Middle East news (really M.E.!)

[Pladio]

"But... it's... completely... DIFFERENT!" Yep-o, I somehow knew that would be coming.

You brought it upon yourself

Anyway, what do you suggest? Not do the exchange, even if that means that the low-key conflict will drag on, and tens, hundreds, thousands more will die? There's nothing moral about that; it's just sanctimonious.

The first priority must be to find a solution breaks the tit-for-tat cycle of killing that's been going on there since the 1930's or so. The second priority is to stabilize it so it won't start again. And a very distant third is punishing the guilty. In no case must the third priority endanger the other two. This means that necessarily a lot of murderers will go free; some may even have parades thrown for them, win Nobel peace prizes, or have airports named after them. But if that's what it takes to stop the bloodshed, it's a price worth paying. The alternative is simply a never-ending cycle of vengeance.

I agree with you. I still think he's a murderer and terrorist and releasing him is a crime against humanity.
I also don't believe this will really lead to peace, especially considering what Hezbollah did in Lebanon a few months ago. Also considering that this deal will probably be an incentive for more kidnappings and killings by those terrorist groups in and around Israel.
Hezbollah is also currently rearming since last war.

So, in theory I'd agree with you, but in practice I don't.
Of course, we'll see though. Maybe you're right. Hopefully you are.
Let's all pray to whatever gods we believe in that peace shall come soon.

 

[dteowner]

The first priority must be to find a solution breaks the tit-for-tat cycle of killing that's been going on there since the 1930's or so. The second priority is to stabilize it so it won't start again. And a very distant third is punishing the guilty. In no case must the third priority endanger the other two. This means that necessarily a lot of murderers will go free; some may even have parades thrown for them, win Nobel peace prizes, or have airports named after them. But if that's what it takes to stop the bloodshed, it's a price worth paying. The alternative is simply a never-ending cycle of vengeance.

I find myself in the rare position of agreeing with you nearly completely. I'm not sure a solution exists to break that cycle, though. Could priority 3 be a vehicle toward that goal, though? Imagine the instant legitimacy they'd gain if Hezbollah very publicly stated they were changing their ways and put Qantar on trial to prove it. It's not like the guy's more than a symbolic pawn now anyway. Imagine the instant overwhelming pressure on Israel to match that gesture. You'd have to have some seriously dynamic leaders for both sides not to be strung up by their own followers, but hey...

I know, it's more likely I'll ride a unicorn down Main Street of the Bustling Metropolis and find a pot of gold at the end of a rainbow out front of the courthouse AND I won't have to pay taxes on it. I know, I know, you were willing to believe until the "taxes" part.

 

[Prime Junta]

I also don't believe this will really lead to peace, especially considering what Hezbollah did in Lebanon a few months ago. Also considering that this deal will probably be an incentive for more kidnappings and killings by those terrorist groups in and around Israel.

Peace is certainly a long way off. However, I think that the prisoner exchange as well as the other recent developments make peace less unlikely than it has been for decades. I don't know what can or will bring peace to the region, but I do know that it won't happen without things like this prisoner exchange.

Re the Hezb in Lebanon, their position -- both military and political -- has changed completely since 2006, due to Damascus breaking with Teheran, and due to the fact that they spent their political capital in Lebanon in that mini-war this spring. I wrote at length about this in threads on this forum during and after that conflict, so I won't bother going into it again, other than to note that their freedom of movement is much more constrained now than it was then.

Re incentives to kidnapping and killing: the 2006 war served as an extremely powerful disincentive for Hezbollah to do that. What's more, since Israel no longer holds any Hezb prisoners, they no longer have any pressing reason to do so. I would be extremely surprised should they do a damn-fool thing like that now. This may encourage Hamas, though, since they have much less to lose, but OTOH their operational capacity is much more limited, and I have a feeling they're already doing their damnedest to kidnap any Tsahal soldiers they can.

Hezbollah is also currently rearming since last war.

If you were in their shoes, wouldn't you be doing that too?

So, in theory I'd agree with you, but in practice I don't.
Of course, we'll see though. Maybe you're right. Hopefully you are.
Let's all pray to whatever gods we believe in that peace shall come soon.

I could say the same. In a perfect world, terrorists like Qantar would be put on trial, get sentenced, and do their time (or get that short drop with the quick stop). But the world isn't perfect. If there is to be peace, it will mean that Hariri's assassins will go scot-free, as will Qantar, as will any number of other stone killers on all sides of the conflicts.

And finally, just to make this clear -- I'm still not very optimistic about the prospects for peace in the region; there have been way too many false dawns before, and they've always come to nothing. I do believe that we have to keep trying, though, and while peace may not be possible even with stuff like this, it certainly won't be possible without it. Give the choice between certain war and an uncertain possibility of peace, I'll take the latter.

 

[Prime Junta]

I find myself in the rare position of agreeing with you nearly completely. I'm not sure a solution exists to break that cycle, though. Could priority 3 be a vehicle toward that goal, though? Imagine the instant legitimacy they'd gain if Hezbollah very publicly stated they were changing their ways and put Qantar on trial to prove it. It's not like the guy's more than a symbolic pawn now anyway. Imagine the instant overwhelming pressure on Israel to match that gesture. You'd have to have some seriously dynamic leaders for both sides not to be strung up by their own followers, but hey...

The problem is that the movement wouldn't survive a move like that. It's conceivable that there are people in the Hezb leadership who would be willing to do that, but if they tried, the militant wing would split off from it... and they're the ones that have the guns. Hezbollah is just as loyal to their own as Israel is -- they will never betray one of their fighters, especially one that's been sitting in an Israeli jail, no matter what he's done.

What's more, many of the people in the Hezb leadership aren't any cleaner than Qantar is. Many of them are simply gangsters who got religion. If he was given a fair trial, a huge amount of dirt on them would come up, which would erode the legitimacy of the movement far more than the gesture would strengthen it.

IOW, it's a nice thought, but it won't fly -- any more than the fairy-tale of justice and fairness winning out in the end. The best we can hope for is that the Hezb fighters are given nice new uniforms with a cedar tree on the sleeve, rather than the yellow flag with the green rifle. If we got that far, things would already look a lot better.

 

[Pladio]

Re incentives to kidnapping and killing: the 2006 war served as an extremely powerful disincentive for Hezbollah to do that. What's more, since Israel no longer holds any Hezb prisoners, they no longer have any pressing reason to do so. I would be extremely surprised should they do a damn-fool thing like that now. This may encourage Hamas, though, since they have much less to lose, but OTOH their operational capacity is much more limited, and I have a feeling they're already doing their damnedest to kidnap any Tsahal soldiers they can.

I was talking about every other group, hezb is an exception to this because of the situation. Hamas and other groups will learn that kidnapping and killing gives them militants back alive and kicking.

If you were in their shoes, wouldn't you be doing that too?

Yup, my point was that they're not going for peace, they're going for war.

I could say the same. In a perfect world, terrorists like Qantar would be put on trial, get sentenced, and do their time (or get that short drop with the quick stop). But the world isn't perfect. If there is to be peace, it will mean that Hariri's assassins will go scot-free, as will Qantar, as will any number of other stone killers on all sides of the conflicts.

You could, but my question is: Will letting them off the hook bring peace (as in being a step towards it like you're suggesting)? Or will it instead incite more violence and kidnappings from other terror groups who now believe that kidnapping and killing is rewarding?

 

[Prime Junta]

I was talking about every other group, hezb is an exception to this because of the situation. Hamas and other groups will learn that kidnapping and killing gives them militants back alive and kicking.

Um... were you under the impression that this is the first prisoner exchange of this type?

Yup, my point was that they're not going for peace, they're going for war.

They're _arming_ for war. That's the only sane thing to do in their position. It doesn't mean that war is their first option. Without a realistic capacity to wage it, they won't have any bargaining power at all. You cannot judge anything at all about their intentions from the simple fact that they're rearming. They're certainly ready to fight if they need to, but they're also quite conscious of the costs of fighting -- and that cost is very high.

You could, but my question is: Will letting them off the hook bring peace (as in being a step towards it like you're suggesting)? Or will it instead incite more violence and kidnappings from other terror groups who now believe that kidnapping and killing is rewarding?

It's certainly a step towards peace on the Israeli/Hezbollah/Lebanese front. You could argue that it has the opposite effect on the Israeli/Hamas front -- but that only if you believe, against the evidence, that Hamas hasn't kidnapped any more soldiers lately due to lack of incentives rather than lack of capability.

Furthermore, I believe the following things:

(1) There is no single, universal, global magic solution that will resolve all of the Middle Eastern conflicts at a stroke. You have to tackle them one by one.
(2) The least intractable of the conflicts is the Israeli-Syrian one. The Israeli-Hezbollah-Lebanese one is next, and it's connected to it.
(3) If one of the conflicts is resolved peacefully, it will create a precedent that may make it easier to resolve any of the other ones. This could create a momentum for peace -- a true peace process, rather than the fake one that's been going on since Oslo -- that might, over time, result in peaceful resolution of all or most of the conflicts in the region.

So, to answer your question, yes, I do believe that this exchange makes peace more rather than less likely on balance. There are certainly negatives, but I believe the positives outweigh them.

 

[dteowner]

Sounds like my idea was truly a flight of fantasy, since it looks like Qantar's situation is going the other direction completely.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/20080720/wl_mcclatchy/2996428

Seems to me this prisoner exchange has turned into a major step back with no sign of "2 steps forward" on the horizon. Thoughts?

 

[Pladio]

Wait and see was what PJ suggested. I think that's what we need to do for now. If this can lead to peace I'm for it. I'm pessimistic about it though and believe Kuntar will probably die in a mysterious car explosion...

 

[Prime Junta]

Sounds like my idea was truly a flight of fantasy, since it looks like Qantar's situation is going the other direction completely.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/20080720/wl_mcclatchy/2996428

Seems to me this prisoner exchange has turned into a major step back with no sign of "2 steps forward" on the horizon. Thoughts?

First off, that article had a slant like the north face of Mount Everest, so don't take it at face value.

Second, some things to keep in mind:

(1) Qantar is, and will remain, a hero to about half the Lebanese population, and to very many disaffected young men around the Arab world in general. There is no way to change that.

(2) The Lebanese government, "pro-Western" or not, has been extremely weak ever since the PLO set up shop in Beirut. This can only change if there are major structural shifts within Lebanese society, which will take at least a generation or two, if they're ever to happen.

(3) The best-case scenario that the "pro-Westerners" are currently shooting for is something like this:

(a) Avoid another war. There are at least four of them that they're trying to avoid. This is a very delicate balancing act, because doing something to avoid one may well make another more likely.

(b) Integrate the Hezbollah into the polity, in some way or another. Specifically, they're looking to merge the Hezb army into the Lebanese one, and to bring the Hezb social and public services somehow under the Lebanese national umbrella. Following that, there could be substantive changes in small areas -- allowing Lebanese police and, say, street-sweepers access to Hezb-controlled areas, bringing a part of the Hezb's budget into the national one, and so on.

The Qantar thing should be seen against this background. The Lebanese government has clearly taken the line that they're willing to make all the symbolic gestures the Hezbollah can ever ask for -- celebrating their martyrs, hanging up posters at the airport, giving the red-carpet treatment to Qantar, whatever -- in order to make progress on substantive issues easier.

I have no idea whether this will actually work, but it will certainly have some effect among the Hezb's base. If it's sustained, it might.

Finally, re Lebanese-Israeli peace talks: the problem as it currently stands is that there's nobody there who's in a position to negotiate. The Lebanese state's differences with Israel are pretty trivial; the problem is the Israel/Hezbollah angle. In order to have a meaningful peace accord, the Hezb will have to be a party to it. The Lebanese government is still way too young and way too precarious to do anything at all about that; they haven't even come up with a program yet. If there is a Syrian/Israeli peace, I'm pret-ty certain that a Lebanese-Israeli one will follow -- always assuming that the Lebanese government manages to not fall apart, and that the Hezb stay in it.

IOW, "wait and see" is the way to go. Like it or not, the Hezb is there to stay: if you want peace in the region, the only way to go is to try to integrate it with the Lebanese state. Now they have a seat at the Lebanese national table. They have no experience governing a country, and will certainly make mistakes.

Beyond that, it's impossible to say what line they will take. I'm hoping they'll see sense and opt for integration with the Lebanese state and peace with Israel. That's by no means a given, but seeing the Lebanese government "embrace the resistance" is a step in that direction.

I would not expect to see any further progress on the Lebanese/Israeli front until (if) there is a peace treaty between Israel and Syria. Until then, the best we can hope for is a somewhat functional Lebanese government with the Hezb in it, and no more shooting or provocations from any of the parties. If we're lucky, there will be such a treaty within the next 12-24 months, and if we're _really_ lucky, the Hezb will have gotten some experience at governing by then, and will be ready to put their imprimatur on a Lebanese/Israeli peace treaty.

Summa summarum, the Middle East can turn on a dime -- but generally wars break out a great deal more quickly than peace. So let's be patient and see where things go from here on out -- and, most especially, let's not get too caught up in flamboyant symbolic gestures of any stripe.

 

[dteowner]

Thanks for the analysis. Perhaps I'm putting too much stock in the power of symbols (good and bad), but it seems that the direction that Qantar is being used would be gasoline-soaked tinder. There's enough nutjobs with a vested interest in continued conflict on both sides of the fence that running Qantar up the symbolic flagpole would have to be considered dangerous provocation.

 

[Prime Junta]

It certainly won't raise the stock of the Lebanese government in Israel or the West -- but, then again, that's not really that important: Israel and the West know well enough that any alternative to the Lebanese government will be much worse. If it is to succeed, it has to raise its stock among Lebanese Shi'ites, and that's what this is all about. Expect to see more of this sort of thing over the next year or so.

The Lebanese government's problem is precisely that it's (largely but not completely unjustly) seen as the lapdog of the French and the Americans. If it's to become credible enough to give the country any semblance of unity, not to mention credible enough to be able to sign a peace treaty, it'll have to do some serious chest-thumping first. As long as that's all that it does, there won't be a problem. That isn't to say that it won't do something rock-stupid and substantive, which would be a problem.

But the first thing to do when looking at stuff in the Middle East is to ask "is this theater, or is this substantive?" Generally speaking, theater is harmless (and there's a lot of it); substantive things are usually low-key but they matter.

 

[dteowner]

I guess I don't trust the Israelis to ignore the grandstanding, and I'd be giving the Lebanese 2 minutes in the penalty box for unsportsmanlike conduct.

 

[Prime Junta]

As long as they just respond with some grandstanding of their own, there's no real problem. I doubt they'll stage bombing raids just because of this; they're all too well aware what's at stake here. As long as they stick to chest-thumping, this ought to blow over in a month or two.

When's the last time someone conducted themselves like a sportsman (either as a winner or a loser) in world politics anyway? Come to think of it, when's the last time a sportsman conducted himself as a sportsman?

 

[magerette]

This is a very sketchy short article from the Jerusalem Post--can anyone fill me in?

Iranian Cleric Blasts Ahmadinejad

I can't tell if he's blasting him for domestic incompetence, ignoring the UN, being too pro-West or too pro-nuclear or just a generally wanker.

(Thanks in advance--I had to wade through a sea of dattaswami threads to find this one.)

 

[Prime Junta]

Ok, I'll try.

Here's the short version:

"Nancy Pelosi attacks President George W. Bush on the economy. Film at eleven."

Here's the longer one:

By neighborhood standards, Iran has relatively broad political freedoms. I'd say it's about halfway between a genuinely free society and your typical authoritarian Saddam/Bashar/Mubarak/Saudi style place, where political discourse happens in private and the opposition is underground, in jail, or under house arrest. So a lot of political discourse there is out in the open. It's very hard to tell what it means unless you know more about the people concerned.

There are several independent power centers, with a variety of motivations, bases of support, and ideologies. These include at least the following:

1. The "old-style revolutionary conservatives." These are the ideological successors of Ayatollah Khomeini. The current boss, Ayatollah Khamene'i, is one of them. They control the Council of Advisors -- the ultimate authority in the country. They want a country that's governed by Islamic law, and they like the position of the Council of Advisors just fine, thank you very much. They're not opposed in principle to rapprochement with the West or their neighbors, but in practice their unyielding position on Israel sorta makes this rather difficult. (My take: given a chance, it's a possibility this group could become something "we can do business with," as Thatcher put it -- they're not stupid, they're not rabid fanatics, and they're relatively realistic.)
2. The "new-style populist-nationalist-Islamists." Ahmadinejad is their front guy. The support base is disaffected urban youth, of which Iran is in no short supply. They want Iran to dominate the region, and are opposed in every way to being friends with anyone, except on their terms, and they're very big on stuff like public morality (keeping the women covered, that sort of thing). These guys are kinda nasty.
3. The Revolutionary Guard. This is a state within a state: they're their own army, they run their own industries, and they control lots of choke points in the economy. They're ideologically close to the new-style populists, but they're also very concerned about maintaining their privileged position in society. They prefer to work in the background, though, partly because they're so very strong. I would suspect they're rather corrupt.
4. The "Reformers." The West's great missed chance on Iran, Mohammed Khatami, is one of their leaders. They're clerics who want "Islamism with a human face." They'd like to see Iran become a more open society with more or less normal relations with the rest of the world. I would suspect that many of them secretly admire Turkey's Tayyip Erdogan. Their base of support is one part of the clergy, plus much of the educated youth and the small middle class. Unfortunately, they had their shot at power when Khatami was president, but the West totally snubbed him, after which the old-style conservatives and new-style populists booted him out of power. I'd very much like to see them succeed, but I don't hold out much hope.

So, without knowing much about the individual concerned, this looks like a Reformist cleric blasting Ahmadinejad. That sort of thing happens in Iran all the time. It doesn't, in and of itself, mean anything in particular. If he was joined by voices from the Conservative establishment, there would be something interesting going on. I don't know why this particular instance made it to JPost; perhaps it does mean something, or perhaps the reporter just wanted something to show that Ahmadinejad isn't all that popular really.

 

[Pladio]

I thought Ahmadinejad wasn't so popular except for in his group ... By this I mean, the conservatives tolerate him because he's against Israel, but they don't particularly like him. He doesn't make problems for the Guard, so they don't care too much and if it's only the last group which is against him then he's in a good position. But all in all, I thought they didn't really like him.

 

[Prime Junta]

That's true; he got elected largely because (1) his group is a pretty big one, and (2) the other big group, namely the folks supporting the Reformists, were seriously discouraged by the failure of Khatami's policies to deliver anything substantial to them on the one hand, and by the old-style conservatives' moves to purge the candidate lists of most serious reformist candidates. The trouble is that the old-style conservatives don't really have a mass constituency, and the reformists have been more or less marginalized since Ahmadinejad got into power.

I do think he has some kind of understanding with the Guard that goes beyond simple tolerance; however, I think he needs the Guard more than the Guard needs him. There have been signs that the old-style conservatives have been losing patience with him lately.

But unfortunately I don't know Iran nearly as well as I would like; I've been gradually reading up on it though, so perhaps I'll be able to offer better insight in a few more weeks or months.

 

[magerette]

Thanks very much, Prime J. You have a great deal more insight into the situation than I do, or than was displayed in that article, which was taking way too much for granted in its reporting, and I appreciate the time taken to clearly explain the various factions. That fleeting reference (in the JP) to the Republican Guard told me nothing.

Now that I'm armed with a few more facts, I'm wondering if this isn't just some pre-election bruhaha from the opposition, perhaps laying the groundwork for their stance in 2009.

 

[Pladio]

Maybe here's the other group going against him...

Iranian conservative attacks president on economy

TEHRAN, Iran - A top conservative cleric close to Iran's supreme leader criticized the economic policies of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, saying they threaten to keep Iran from its goal of becoming a regional superpower by 2025.

He probably needs to get some real support from the conservatives to win the elections....
What do you think ?

 

[magerette]

I find this little bit of lockstep between the Republican party in office and the Republican party in waiting disturbing, not so much for the reasons behind the decision, but for the joined at the hip philosophy--that our official foreign policy is now filtered through election politics:

Politics Scuttle Diplomatic Plan in Iran

It basically says Bush has changed his mind about pursuing negotiations with Iran primarily because of it's perceived effect on the McCain campaign, so this becomes another radioactive egg for the next administration's basket.

If there's a way to show the world our current lack of coherent leadership, Bush seems to have a supreme talent for finding it.

Or I could be biased, of course,