Well, I suppose that's about as good as you can do in a five-to-ten-minute presentation. It's bound to be a huge simplification, and as such, it's very dangerous to draw any conclusions from it beyond what he actually states.
There were only two things that actually jarred with me.
First, his characterization of Saudi Arabia as the "backbone of Sunni Islam." It isn't. It's the backbone of one particular branch of Sunni Islam, but I very much doubt that Sunni Muslims from, say, Turkey, Indonesia, or even Lebanon or Palestine would feel any particular loyalty to Saudi Arabia. Mecca and Medina happen to be there, and the hajj is immensely important, but that doesn't give the Saudi state, or Saudi scholars, any particularly privileged position for Sunnis. If anything, the backbone of Sunni Islam would be the Al-Azhar mosque and university in Egypt, I'd say, even if the holiest places of Islam -- Shi'a and Sunni alike -- happen to be situated in Saudi Arabia.
Second, his characterization of the Iran/Iraq relationship. The way he stated it, Iran could simply take over Iraq because Iraq is majority Shi'ite. That's not so. Iranian/Iraqi relations are way more complex (and difficult) than that, with Iraqi Shi'ites having various highly divergent positions about Iran. The current Iraqi government is based on an organization formerly called the Badr Brigades (now called the Iraqi Army), which was organized and trained in Iran. They have extremely close personal ties to Tehran. The current main antagonist to America, Moqtada al-Sadr, is an Iraqi phenomenon, opposed to Iranian dominance over Iraq, and opposed to the current government.
A bigger problem with this exposition, though, is that it characterizes Iraq as a purely regional problem -- Kurds wanting this, Syrians, Jordanians, and Saudis wanting that, Iranians wanting the other -- without any attention paid to what Iraqis of various religious, ethnic, and political backgrounds want.
Now, I'm not really well-versed in Iraqi politics, but I have a very strong suspicion that they're a lot like Lebanese politics. If that's the case, yes, you do have to know about the regional picture, but it's far more important to understand, say, Ayatollah Sistani's relationship to Moqtada al-Sadr's father, Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, or what Jalal Talabani was up to before they made him president. Or, at the very least, that such relationships, alliances, antagonisms, and histories exist and make the situation enormously more complicated than it is.
Finally, about his prognosis -- yeah, America is stuck there like a louse in tar, as the Finnish saying goes. Pulling out would certainly lead to an intensification of the conflict with regional players meddling like crazy, probably through proxy (except the Turks, who would certainly give the Kurds a righteous stomping fairly early in the game); we're talking the Lebanese civil war with the added excitement of it happening on top of some of the best oil reserves left on the planet, at a time when oil is climbing inexorably towards $200/bbl. But if the American game plan is to sit there and hope, I don't know how much better the outcome of that would be.
And finally finally, IMO his "extra info" doesn't really say much. The salient point about Shi'ism is that it's based on (a) martyrdom and (b) 1300 years of getting stomped on by Sunnis, which he already mentions in his main presentation.
