To go off on a bit of a tangent, that hoopla about "insufficient" body armor and "insufficiently armored" Hummers isn't exactly so. Or, rather, much of the hoopla is based on huge misconceptions about what actually happens in a war.
Thing is, armor involves trade-offs. A heavily body-armored soldier will move more slowly, tire more quickly, and require more backup and support. A heavily armored vehicle will move more slowly, have poorer visibility, run out of fuel sooner, and wear out faster. What's more, the enemy adapts their tactics to different types of targets.
If you have lots of lightly armored, highly mobile forces with great situational awareness, you'll end up facing snipers, hit-and-run attacks with light arms, and light IED's. If you up-armor them, you'll have a fewer (because they need to spend more time in transit and resupply), less mobile units with poorer situational awareness -- and you'll be facing heavier IED's, more elaborate ambushes with RPG's and mines, and that sort of thing. Even the Palestinians have taken out Merkava tanks by burying a water boiler filled with TNT in the road, and setting it off when the tank is on top of it -- and some of the insurgents in Iraq are a fair bit more sophisticated; at least the ones trained and equipped by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are.
Put another way: which would you rather have, one fully armored Hummer, or ten unarmored ones? The answer, of course, is that you'd want a mix of them -- say, one fully armored vehicle for every five unarmored ones. Then you'd do your level best to use them where they're most effective. And you'd inevitably make some mistakes and lose some of the light vehicles and troops to weapons that would have been stopped had you used the more heavily armored ones instead. And then some civilian will start wailing about "sending your troops into battle with insufficient armor."
IOW, you can't up-armor your way out of casualties, and lack of or insufficient equipment isn't the problem in Iraq -- not now, and not before.
Strategically, the problems are (1) being there with no realistic strategic objective, (2) being there with about one-fifth or one-tenth the number of troops required to keep the place locked down, and (3) being there with a configuration, doctrine, and skill set designed for a conventional rather than an asymmetrical war. This was the case from Day 1, and of these problems, only number (3) has been partially addressed by now.