Not sure if this was the attempt I requested to explain the logic or not. If so, I must say I'm not convinced. You mention in another post that the nuclear facilities are "hidden and hardened", so I'm not sure how we're going to detect anything short of a test, at which time it's too late anyway.
Yes, that's exactly my point: there's nothing we can do to prevent them from getting to the point that they have a testable device. Thing is, a testable device is not yet quite a weapon, and you can't make it into one without testing it. Therefore, the idea behind my strategy is to (a) engage with them without preconditions at all levels, and (b) make it clear that all that will stop if we find indisputable evidence that they are pursuing a weapon -- e.g. a nuclear test.
IOW, we would make doing that test as costly for them as we possibly can, and *not* doing that test as beneficial as we possibly can.
Let's not even go into confirming less visible things which I'd assume we'd want to control, such as biologicals, human rights violations, or terrorist funding. Without a smoking gun (non-smoking guns don't qualify in Euro circles, mind you), you'll never be able to motivate the entire world to do your DPRK-esque embargo (see events leading up to Iraq). You've got no hammer for Dagger Velvet to swing. Which means you gave away the farm, lost a couple years, and ended up in worse shape than when you started.
Again, you're pretty much restating my argument right back at me. Hard, concerted action -- North Korean style sanctions, Rith's military strike, whatever -- is only feasible if there is a smoking gun. That's why saber-rattling beforehand is doubly pointless.
Honestly, I want someone to explain this to me. It doesn't have to be PJ, either, although he's certainly eligible. I'm not the sharpest knife in the drawer, but there's a lot of folks subscribing to logic that appears to me to be obviously and fatally flawed. Seriously, I need some help on this one, folks.
Well, I tried, but apparently I failed. You seem to have entirely missed the whole idea behind my strategic reasoning, though, so here it is again, slightly simplified:
(1) Premise: There's nothing we can do to force Iran to abandon their nuclear weapons program if they really want to do so.
(2) Premise: Hard, concerted, international action -- DPRK style sanctions or a military strike -- is only possible if there's a smoking gun, such as an actual nuclear test.
(3) Premise: Iran wants to engage with the world, politically, economically, and culturally.
(4) Strategic goal: Prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear test threshold.
(5) Policy: Give Iran maximal incentives not to do the test, and maximal disincentives to do it.
(6) Proposed action: Engage with Iran politically, economically, and culturally, in ways that give them immediate, tangible benefits for the engagement. We don't even have to tell them this will be replaced with DPRK-style sanctions and a possible military strike if they do test a nuclear device.
(7) Proposed action: Simultaneously, work to defuse tensions in the entire region, to reduce their need for a nuclear deterrent.
(8) Proposed action: Add further carrots to entice them to agree to a more stringent inspection regime, which would further retard their progress towards a nuclear weapon.
(9) Proposed action: Attempt to get Israel to scale down or, if possible, entirely dismantle its nuclear deterrent, e.g. by explicit guarantees by a third party (e.g. the USA).
I believe this strategy is likely to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear test threshold unless tensions in the region escalate much further than they are even now. People do respond to incentives, you know -- and the more they have to lose, the more leverage we have over them.
Oh, and, I believe the other things you listed -- human rights, sponsorship of terrorism and what not -- must take a back seat to the nuclear issue. In any case, at least the ones bothering us (e.g. sponsorship of terrorism) will resolve themselves should tensions in the region be brought down.
