her words) "the most brutal crackdown since the revolution followed". She didn't think Mousavi'd really make any difference at all, but she and her family are admitted pessamists about the whole deal.

[V7]

The good news is that even if there's no change in Iran it'll hurt their legitimacy on the street in the rest of the region if it looks too obviously rigged.

[Dyne]

Seems to be hotting up :/
Correspondents say the violence is the worst seen in Tehran in a decade. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8098896.stm)
A few friends of mine involved in an Iranians in Exile for Reform-type thingy are guardedly optimistic.

[Squeek]

And after the recount we will find out that Al Franken is in fact, the new president of Iran ...Very clever. And that wouldn't be such a bad thing either if you think about it. Our two cultures could come together over our fondness for Al Franken.

The keys to ending all the world's conflicts can be found in re-runs of Saturday Night Live!

[Prime Junta]

More rumors: Rafsanjani is said to have resigned from the Expediency Council chairmanship, and the Interior Ministry electoral commission is said to have called fraud. Also rumors of a split high within the Iranian establishment.

We'll know soon enough if, or how much, of this is real. Right now this is looking like a pre-revolutionary situation; most of these fizzle out, but here's to hoping.

[magerette]

More rumors: Rafsanjani is said to have resigned from the Expediency Council chairmanship, and the Interior Ministry electoral commission is said to have called fraud. Also rumors of a split high within the Iranian establishment...



It's definitely looking interesting. Of course over here it's all seen through the prism of US interests and influence, which is a bit distorting, but our news is showing significant angry people in the streets:

http://msnbcmedia2.msn.com/j/MSNBC/Components/Photo/_new/090613_iran_protests2.h2.jpg

We'll know soon enough if, or how much, of this is real. Right now this is looking like a pre-revolutionary situation; most of these fizzle out, but here's to hoping.

Rather ironic if Obama's efforts to reach out and be inclusive and work for peace turn out to be part of the catalyst for a potentially violent regime change.

Is that the deep Machiavellian plan or just a fortuitous but totally unintended side effect? Much cheaper than an invasion though. (/irony)

[Prime Junta]

Looks like the riots are dying down. Ahmadinejad is preparing a purge, under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign; a couple of dozen reformists have already been arrested. There are still rumors of a split within the Iranian top leadership, but thus far nothing concrete has materialized.

I think that was about that, and in a week or two it'll be back to business as usual. We may never know exactly how genuine Ahmadinejad's victory was -- he does have a lot of support, especially among the rural poor, so he may even have won this straight. But at the least, I think we're seeing a "red-state/blue-state" split within Iran, with the educated, middle-class, and urban supporting reformers like Larijani, and the poor, rural, and uneducated supporting religious populist nationalists like Ahmadinejad. How that will play out in Iran's future remains to be seen.

I'm disappointed, I admit it. I was hoping for a reformist win, or, even better, a revolution; looks like we're getting neither.

[Prime Junta]

Juan Cole on the likelihood of electoral fraud:

[ http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/stealing-iranian-election.html ]

He notes several suspicious features, e.g. that Ahmadinejad took Tehran by over 50%, where he is known to be unpopular, and even Tabriz -- the home city of Mousavi -- by 57%.

He's predicting that this won't spark a revolution, but that it will undermine the regime's legitimacy in the medium term.

[coyote]

Thanks for posting the link. I was extremely curious to get more detailed information, which the typical news reports unfortunately lack.

I am less informed, but presume to disagree on one point: a bloody revolution would not be preferable over a continued rule of Khamenei et al. in the medium term. Still, I am also very disappointed by this outcome, and I agree with Juan Cole's advice: Obama's open hand diplomacy is the right way to go regardless of who is the Iranian president.

[Prime Junta]

That would depend on how bloody it is. Obviously a Poland- or USSR-style bloodless collapse of the regime would be preferable, but that's generally speaking not the way things happen in that neighborhood. Protracted and bloody civil war would be the worst outcome; there is however a lot of room between these two, and IMO a fair stretch of the continuum toward the bloodless end would be preferable to the status quo.

[JemyM]

There are some countries that need a revolution as far as I concern, violent or non-violent.

[coyote]

Agreed, but is a relatively bloodless revolution possible in Iran? My first guess would be that the military would support the government, given that Ahmadinejad is a military animal himself, both as Commander in the Revolutionary Guard and by supporting military armament. Also, the right-wing Mullah's are likely to fight back ferociously, given how little they cared about human rights in the past.

Some countries could really use a revolution, but I am not sure if it is always possible, Jemy. North Korea, for example: the population would be better off with almost any other imaginable government, but they are repressed to the level that most of them can't even think about revolution, let alone organise one.

[Prime Junta]

There's the rub -- I don't know. If the military, the Basiji, and the Revolutionary Guard are against a revolution, there won't be one. If one or two of the three are neutral or for a revolution, there may be one.

[vanedor]

Yep, this remembers much Bush re-election in 2004.

ie, the entire world know that the former president is incompetent, unfit to hold great responsabilities... yet, using gun(or bomb?) god and gay, using the votes of the red-neck of their country, was re-elected.

Only problem with Iran is that the red conservatives tend to be far more numerous than the blue liberals than in the US.

[Rithrandil]

It's not like Kerry was much better, and comparing what's going on in Iran to the 2004 election is a pretty huge leap.

[txa1265]

It's not like Kerry was much better, and comparing what's going on in Iran to the 2004 election is a pretty huge leap.

Exactly - the Bush vs. Kerry thing might have been a sad commentary on the state of both parties, and undoubtedly there was small scale tampering, but I'd have needed to see Bush capture 75% of Massachusetts and sweep Cambridge before I cried foul ;)

[vanedor]

Yeah, I guess in a few years, some people who voted for Ahmadinejad will claim "But but but Mousavi wasnt MUCH better!" in a poor excuse for voting for him after their country go bankrupt and/or bombeb.

Still not a valid excuse for voting for probably for who was already known as the worst president the US had since... uhm, what about "ever" ? Kerry, despite his lacks, at least had the aura of virginity, he was an authentic war veteran and lirely a hero, and he was never given a chance to demonstate how good or bad he could have actually been. But worse than Bush? C'mon, stop dillusioning yourselves.

[Rithrandil]

Yeah, I guess in a few years, some people who voted for Ahmadinejad will claim "But but but Mousavi wasnt MUCH better!" in a poor excuse for voting for him after their country go bankrupt and/or bombeb.
Yeah, because Bush was *totally* responsible for 9/11 happening, and we all totally knew about the economic crises that would happen in 2007 during the 2004 election. Our economy was still going strong at that point - or at least appeared to be due to the housing bubble.


Still not a valid excuse for voting for probably for who was already known as the worst president the US had since... uhm, what about "ever" ?
Does Carter ring a bell? Wilson? Or god forbid, James Buchanan?


Kerry, despite his lacks, at least had the aura of virginity,
Aura of virginity? I assume this a typo or some sort of translation error, although the idea of Kerry being a virgin does make me giggle ...


he was an authentic war veteran and lirely a hero
So it's safe to assume you wanted McCain to win in 2008, then. Glad to hear your support for the ticket!


and he was never given a chance to demonstate how good or bad he could have actually been.
Neither was Dukakis or Aaron Burr - somehow that does not bother me very much.


But worse than Bush? C'mon, stop dillusioning yourselves.
I said "not much better". Say Kerry won in 2004. What would have happened? We'd have left Iraq, probably - so the surge would have never happened and we'd probably be whining about a massive ongoing genocide there. Afghanistan may or may not be better than what it is now. The economic collapse would still have happened.

Oh, but my parent's taxes would have gone up, again, and since they're already at 60% of their income, I will vote "no" to anyone trying to raise taxes no matter what other things they want to do. So what did I do? I voted for the guy who would keep us in Iraq and Afghanistan and not raise my taxes.

So, yes, from where I stand, "it's not like kerry was much better" is a completely accurate statement - and to be honest, if you're honestly trying to compare the situation in Iran with the 2004 election, or Bush with Ahmadenijad then you honestly have no idea what the hell you are talking about.

[Squeek]

Kerry wasn't hard to defeat because he went too far in his opposition to the war. Opposition to the war should have won him the election since it was a popular sentiment. But not only did Kerry bungle it, he then got snotty about it, and that then turned off a lot of the remaining "undecideds."

Kerry lost on his own, despite all the fine efforts his supporters made and despite all the millions of voters who were fed up with Bush and were willing to vote for anyone else but him. It was quite a trick.

[Prime Junta]

Oh, great. This turned into another thread about American presidential elections. Apologies for making the red-state/blue-state analogy that sparked it.

But carry on, we can always start a new Middle East thread...

[vanedor]

Yeah, because Bush was *totally* responsible for 9/11 happening, and we all totally knew about the economic crises that would happen in 2007 during the 2004 election. Our economy was still going strong at that point - or at least appeared to be due to the housing bubble.

Never claimed he caused the 9/11 but he certainly didnt do what was need after beside invadint Afghanistan. And instead of dealing with the situation there, he spent tenfold for an useless war.

Does Carter ring a bell? Wilson? Or god forbid, James Buchanan?

Carter, Wilson? éh, Both much better presidents who actually achieved good things during their respective mandates. James Buchanan? I might give you the point here... but seems to me he was simply not the good man in a very difficult situation. I doubt many could have done better.

Aura of virginity? I assume this a typo or some sort of translation error, although the idea of Kerry being a virgin does make me giggle ...

I guess you don't use this word the same way we do in french and only use the sexual meaning of this word. Sorry about that. My next sentence explains pretty much what I meant by "virginity".


So it's safe to assume you wanted McCain to win in 2008, then. Glad to hear your support for the ticket!

Perhaps, if McCains would have been against Bush!


I said "not much better". Say Kerry won in 2004. What would have happened?

I'm not a fortune teller but I can take a few guesses. The deficit would be far less important, you would have been in a much better position to deal with the economic crisis. Hell, you might even have avoided it. There might be a sightseeable end to the afghan conflict. The reaction to Katrina would have been better. You would already have better anti-pollution measures... hell, we might already have electric car today. Rumsfeld out two years earlier.


I will vote "no" to anyone trying to raise taxes no matter what other things they want to do.

Do you actually realize what you wrote here? Geezus.

[vanedor]

Oh, great. This turned into another thread about American presidential elections. Apologies for making the red-state/blue-state analogy that sparked it.

Actually, I had this thought before you mentioned the red/blue state idea. No apologie needed from you, I was about to write this anyway!

Anyhow, I'm out till tomorrow so it might die out. Sorry for kidnapping this middle-east thread!

[Rithrandil]

I'll post my reply in a PM to vanedor instead of hijacking the thread :D

[Rithrandil]

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/14/israel.netanyahu/index.html

Huh. Netanyahu "said Sunday that Israel would agree to a peace agreement with Palestinians under which there would be a "demilitarized Palestinian state.""

Well, I guess this is at least a step forward from the "no Palestinian state" stance he used to have, right?

[Prime Junta]

Sure is. Also a perfectly safe step to take, since no conceivable Palestinian leader will agree to it. (Which he knows perfectly well, too.)

[Squeek]

I'm not at all surprised that Netanyahu is comfortable talking about peacemaking despite his usual disposition as a hawk. He's familiar with the landscape of the conflict, knows what he wants and what he's willing to accept, and prefers to be pragmatic.

He's the kind of guy anyone would be happy to negotiate with, as opposed to someone like Yasser Arafat who was prone to just waste everyone else's time.

[coyote]

Seems the public pressure did achieve 'something' in Iran: Ali Khamenei ordered the Guardian Council to investigate the Iranian election results.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104244385

The Guardian Council, of course, is comprised largely of conservatives and closely aligned with Ahmadinejad's positions, which makes a fair investigation unlikely. On the other hand, public pressure appears to be rising and maybe the people can achieve more than this largely symbolic gesture.

[Prime Junta]

That does change the game. I'm still pessimistic about the odds of real change there, but here's to hoping.

[Prime Junta]

Oh-ho, Mir Hussein Mousavi has come out to lead an illegal rally against the election results. That's crossing the Rubicon. With the Guardian Council investigation, this might get exciting yet...

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8101098.stm ]

[dteowner]

I find it rather disorienting that you're cheerleading for a bloody revolution. Not that you're wrong, but it's not your usual kisses-n-hugs stance.

[magerette]

Oh, great. This turned into another thread about American presidential elections. Apologies for making the red-state/blue-state analogy that sparked it.

But carry on, we can always start a new Middle East thread...

Apparently I cursed the thread earlier when I said it was the only one on the board that usually stayed on topic. ;)

I think Ahmadinejad sounds both blustery and nervous in this LA Times article
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran-election15-2009jun15,0,1529351.story
which also mentions that crackdowns on the protestors have begun:
State news media quoted police officials as saying that they had detained nearly a dozen people who allegedly instigated protests and at least 160 opposition demonstrators.
and the NY Times explores it further here, echoing a lot of coyote's npr reference
Unrest Deepens as Critics are detained (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/world/middleeast/15iran.html?ref=todayspaper)

[Prime Junta]

I find it rather disorienting that you're cheerleading for a bloody revolution. Not that you're wrong, but it's not your usual kisses-n-hugs stance.

You mean like when I've consistently supported the Palestinians' right to resist occupation, by violence if necessary? -- I'm not a pacifist, dte; I just don't support all the wars you do.

Generally speaking, I support revolutionary action, including armed resistance, against political regimes that do not afford peaceful means of change. Democracies contain the machinery for change; non-democratic states don't. I would be strongly opposed to any attempt at overthrowing the American or European polity by force, but I would be supportive of such attempts against, say, the North Korean one -- *if* I believed they were likely to succeed.

I'm also generally speaking opposed to attempts to overthrow tyrannical regimes from the outside; not because I think it would be wrong to overthrow them, but because usually such attempts have outcomes that are worse than the regime.

As to Iran, as I've said, I don't know enough about the situation and power relations there to be able to have a strong opinion on it. If I believed that conditions there were such that there was a realistic chance of overthrowing the vilayet-e-faqih, I would support it every inch of the way; if I didn't, I would be opposed to it. As it is, I don't know. That means that all I can do is *hope* that the conditions are genuinely prerevolutionary, and now that the ball is rolling, the revolution succeeds. "L'avenir est fait / par les révolutionnaires / Mais se moque bien / des petits révoltés," as Jacques Brel put it. And he would not have approved of my stance. :)

[Prime Junta]

Shots fired, a protester killed. Awaiting further developments...

I've read several commentators saying that they were surprised at how ham-handedly the election results appear to have been faked. Their explanation is that the Mousavi surge took them by surprise, and they had to resort to extremely clumsy and dirty methods to steal the election. That sort of thing can backfire badly.

We'll see in the coming days if, and how far, it escalates, but this is starting to look more and more revolutionary by the hour. I very much doubt a return to the status quo ante is on the cards since Mousavi defied the ban on demonstrations; either we'll see a successful revolution, a very heavy-handed crackdown and the imposition of the equivalent of martial law, or a descent into civil war. Interesting times...

[dteowner]

Seems to me that the religious leaders will have to take real action sometime soon, even if that action is actually a complete lack of action. They'll either have to kick Mousavi's butt, or do nothing and effectively endorse his gambit. Just don't see a good "half solution" available, particularly since Mousavi isn't taking his screwing gracefully.

Those coots don't strike me as the type that like having their hands forced, based on the limited and likely slanted reports we get here. If Ahmad-whatever's crew was in charge of this vote-fix debacle (which seems like a safe assumption), I expect the Ayotollah's taking stripes out of his back as we speak.

[Prime Junta]

Except... we don't know that. We don't know exactly what Ahmadinejad's connection with the Guardian Council is; we don't know exactly how far he can count on Khamene'i's support; we don't know who exactly pulls the strings in the Ministry of the Interior (although we do know that the Minister of the Interior is an Ahmadinejad appointee, and most of the Ministry staff are the Minister's appointees); we don't know exactly what the relationship between Moussavi and the Guardian Council is.

Or maybe *somebody* knows, but I sure as hell don't.

That's why I really can't make any good guesses on what could happen next. How strong is the rebellion? Where does the GC stand? If the rebellion is stronger than it looks, the GC could still pull its chestnuts out of the fire by handing them Ahmadinejad's head on a platter. OTOH if it's not all that strong and they throw their weight behind Ahmadinejad, it'll be the gallows, prison, or exile for Mousavi, a major crackdown, and a major deterioration of Iran's international standing. And if it turns out that Ahmadinejad did actually honestly win the election (or would have, if the ballots were counted right), how the hell is he going to prove that now?

For me, all bets are off -- and going by the commentaries I've been reading, the real experts haven't been doing all that great with their prognostications either.

[Rithrandil]

A bunch of my Iranian friends are freaking out about this. I really don't know where I'd stand. I'd love for Iran to be free but I'm not sure if I really would like the amount of bloodshed that might take.

[Prime Junta]

Well, it's not like we can do much, other than hope for the best.

(I just noticed, looking at my previous post, that by the Mixed Metaphor Index, this thing just crossed into full-blown crisis territory on my part.)

[Prime Junta]

George Friedman thinks Ahmadinejad won the election fair and square:

[ http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090615_western_misconceptions_meet_iranian_reali ty/?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_campaign=none&utm_medium=email ]

True to form, he goes on to predict that what happened yesterday will continue to happen tomorrow.

I'm not quite so sure. By the numbers, he would have gotten eight million more votes than in his previous election. Eight million. That's a whole lotta votes, even in a country the size of Iran, with 65 million people. There's also the very strange matter of the Interior Ministry announcing the result much before there was time to count even a significant fraction of the ballot (they gave him 65% at that time; the final result was 62% and change), and lots of relatively reliable accounts of major abuses at polling stations.

Also, the Beeb to the rescue -- they had a very good piece on the power relations driving this behind the scenes. It's very messy, and... they don't know what's going to happen either, nor whether Ahmadinejad's victory was legit or not.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8101841.stm ]

[Prime Junta]

FiveThirtyEight thinks the results are fishy, and explains why. They don't know much more about Iran than I do, I think, but they do know a great deal more about numbers, so they're worth listening to IMO.

[ http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/iran-does-have-some-fishy-numbers.html ]
[ http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/did-polling-predict-ahmadinejad-victory.html ]

[dteowner]

One of the comments on Nate's site was actually very interesting. There's no way to verify the poster, but he does bring up some interesting points at the end. Particularly, where's the joyous victory parade?

I'm sitting in my grandparents' house in Tehran right now and I'm hearing mini-explosions, there's helicopters flying around, it smells like smoke, and it took fifteen minutes for this website to load because they've slowed down the internet so much here. On top of that they've basically blocked parts of Iran from the international phone network so I can't even call my mother. 80% of the Iranian people did not enthusiastically turn out in order to re-elect someone who has ruined this country both economically and culturally. The Iranian people know that this election was rigged. How could it have been possible for Mousavi to lose Tabriz when he is from Iranian Azerbaijan and Ahmadinejad has abysmal approval ratings amongst Turkic speaking Iranians? On top of that, I voted in this sham election. Do you know that all votes in Iran are cast on paper and that paper needs to be counted by HAND because you have to write in the code and name of the candidate you are voting for? Mousavi only claimed victory two hours into the vote because his campaign found out that the Interior Ministry was going to go forward and claim that it was extremely likely that Ahmadinejad was going to win, 2 hours into the balloting. You tell me, how do you even count 5.5 million paper ballots only two hours after the polls close? In Tehran it is also policy that the ballot boxes need to be transported to the Interior Ministry before they can even be opened, subtracting even more time from the 2 hours. Facebook does not work, Youtube does not work, basically all communications are down. You tell me sir, if they did not rig the elections where are all the people who supported Ahmadinejad? Why aren't they celebrating? Why is the mood in Tehran, even southern Tehran so gloomy? Why is the government so scared? When looking at these basic facts you can come to the conclusion far more easily than using some stupid statistical analysis that gives legitimacy to a government which for 30 years has just further consolidated its power.

[txa1265]

That does change the game. I'm still pessimistic about the odds of real change there, but here's to hoping.

It is just a sad situation all around. At best the reformers are going to get a 'end justofies the means' with a lot of dead bodies of kids in between ...

[coyote]

Unofficial documents, one purportedly leaked from the interior ministry and another released by an adviser to Karroubi, are now circulated among the Iranian opposition, including two different sets of election results both giving Mousavi a clear lead over the other candidates. The allegedly leaked report also claims that a computer programme was used for computing faked results for the individual polling stations in advance, according to the desired outcome:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/15/iran-election-analysis-figures

If true and the software either did not account for or was not given enough input data to make good guesses on the geographical distribution of votes, this might account for the uniformity of relative results over different provinces.

Apparently, it would not be the first time that documents were leaked from the ministry, either.

[Prime Junta]

"The authenticity of the documents is impossible to verify." Blech.

Apart from a protracted civil war, IMO the worst outcome would be an Ahmadinejad victory widely thought to be fraudulent, and subsequently imposed by force. That would make it very difficult to talk normally to the regime, and an Iran that's backed into a corner as it clamps down on parts of its own populace is not in anyone's interest.

IOW, I really hope we get *some* kind of closure on this. In my order of preference: a revolution overthrowing the vilayet-e-faqih; a Mousavi win; an Ahmadinejad win somehow shown to be legitimate. Otherwise Iran will give *everyone* a headache.

[Prime Junta]

Recount.

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/8102400.stm ]

They've now had a few days to forge the ballots, though, so it's hard to imagine how they're going to convince anyone that they're being honest this time, whatever the result. Still, a HUGE development -- with a victory margin of 2:1, there's only one reason to even consider a recount.

[coyote]

"The authenticity of the documents is impossible to verify. Blech."

Exactly, but it is not surprising: it is usually impossible to verify even authentic documents from anonymous sources. As you already mentioned, also a legitimate victory of Ahmadinejad is practically impossible to verify at this point, so everyone is poking in the dark and clasping at a few straws available.

Cancelling the election, as suggested by Mousavi, might be the best option either way: If the Iranian government faked the first and is really devious, they might pull off another fake, with improved statistics gained from actual 2009 votes. It might calm the people. If they faked and the next vote is not manipulated, the people might regain a bit of trust in their state and would be happy with Mousavi, who is not the most important player in Iran anyway. If Ahmadinejad won legitimately the first time: same as a good fake the second time.

Too naive?

[Prime Junta]

True, that would be one way out -- one with its own risks, naturally. I'm pretty sure the Iranian leadership is fumbling in the dark too, just like the rest of us. The difference being is that they can affect how this pans out.

[magerette]

Richard Engels(MSNBC) (who just got back from Tehran because he couldn't get his journalist visa renewed) had some interesting comments last night on the attempt by the government to shut down communications among the protestors and the foreign press. He said the attempts by the mullahs and the Revolutionary Guard were 80's style crackdowns on shutting down reporters, television and cell phone coverage, with some attempt to get to social networking being far less successful as the Iranian protestors are able to exploit the internet much more creatively; using twitter to organize after the text messaging was shut off, utllizing all the resources of the internet , i.e., when one site is shut off, they find another to host their uploaded videos, and just generally make it impossible to shut things down in the old school way without shutting down all the satellite communications and thus the whole country. It seems to me that this is a big factor in what may happen next. This seems to be a million miles from the totalitarian regime in North Korea in successful mind control.

As commentators keep saying, it's hard to govern without the trust and support of the governed, no matter what your style of government, and that social contract appears to be broken ior at least bent atm.

This article (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran16-2009jun16,0,5600560.story?page=1)notes that at least seven people were officially acknowledged as killed yesterday at the end of the long and otherwise fairly peaceful protest march through Tehran and that Mousavi has called for a general strike.

[Prime Junta]

Mousavi has called for a general strike.

Yikes. Them's fighting words. I don't think there's any going back after that -- one of the two is going to jail, the scaffold, or exile.

[Rithrandil]

Just a few small updates:


The State Department called Twitter and asked them to delay an planned upgrade + service outage that would (of course) cut off Iranian's ability to show what is going on right now. Seems twitter agreed (http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssTechMediaTelecomNews/idUSWBT01137420090616?rpc=60)

Boston globe has a bunch of pictures up from Iran (http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/06/irans_disputed_election.html)

Andrew sullivan has a lot of stuff on his site on the Atlantic(http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/).

According to Cyrus Agency News, via the Washington times (http://www.washingtontimes.com/weblogs/watercooler/2009/jun/15/revolutionary-guards-arrested-iran/): "According to the Cyrus News Agency (http://www.cyrusnews.com/news/fa/?mi=9&ni=2307), Tuesday morning 16 senior members of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were arrested. "These commanders have been in contact with members of the Iranian army to join the people's movement," CNA reports. "Three of the commanders are veterans of Iran-Iraq war. They have been moved to an undisclosed location in East Tehran." This report has not been confirmed by other sources."

[Prime Junta]

For the record, I did *not* expect anything like this. I considered the Iranian government to be one of the more stable ones in the M-E; after this, no matter who comes out on top, it's clear that it's far shakier than it appeared.

It's a small consolation that nobody else appears to have expected it either. Including the Guardian Council.

Interesting times, folks. Interesting times...

[magerette]

Amazing pictures, Rithrandril. Also that Cyrus News thing sounds like they interrupted a coup of some sort from within the Guard itself. Unconfirmed I know, but that sounds quite serious.

[coyote]

It's a small consolation that nobody else appears to have expected it either. Including the Guardian Council.

They are like those chemists who handle dangerous substances five days a week. At first they use special gloves, work under the fume hood and have all kinds of security precautions. As the years pass, they get more and more relaxed, work with bare hands, put chemicals on the office desk, that kind of stuff. Naturally, accidents happen.

I think they got really careless when they faked this election, because it worked out for them all these years. Only that in the end, after all the bloodshed, maybe something good will come out of it. Maybe it will become a lot worse. I don't know.

[Rithrandil]

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23747.html

This story actually made me glad that Obama won the election. Shocking, I know.

[V7]

Starting to look like its going to come to a confrontation, in which case the question is will the military shoot on protestors. I've seen a number of plausable suggestions that the current mess is an atempt at a coup by A. and his security/military contacts against the clerical establishment. Either way the longer the protests continue the less change the government has of staying in power.

[txa1265]

Media are getting veiled threats against their safety if they dare venture out ...

[magerette]

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23747.html

This story actually made me glad that Obama won the election. Shocking, I know.
Are you hearing that :music: Bomb bomb bomb, bomb bomb Iran:music: refrain in the background? ;)


@V7: the military already has opened fire on protesters, yesterday. Some deaths were reported by the official Iranian channels, and many more injuries and unofficial reports are online.

[Prime Junta]

@V7: the military already has opened fire on protesters, yesterday. Some deaths were reported by the official Iranian channels, and many more injuries and unofficial reports are online.

Except that we have no clue about what really happened. Was it the military? The basiji? The Revolutionary Guard? If it was the military or the RG, does it represent an official order, an individual losing his cool in the heat of the moment, or an order by somebody down the ranks linked to a faction?

Hell, even the official story -- "thugs" attempting to overrun a military guardpost -- isn't inconceivable; there were by all accounts a couple of hundred thousand very angry people protesting, and it's within the bounds of possibility that a small group of them would have gone for a damn-fool thing like that.

And yeah, this is a time to tread carefully. Making loud proclamations now -- like when Bush supported the protesters in '05 -- would hand the Ahmadinejad faction a very big stick, since they'd be able to paint the whole thing as a plot by the Americans and Zionists. Which does resonate -- people in that part of the world are so used to thinking it anyway. At this point *really* all we can do is watch, wait, and hope: neither guns nor butter nor talkie-talkie can do any good, and any of them has a potential for doing much harm.

[Prime Junta]

By the way, I'm now convinced that the election results were due to massive, massive vote-rigging. The reason? Tehran. By now it's obvious that the Mousavi supporters outnumber the Ahmadinejad supporters by a wide margin; to the point that they've had to bus in Ahmadinejad supporters from the provinces for the counterprotests. The official results had Ahmadinejad win Tehran with a comfortable margin. This doesn't add up; to get the streets looking like this, Mousavi has to have a supermajority of support there.

This doesn't mean that Ahmadinejad couldn't have won, but it does prove (IMO anyway) that the official results are bogus. Whether a recount will resolve this or not, we will see.

[Prime Junta]

More rumors: Rafsanjani is said to have called an emergency meeting of the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly of Experts appoints the Supreme Leader of the Guardian Council, and can, in theory at least, dismiss him. The Supreme Leader is, of course, Ayatollah Khamene'i.

Significant background fact: Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad had a very public election-eve scrap, when A accused R of corruption. IOW, R would very much like to see A go down in flames.

True? We don't know. If it is, it can mean either that R is orchestrating a kind of palace (mosque?) coup, and wants to replace Khamene'i with someone more congenial; or that R wants to force K's hand to make him drop A and get behind M(ousavi).

I told you it was going to be complicated.

Oh, and, they're getting SOME support from the West: The Pirate Bay renamed itself to The Persian Bay, painted itself green, and is offering advice to Iranians on how to evade net censorship and snooping. And, you know, I have a feeling that sort of thing might be the best thing that people in our part of the world can do to help.

This is looking more and more like a revolution by the day. Keep your fingers crossed, everyone!

[Benedict]

This doesn't mean that Ahmadinejad couldn't have won, but it does prove (IMO anyway) that the official results are bogus. Whether a recount will resolve this or not, we will see.


Once again I've found fivethirtyeight's analysis hugely impressive. I'd also have believed an ahmadinejad victory perfectly happily, even one at a higher than expected margin, but the data just doesn't look right in terms of the votes he's picked up and where he's picked them up. It just looks like he got greedy and painted the election picture he wanted without thinking about whether or not it was realistic enough that people would buy it.

I still can't hear the name Ahmadinejad without thinking of a bit on one of our topical news satire panel shows where the host said that the way he always remembers how to say Ahmadinejad's name is to start out saying "I'm a dinner jacket" and then veer off towards the end.

[Prime Junta]

It's amazing how clueless EVERYBODY is about this. Everybody. (Including, naturally, yrs trly.) I've been following my usual list of People And Parties Who Should Know. Normally they all say more or less similar things, even if they disagree on the details. Right now they're saying completely opposite things. Ahmadinejad won! No, Mousavi won and Ahmadinejad stole it! No, Ahmadinejad stole it even though he would have won fairly anyway! No, the whole thing is orchestrated by Rafsanjani! It's a revolutionary threat to the Iranian theocracy! No, it's an internal dispute between the ayatollahs! The protests are already dying out! No, they're only just starting!

Amazingly, I haven't run across anyone blaming the Americans and the Zionists for this. Yet.

[JemyM]

Just randomly wanted to drop this video here;
We are the ones we have been waiting for (http://www.disclose.tv/action/viewvideo/11184/We_Are_The_Ones_We_Have_Been_Waiting_For)

[Benedict]

Possibly not a great joke, but I was amused by one comedian describing Mousavi as still basically being extremely conservative, kind of a Mullah Light.

(won't even make sense at all unless you have Muller Light yoghurts in your country).

[Prime Junta]

Or Miller Light beer, I suppose.

From what I've gathered, that's Mousavi all right. Still, Mikhail Gorbachev was a solid, reliable CPSU politruk, and look what happened when *he* took the helm.

[coyote]

At first I was cautiously sceptical about Mousavi, too, but at the moment I am positively impressed. He is more courageous than I thought he would be in challenging the official numbers already blessed by Khamene'i, and I give him additional credit for telling supporters that their life is in danger if they go to a planned demonstration, even suggesting that they stay at home.

At this point, I think he has to go forward, though. Maybe the Guardian Council can turn things around by ousting Ahmadinejad by the recount, but a resigning Mousavi would essentially deliver himself and all moderate and reformist factions into at least four years of political persecution. I do not know how far Ahmadinejad's ambitions reach; maybe he will even try and extend his presidency beyond that point. He is probably frustrated that he cannot assume any of the clerical positions due to his upbringing and education.

[Benedict]

There was one bit in the Times today that stuck with me talking about Mousavi. Saying that generally he's not charismatic, his policies aren't a million miles away from ahmadinejad, he was looking like he was going to lose big time, and the moment that the polls started turning all he'd done was hold his wife's hand in public, that seemingly trivial gesture to western norms was enough of a public display of affection and humanity to unleash all these feelings in millions of Iranians.

[Prime Junta]

At this point, I think he has to go forward, though. Maybe the Guardian Council can turn things around by ousting Ahmadinejad by the recount, but a resigning Mousavi would essentially deliver himself and all moderate and reformist factions into at least four years of political persecution. I do not know how far Ahmadinejad's ambitions reach; maybe he will even try and extend his presidency beyond that point. He is probably frustrated that he cannot assume any of the clerical positions due to his upbringing and education.

There was a piece in the NYT arguing that Ahmadinejad has already performed a silent military coup -- that his power base in the Revolutionary Guard and the Basiji are strong enough to make puppets of the ayatollahs, and Khamene'i is essentially taking his orders from him; i.e. that Iran has quietly gone from a semi-democratic theocracy to a military dictatorship.

Then again, the piece was written by people from the American Enterprise Institute, so I'm inclined to take it with a bit more salt than most commentaries on the events.

[Rithrandil]

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/6/17/743478/-Ahmadinejad-Rally-Photoshopped-to-Appear-Larger

So it seems Ahmadinejad's rally was photoshopped!

[vanedor]

There was a piece in the NYT arguing that Ahmadinejad has already performed a silent military coup -- that his power base in the Revolutionary Guard and the Basiji are strong enough to make puppets of the ayatollahs, and Khamene'i is essentially taking his orders from him; i.e. that Iran has quietly gone from a semi-democratic theocracy to a military dictatorship.

Funny PJ, this article I read this morning claims exactly the opposite :

http://www.cyberpresse.ca/international/moyen-orient/200906/17/01-876330-cest-la-faute-a-layatollah.php

For those who don't read french, it's an interview with iranian former(and first) president Abolhassan Banisadr who now live as an exile in France. Basically, he says that it's all the ayatollah's fault, that's it's the ayatollah who organized the rigging. That Ahmadinejad is more or less a powerless puppet. He also notices the same sort of fervor in the people manifesting today than what he saw during the iranian revolution in 1979.

[Prime Junta]

What I said: everybody who usually knows their stuff keeps saying completely contradictory things. Oh well, we'll know more in the coming days, weeks, and months...

[V7]

@V7: the military already has opened fire on protesters, yesterday. Some deaths were reported by the official Iranian channels, and many more injuries and unofficial reports are online.

I knew about that - was thinking more along the lines of an organised effort to crush the disidents. From what I can see it looks like there's three likely outcomes 1) the government waits out the protests and stumbles on more or less in control, 2) they order a crackdown and the military refuses (cf Yeltsin in Russia and the colapse of the USSR) 3) the military rolls in the tanks (cf Tiananmen Sq). My guess is the third is most likely.

[Prime Junta]

I don't think it's going to be that simple, V7. First off, it's getting increasingly hazy what "the government" actually is, does, or wants, and exactly who's backing it. We've had credible reports of the army facing off Basiji thugs, and it's pretty clear by now that there is a split within the leadership.

Plus, there's the question of "then what?" As I've said, I know nowhere near as much about Iran as I'd like, but I don't think it's the kind of country that you could keep under control by exclusively military means for long. IMO your outcome (1) is far more likely than (2) or (3), with outcome (4) -- an actual disintegration of the country into some level of civil strife between the Basiji/Revolutionary Guard, elements of the army, elements of the police forces, mass street action with civil disobedience, strikes, and what have you -- at least equally likely.

But really, all the people I know are worth listening to on this are screaming completely contradictory things. The only thing I can say at this point is that once this is over, Iran won't be country it was before June 12.

[vanedor]

I don't know, but my guts tell me that outcome 3 tend to be the most likely. For the pro-Ahmadinejad, it almost became a fight between the faithful and the unbelievers. His support among the troops, especially the Basiji/Revolutionary Guard, seems pretty absolute. I can only hope that you are right but with the government trying to shut down the medias/communications, expulsing every journalists(the last CBC journalist still there has to leave Iran friday)... it seems to me that they are preparing a Tiananmen. A bloody crackdown.

Sure, something unexpected might be going on in the shadow and could prevent it. Let's hope so.

[dteowner]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090617/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_iran_election_223

They finally got around to blaming us. Took long enough. I wonder if this is a response to the Twitter thing.

[Prime Junta]

The power relations are different. With Tiananmen, we had a bunch of local, unorganized, unarmed, and idealistic students facing off against a monolithic, highly organized, regimented, totalitarian state. In Iran, we have a big ol' basket of independent power centers commanding varying amounts of firepower with varying amounts of loyalty, forming and dissolving alliances. It's a lot harder to pull off a Tiananmen in conditions like that.

It most certainly could happen, but I don't think it's the most likely outcome -- and even if it *does* happen, I don't believe the resulting status quo can hold for very long. The internal contradictions are too big.

[Prime Junta]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090617/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_iran_election_223

They finally got around to blaming us. Took long enough. I wonder if this is a response to the Twitter thing.

I don't think they need anything in particular for that. It's the only logical thing to do, and you're the traditional scapegoats.

However, I don't think it'll be as effective this time as it has been until now. For one thing, denouncing America has become a rote matter -- a bit like when you guys make schoolkids recite the Pledge of Allegiance. And for another, there's your Prez, his impeccably-timed, impeccably-phrased speech in Cairo, and his carefully circumspect words right now.

Plus, you or I may not take that "Blessing of Hussein -- He Is With Us" ("barakat Hussein - 'o ba ma" in Farsi) thing all that seriously, but some people in Iran will -- and, I have a suspicion, that might have some of the more religious of the mullahs feeling just a wee bitty bit... weird, shall we say.

[DeepO]

"The man who leaked the real election results from the Interior Ministry - the ones showing Ahmadinejad coming third - was killed in a suspicious car accident, according to unconfirmed reports, writes Saeed Kamali Dehghan in Tehran."
(scroll down to 11am)

http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2009/jun/17/iran-uprising

[V7]

First a sorry, was bein glazy, where I've written government read A and his circle in the security/military - while there's no certainty it seems likely that they're behind a powergrab and essentially breakking the 'rules' the ruling elete/clerics had been working under (note also the allegations of corruption threats of a purge).

The power relations are different.

Actually I think you're over-complicating this - when protests/civil disobiedance get to this level they've pretty much got the power to shut the country down - outcome 1 is only going too happen if the protestors get bored/go home and I don't see that likely at this point. the question then is will A and co. feel threatened enough to try and pull the trigger and what will happen if they do (there's an outside chance they could backdown/resign/run but I'd guess thats unlikely too) - if they don't we get something on the velvet revolution end of the continum if they do its a most likely the bulk of the military will fall one way or the other (I believe Iran is stable enough that a protracted civil conflict is unlikely at this point) and I expect the result will be pretty decisive. My prediction would be a resoluution of some kind in two weeks or a month at the outside if only because A and co can't afford an ongoing open conflict at home while they're also picking fights internationally. Hard to say how stable they'd be going forward if A wins but I'd expect a serious pruge and a fairly stable hardline government if they win.

[Squeek]

My old roommate, the Iranian one, took part in the last revolution and described it very simply. He said everyone just protected their own neighborhood. That was it. That was essentially all that most people were doing, according to him.

I wonder if that could happen again.

[Prime Junta]

@V7 -- IMO you're making a quite a bold assumption here. I.e., that A and his clique are strong enough to pull this off. This may be the case, but then again it may not; in particular, I believe you may be underestimating the power of the ruling clerics. My take is that they would already have done it if they had the capability.

Your analysis is a close match for the one the American Enterprise Institute outlined in the NY Times yesterday, though, and it's certainly one of the possible outcomes. If it happens, we'll certainly see in less than two weeks.

Here's something from the Beeb which seems to be opining that A might not be able to count on even the RG for a violent crackdown, and surmises that it's unlikely for this to be resolved any time soon, btw:

[ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8106211.stm ]

The Islamic leadership has not yet deployed a fraction of the defence mechanisms at its disposal.

It knows from its own experience combating the Shah that instruments of state power can be illusory when facing masses of the people.

In past elections large numbers of the the rank and file in the Revolutionary Guards and its auxiliary Basij militia were reported to have voted for reformist candidates.

If they were to be deployed against large numbers of protesters - who could include their own friends and relations - could they be depended on not to go to pieces?

[Prime Junta]

My old roommate, the Iranian one, took part in the last revolution and described it very simply. He said everyone just protected their own neighborhood. That was it. That was essentially all that most people were doing, according to him.

I wonder if that could happen again.

That's pretty much how everyone I've talked to have described the Lebanese civil war. It's what happens when civil peace breaks down. Let's not forget that Iran has the draft, too, which means that most people there have basic military training -- with that background, neighborhood militias will coalesce quite easily.

The difference now, though, is that people have much better access to information and much better means of communication, which makes national-level coordination easier. If the RG/Basij fails to intimidate them, they will have a hard time controlling them by force.

But right now all bets are off IMO.

[V7]

@V7 -- IMO you're making a quite a bold assumption here. I.e., that A and his clique are strong enough to pull this off. This may be the case, but then again it may not; in particular, I believe you may be underestimating the power of the ruling clerics. My take is that they would already have done it if they had the capability.


I don't know if they'd have acted already, sending in the troops is always a last resort because you never really know who they'll back. As I said my opinion is a crackdown and a purge are the most likely outcome at the moment but its by no means certain and the BBC's analysis would lead to the Russia outcome. I'd say A and co are looking pretty confident at the moment but he certainlly wouldn't be the first would be dear leader to overestimate his support at a critical moment.

[magerette]

Can anyone give me a quick and dirty explanation of the difference between the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij(?)militia?

Here's a simple and clear(and hopefully accurate) slideshow of some of the major players:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31395488/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa