Prime Junta
RPGCodex' Little BRO
- Joined
- October 19, 2006
- Messages
- 8,540
President Obama decided to quietly scrap Bush's project to install ABM batteries in Poland and the Czech Republic, ostensibly to protect Western Europe against Iranian missile attacks. This will have some quite interesting geopolitical consequences, which I thought might be worth discussing here.
The missile shield had nothing, really, to do with Iran. ABM's work best the closer they are to the originating point, and they don't work all that well even so. The countries they were supposed to protect never asked for them, and were, in fact, opposed to them. IOW, the reasons for the project were somewhere else.
Specifically, it was intended as a Cold War style gambit against Russia on the one hand, and those European countries that were opposed to the American invasion of Iraq on the other.
Permanent installations such as this would give the host countries strong implicit security guarantees -- and, of course, while they'd be useless against Iranian missiles, they might be of some limited use against Russian ones. IOW, they were intended as a signal to Russia that the USA would not tolerate any attempts of theirs to extend their sphere of influence back into their "near abroad."
Second, the intention was to divide Europe: the New Europe, with their largely pro-American, pro-Republican leaderships were to be split from Old Europe, who were strongly anti-Republican and at least moderately anti-American. This would strengthen America's hand in Europe, neutralize opposition to it, and prevent the emergence of a coherent European security and foreign policy, i.e., castrate the EU as a player on the global stage.
It didn't work.
Russia responded by making all kinds of low-key mischief for Americans: supporting Ugo Chavez's government in Venezuela, selling him weapons, blocking international action on Iran and North Korea, selling Iran weapons, (almost certainly) selling Hezbollah weapons, selling Syria weapons, and so on and so forth. The Georgian war dispelled any remaining doubts about Russia's ability to direct events in its neighborhood.
With Europe, things didn't go quite as intended either. The "New European" countries did become allies, but their resolve started to falter as Iraq sank into a quagmire. Elections removed the pro-Republican/pro-American governments and replaced them with pro-European/pro-Democrat ones, who were much more ambivalent about the whole project. And "Old Europe" -- especially Germany -- cheerfully built closer bilateral relations with Russia. What Russia lost in influence over Poland and the Czech Republic -- such as it was, i.e., not all that much to start with -- it gained with Germany and France.
So, now the USA decided to scrap the initiative. What does this mean?
First, the upside.
For the USA, this opens the door for turning a genuinely new leaf in USA/Russian relations, which means that, for example, concerted action with regards to Iran or North Korea becomes a real possibility. The proposed alternative to the shield -- missile cruisers stationed in strategically significant seas and oceans -- is technologically much better than the stationary shield of the original plan (although still of limited military value). The "Old European" countries will like this, and will find it easier to cooperate with the USA. NATO is suddenly looking more like a viable alliance, with one major internal point of disagreement removed.
For pro-Europeans in the EU -- East and West --, this is a major win. It's clear that the USA cannot be trusted to extend and maintain special privileges to some EU countries, which means that the remaining sensible option for Poland, Czech, Hungary etc. is a European orientation. This (as well as the problems they're facing because of the financial crisis) will make them much more cooperative members, and opens the door to deepening European integration on the security, foreign policy, and military dimensions. The EU is still a very, very long way from being a global power player in itself, but those who wish to turn it into one have now seen one major obstacle removed -- now, the security and foreign political agendas of all the major EU countries are aligned in most significant ways.
For "Old Europe," this is a clear win. Their line was vindicated, they didn't have to lift a finger about it, and they still have all options open -- pursuing deeper European integration, pursuing closer relations with the USA, or deepening relations with Russia, or all of the above. Their freedom of movement has been significantly improve.d
For Russia, this is a huge win. The USA blinked. The way they see it, the Putin/Medvedev tough line worked. They know they won this round, and they will make sure everyone else notices it too. They are now free to pursue their own agenda in their "near abroad," and the US has precious little to say about it.
Then, the downside.
For "New Europe," this is a loss. Their pro-American bloc has been discredited, they no longer have cards they could play to run an independent line in the EU, and they didn't get anything at all in compensation for going with the (highly unpopular in Old Europe) Bush government. People will be asking why the hell they spilled their blood in Iraq, if the US treats them like that. They'll have to play along with the EU, because they have nowhere else to turn, and are still too weak to stand for themselves.
For the US, the biggest loss is in prestige, with Russia, and with the special relationship they had with the Central Eastern European states. Those cards are now gone, and the American position is significantly worse than it would have been had the whole idea never been floated. On balance, the USA comes out a winner, though: it needs Russian cooperation on Iran, the greater ME, and the DPRK, and with this out of the way, they're in a position to get it. Russia will be more cooperative and will stop actively causing trouble for the US, too, which are also clear gains. But it did come up looking weak, inconsistent, and untrustworthy -- but such are the consequences of reversing any major policy direction, however badly it has failed.
On balance, I feel very good about the decision. It was a damn stupid idea to start with, and had either already failed in, or would have been unable to achieve, any of its objectives -- containing Russia, deterring Iran (or intercepting its missiles), or permanently dividing Europe. The only question, really, was how and when it would be scrapped, and with bad ideas, sooner is usually better.
Second, I believe the geopolitical map looks much better now. One major policy difference has been removed between the USA and Old Europe on one hand, Old Europe and New Europe on another, and between all of the above and Russia. That means that Europe will be strengthened, and cooperation between the US, the EU, and Russia will be a good deal easier.
It would've been better had the whole thing never happened, but scrapping it now is better than scrapping it later.
The missile shield had nothing, really, to do with Iran. ABM's work best the closer they are to the originating point, and they don't work all that well even so. The countries they were supposed to protect never asked for them, and were, in fact, opposed to them. IOW, the reasons for the project were somewhere else.
Specifically, it was intended as a Cold War style gambit against Russia on the one hand, and those European countries that were opposed to the American invasion of Iraq on the other.
Permanent installations such as this would give the host countries strong implicit security guarantees -- and, of course, while they'd be useless against Iranian missiles, they might be of some limited use against Russian ones. IOW, they were intended as a signal to Russia that the USA would not tolerate any attempts of theirs to extend their sphere of influence back into their "near abroad."
Second, the intention was to divide Europe: the New Europe, with their largely pro-American, pro-Republican leaderships were to be split from Old Europe, who were strongly anti-Republican and at least moderately anti-American. This would strengthen America's hand in Europe, neutralize opposition to it, and prevent the emergence of a coherent European security and foreign policy, i.e., castrate the EU as a player on the global stage.
It didn't work.
Russia responded by making all kinds of low-key mischief for Americans: supporting Ugo Chavez's government in Venezuela, selling him weapons, blocking international action on Iran and North Korea, selling Iran weapons, (almost certainly) selling Hezbollah weapons, selling Syria weapons, and so on and so forth. The Georgian war dispelled any remaining doubts about Russia's ability to direct events in its neighborhood.
With Europe, things didn't go quite as intended either. The "New European" countries did become allies, but their resolve started to falter as Iraq sank into a quagmire. Elections removed the pro-Republican/pro-American governments and replaced them with pro-European/pro-Democrat ones, who were much more ambivalent about the whole project. And "Old Europe" -- especially Germany -- cheerfully built closer bilateral relations with Russia. What Russia lost in influence over Poland and the Czech Republic -- such as it was, i.e., not all that much to start with -- it gained with Germany and France.
So, now the USA decided to scrap the initiative. What does this mean?
First, the upside.
For the USA, this opens the door for turning a genuinely new leaf in USA/Russian relations, which means that, for example, concerted action with regards to Iran or North Korea becomes a real possibility. The proposed alternative to the shield -- missile cruisers stationed in strategically significant seas and oceans -- is technologically much better than the stationary shield of the original plan (although still of limited military value). The "Old European" countries will like this, and will find it easier to cooperate with the USA. NATO is suddenly looking more like a viable alliance, with one major internal point of disagreement removed.
For pro-Europeans in the EU -- East and West --, this is a major win. It's clear that the USA cannot be trusted to extend and maintain special privileges to some EU countries, which means that the remaining sensible option for Poland, Czech, Hungary etc. is a European orientation. This (as well as the problems they're facing because of the financial crisis) will make them much more cooperative members, and opens the door to deepening European integration on the security, foreign policy, and military dimensions. The EU is still a very, very long way from being a global power player in itself, but those who wish to turn it into one have now seen one major obstacle removed -- now, the security and foreign political agendas of all the major EU countries are aligned in most significant ways.
For "Old Europe," this is a clear win. Their line was vindicated, they didn't have to lift a finger about it, and they still have all options open -- pursuing deeper European integration, pursuing closer relations with the USA, or deepening relations with Russia, or all of the above. Their freedom of movement has been significantly improve.d
For Russia, this is a huge win. The USA blinked. The way they see it, the Putin/Medvedev tough line worked. They know they won this round, and they will make sure everyone else notices it too. They are now free to pursue their own agenda in their "near abroad," and the US has precious little to say about it.
Then, the downside.
For "New Europe," this is a loss. Their pro-American bloc has been discredited, they no longer have cards they could play to run an independent line in the EU, and they didn't get anything at all in compensation for going with the (highly unpopular in Old Europe) Bush government. People will be asking why the hell they spilled their blood in Iraq, if the US treats them like that. They'll have to play along with the EU, because they have nowhere else to turn, and are still too weak to stand for themselves.
For the US, the biggest loss is in prestige, with Russia, and with the special relationship they had with the Central Eastern European states. Those cards are now gone, and the American position is significantly worse than it would have been had the whole idea never been floated. On balance, the USA comes out a winner, though: it needs Russian cooperation on Iran, the greater ME, and the DPRK, and with this out of the way, they're in a position to get it. Russia will be more cooperative and will stop actively causing trouble for the US, too, which are also clear gains. But it did come up looking weak, inconsistent, and untrustworthy -- but such are the consequences of reversing any major policy direction, however badly it has failed.
On balance, I feel very good about the decision. It was a damn stupid idea to start with, and had either already failed in, or would have been unable to achieve, any of its objectives -- containing Russia, deterring Iran (or intercepting its missiles), or permanently dividing Europe. The only question, really, was how and when it would be scrapped, and with bad ideas, sooner is usually better.
Second, I believe the geopolitical map looks much better now. One major policy difference has been removed between the USA and Old Europe on one hand, Old Europe and New Europe on another, and between all of the above and Russia. That means that Europe will be strengthened, and cooperation between the US, the EU, and Russia will be a good deal easier.
It would've been better had the whole thing never happened, but scrapping it now is better than scrapping it later.
- Joined
- Oct 19, 2006
- Messages
- 8,540